Abu Risha Sends a Stern Message to Kurdish Leaders

From Iraq the Model.

The chief of the Awakening Councils in Iraq Ahmed Abu Risha told the press that it was not unlikely to form an alliance with PM Nouri al-Maliki in the future because Maliki “presented a national project that transcends ethnic and sectarian lines that strengthens Iraq’s unity”. When asked about Iran, Abu Risha called Iran’s role in Iraq “worrisome” and that “facing this [intervention] requires that Iraqis adhere to their choice of national independence and reject interference in their internal affairs”.

It seems that Maliki may be able to draw a major Sunni party into his new government. If true, his dependence on Sadr is significantly less important.

To read the complete article, click here.

Sadr Front calls to halt resistance in cities of withdrawal

From Alsumaria.

In a statement read out by Al Sadr Front spokesman Salah Al Ubaidi, the front called on followers to halt resistance in Iraqi cities and villages from which US troops have pulled out.

If Coalition Forces have pulled out of all cites, then does that mean they will stop all resistance. I guess, we will see.

Armed groups cross into Iraq for attacks

From Alsumaria.

Dhi Qar police chief Sabah Al Fitlawi affirmed that extremist armed groups that have trained in Iran have entered the country the last past days in aim to execute bombings targeting senior officials. Al Fitlawi noted that these special groups which include each 10 militants have crossed the borders from Iran into Amara City. He asserted that these forces are targeted against officials around Iraq mainly in Al Nassiriya. He clarified that local authorities have intensified security measures and banned circulation of motorcycles.

This action from Iran will be a good test for Iraqi Security and Coalition Forces' ability to track down these Special Group militants and detain/kill them. PM Maliki's recent surges in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City effectively defeated Special Groups in Iraq causing them to either die in battle, disperse and go to ground, or retreat back to Iran.

Iran has been training Special Groups in an attempt to re-establish their influence within Iran. From this article it appears the training is complete (of at least the first group) and Iran is wanting to re-establish their influence as quickly as possible.

A couple of points here are worth mentioning.

1. Al Qaeda was defeated in Iraq due to its extremism and attacking the population it initially supported. These two factors resulted combined with the surge of American forces to provide seucrity for the population resulted in its loss of tacit support and therefore its unassailable base among the population. The same can be said for Sadr's militia and Special Groups. While initially providing essential services for the population, these entities quickly showed their extremism and attacked the very population which was protecting them resulting, over time, in their loss of popular or tacit support thereby losing their unassailable base leading to their downfall.

2. The capability of the Iraqi Security Forces allows it to protect the population now. Can it defend the country from external major combat operations? No, but it can protect the population from externally led insurgencies and has ties to several people who inform on militants. This fact is how they were able to diminish and almost eliminate Iranian influence in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City.

3. The Iraqi government is providing essential services now to most Iraqis. While limited, projects are underway for better and more efficient services. Commerce is beginning to take hold in the country, not only in Baghdad, but also in smaller townships. While significant problems still exist, they are being resolved slowly but surely.

4. The recent violence is still fresh in many Iraqis minds. They do not want to return to violent extremism of 2006. Special Groups coming into communities will not be welcomed and I predict will be informed upon. Expect to see ISOF operations in the near future taking down these groups once they attempt to establish a base of operations from which to launch attacks.

5. These Special Groups may get one or more attacks off. If they do, the possible renewed violence will have many groups informing on these Special Groups further limiting their ability to carry out future attacks.

Iran needs to quit these forms of operations as it will only hurt their political and economic impact they could have within Iraq. Iran is still trying to stir up insurrection to keep the US military consumed in Iraq. However, the game has changed and Iraq is moving from a war to nation building. Iran's attempt to bring back a state of war will fail as ISF capacity is now too great to allow large scale open warfare by an insurgency. In addition, Coalition force numbers are still too great to allow this to happen.

There are many within Iraq who would favor much Iranian influence in Iraq; however, not by an insurgency or Special Groups. Iran's major influence in Iraq right now could be political. Trying to re-establish an insurgency will only hurt their political efforts.

The Hezbollah model used in Lebanon will not work in Iraq as Iraq has a robust provincial and tribal influence which makes it down to the normal Iraqi and provides for the tribe. Unlike Lebanon, reconciliation in Iraq started from the bottom up vice the top down. The only places where this model had hopes of florishing were Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City. All of these places and their inhabitants are now better off without Iranian Special Group influence and the people know it. Commerce quickly came back to Basra and Sadr City once Special Groups were contained/defeated. In additon, oil wealth is making it down to these groups already. This fact will only become more and more evident as essential services become more and more robust.

Attacks will also not work as they will only spur popular dissent against these groups.

Iran's best bet at this time is to attempt to influence the government. Unfortunately, its major power brokers in this realm is Sadr and his political members who are walking on egg shells at this time as they have lost popular support especially in Basra, Maysan, and Sadr City. Also unfortunately, Sistani, the revered spiritual leader in Iraq, is very much against a theocracy and has stayed out of polititics as the country develops its democratic ways.

Given its goal of maintaining an isurgency to keep the US tied down, Iran has no other good choice, in the near term, except to bring in Special Groups to continue or promote an bloodshed. While it may get off a spectacular attack, I predict this project will fail miserably as Iraqis are tired of war, are finally experiencing what a free, democratic society can do for them, and are quite frankly liking it.

Once this project fails, Iran will continue to train Sadr and wait for Sistani's death in the hope that they can re-introduce Sadr as an Ayatollah. However, by that time, democracy should be so ingrained in Iraq that this religious influence will be seen as an infringement of democratic rights. That is why Sistani is allowing this democracy to learn and grow without religious influence right now. He understands that while a democracy will keep the church and state separate, a strong democracy can lead to a strong conservative religious movement which can benefit from the power of the secular state.

This fact is lost on leadership of Iran which has a strong religious totalitarian state which must suppress its people to maintain control. However, it is not lost on its people who will shortly see that crossing over the border to Iraq will allow for democratic freedoms they have been lacking for almost 30 years. This fact is what Iran truly fears most. It is a fact which all totalitarian states in the region fear most, and it is why all these states allowed members from their soil enter Iraq to attempt to destroy the young democracy.

For its part, the US must maintain a strong presence in Iraq until successful handover of power from pronvincial and national elections. At that point, the democracy in Iraq will be unstoppable for Iraqis have given what is needed to allow for a successful democracy to persist and flourish. Namely, they have given their blood. The current generation will not soon forget this very gruesome fact.

The Ultimate Sadrist Spin

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Muqtada al-Sadr throws down his arms at Maliki’s feat in the last act of his months-old saga of surrender; he officially disbands the Mahdi Army to everyone’s disbelief, including mine,

Mr. Kazimi continues,

I read Sadr’s directive yesterday: I have to admit that at first I dismissed it as a forgery, seeing that it appeared on an anti-Sadrist website that had peddled forged statements attributed to Sadr in the past. Not only was the wording weird and disjointed, but Sadr actually demobilizes the Mahdi Army, going far beyond “freezing” its activities as he did twice in the past year. He limits “resistance” to a “group that shall be authorized to do so by us in writing soon” and that they alone were the ones allowed to carry arms. Everyone else must turn pacifist.

This piece is very interesting. Beginning in March, PM Maliki began going after the Mahdi Army and Special Groups. He had success in Basrah and later repeated that success in Sadr City. Now Sadr is disbanding the Mahdi Army while Iraqi Army forces are going after his and Iranian elements in Maysan.

PM Maliki is also using the Iraqi Army against the last remaining remnants of Al Qaeda in Mosul.

Having just returned from Iraq recently, I can honestly say it is quite different from a few years ago. But more about that later.

For a full read, click here.

Cat’s Out of the Bag: Onwards to Maysan

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Well I guess enough people are openly discussing this now in Baghdad that it’s okay for me to write about it. Mind you, all the following is classified under the category of gossip: The Iraqi Army and the Marines are preparing for a major campaign against Mahdi Army and Iranian targets in Maysan Province (‘Amara). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may even put the entire elected leadership of ‘Amara—many of whom are Sadrists—out of a job, by flexing his authority under emergency powers. There is even talk of air strikes against military targets—weapons depots, transportation vehicles and individuals—on the Iranian side of the fence; these are targets that are arming and otherwise supporting the Special Groups throughout Iraq.

The Maysan Province is home to the major ratline of supplies from Iran. It is also home to many Iranian agents inside of Iraq. As such, Mr. Kazimi states,

I expect the battle for Maysan to be difficult: this would be Iran’s last stand in Iraq. The fighting would also be occurring on topographical and human terrain that the Iranians have been studying and cultivating for decades. It could start incrementally, and the ante could be raised as the operation faces increased resistance, eventually leading to bombing runs inside Iran.

The province is worth watching. If a battle occurs in this region, it will mark the formal end of all friendly relations between Iraq and Iran and will fully test PM Maliki and his Security Forces.

For a full read, click here.

Red Herring Fatwas

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

So what happens if the western media can’t spin or sensationalize events in Iraq when not much is happening? Why, they make it up! The Associated Press put out a wire report yesterday hinting that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani is about to declare jihad against the Americans. Whhhhhaaaaaat???

Mr Kazimi goes on to show how the AP misinterpreted Sistani's statements. Even more telling is this remark.

So let me pull rank here and tell you all that I’ve met Sistani. In fact, I sat in on an hours-long conversation between Sistani, his eldest son who runs his father’s daily affairs, Adil Abdul-Mahdi (Iraq’s current Vice-President) and Ahmad Chalabi. This happened in the early spring of 2004. It was an illuminating discussion that delved into law-making, the role of Islam, history, international relations and of course, gossip.

An interesting read indeed.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Troops Welcomed In Sadr City

From the Washington Post.

Iraqi soldiers moved unhindered through Baghdad's vast Sadr City district on Wednesday as Shiite militiamen who have long controlled the area faded from view and schools and businesses began to reopen after weeks of strife. The Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is pursuing an increasingly successful effort to contain the militias of his Shiite rivals and to exercise authority over areas where Iraqi forces were once unwelcome. The strategy has won Maliki admiration from Sunni politicians and from U.S. and British officials, who credit him with exerting some of the political will necessary to achieve reconciliation.

Residents of Sadr City not only welcomed Iraqi Troops but gave them flowers and Korans. Iraqi troops have greatly increased in capacity in the last year thanks to the surge of US forces in the country. What does one Iraqi Soldier think?

Sayah said he was relieved that U.S. troops were not playing a central role in the operation, which would have provoked the militias. He said U.S. forces should leave Iraq. "I think it's time," he said. "The Iraqi army has proven itself."

Almost one year after the official start of the surge of US forces, the Iraqi Army now has the capacity to move into militia onclaves in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul. Iraqi forces are now controlling their country. Al Qaeda is for all practical purposes defeated. Sadr's militia is standing down. Those elements which rise up against Iraqi forces are quickly killed or detained.

I agree with Sayah. I would now be appropriate to begin contemplating a slow and methodical withdraw of US forces from Iraq as capacity of Iraqi forces increases. Notice I did not say a withdraw of US forces should begin right now. But now, the US military is in a position to begin transitioning security more and more to Iraqi forces. As Iraqi forces prove they can maintain the peace in their country, US forces should begin to come home and not be replaced.

If we would have withdrawn one short year ago, trust in US forces in the Middle East would have been severely shakened. Now, one year later, having defeated Al Qaeda in Iraq and subdued Sadr's militia, US forces can begin a methodical withdraw knowing that the blood of over 4000 Soldiers has not been in vain. A vibrant democracy is taking hold in Iraq which is protected by a strong, robust Iraqi military.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqis begin to "despise" the Mahdi Army in Baghdad's Rusafa district

From Bill Ardolino at The Long War Journal filing the story from Baghdad, Iraq after interviewing locals in Rusafa. Citizens are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army and towards Iraqi Security Forces. One of several similar quotes:

“Originally the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army) in our area used to deceive people by using the name of the religion to do their purposes,” said Dhia, Hassan’s executive officer. “They were all corrupted. They have history in crime, robberies, murders, rapes and all kinds of bad things. They even reached the level of kidnapping people and demanding ransoms just because they have money. It didn’t matter if he is Shia or Sunni; just because he has money. They gave a bad reputation for Islam.”

From another Iraqi:

“Right now because of the fighting Sadr City, people have started to despise [the Mahdi Army] because of the situation they created,” said “Rammie,” an Army interpreter raised and living in Rusafa. “People have started to know the truth of [the Mahdi Army] as kidnappers, killers, car-jackers and agents of the Iranian government. But the recent fighting against the [Iraqi security forces] means they are also against the government. They are not trying to just fight the invasion forces as they claim, but they fight whoever interferes with their mafia activity.”

These are two key points why the Mahdi Army is suffering from lack of recruits. Their actions are against Islam and against the democratic government. Another quote shows distrust for Sadr's forces due to Iranian connections. These are all fissures which ISF and GOI elements should use to decrease Sadr's influence in Iraq.

For a full read, click here.

Command and control center of armed militias in Sadr city bombed, destroyed

From KUNA.

The U.S. army in Iraq reported on Saturday that its troops and Iraqi forces bombed and destroyed today a centre for the leadership of the armed militias in Sadr City, north-east of the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

Doesn't sound like the Mahdi Army is fairing very well in Sadr City.

For a full read, click here.

Are Sadr and al-Qaeda Teaming Up in Iraq?

From Omar Fadhil.

A few days ago, there were two suspiciously coordinated statements emerging from Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr made open-war threats followed immediately by a similar threat from al-Qaeda. As they say, there is usually no smoke without fire.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi forces see victory in Basra

From Times Online.

Iraqi soldiers are standing proud in Basra one month after launching a surprise offensive to wipe out murderous gangs of Shia militants that had been allowed to flourish under Britain’s watch. Many of them say the operation has boosted their confidence, but the militiamen warn that the only reason the fledgling Iraqi army had any success was because they continue to observe a ceasefire order by the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

This article is posted by Deborah Haynes from Basra. Yes, Basra. To prove it, one of the photos shows here sitting on a tank, specifically a T-55 Tank.

So, what is the significance of a T-55 Tank? The Iraqi Army only owns T-72s. So, where did the T-55 come from? Must be Sadr. This begs the question of where did Sadr get it? Interesting to say the least.....

For a full read, click here.

One month after the launch of Operation Cavalry Charge...

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Deborah Haynes of the The Times becomes the first western journalist to see the situation in Basra with her own eyes, exactly one month to the day since the launch of Operation Cavalry Charge. She is taken along on a tour of Hayyaniya of all places by Gen. Fraiji, who's been described by some anonymous British military sources in earlier media reports as a "dangerous lunatic"; oddly enough, he doesn't come off that way in Haynes' piece. Haynes paints the picture of a city that has undergone dramatic changes for the better.

So, Basra is not the debacle all western journalists have been reporting. In fact, it appears to have been a resounding success. Mr. Kazimi also point out something else which is quite interesting.

Radio Dijla is reporting that the Emiratis have handed over Ismail al-Wa'ili, the brother of Basra's governor, who is wanted by an Iraqi arrest warrant on charges of oil smuggling and other criminal activity. I had heard that he was hiding in Kuwait rather than Dubai ever since Operation Cavalry Charge began. The story of the arrest warrant is true but I'm unsure about the handover, but if it checks out then that's an indication that Maliki is also moving against the Fadhila Party.

I find this fact interesting. The Fadhila (Virtue) Party pulled out of the Maliki coalition in March 2007 and was recently looking at re-entering the Maliki coalition. Now, just a few days later, Maliki's forces possibly arrested Wa'ili's brother.

This can only mean two things. The Fadhila Party did not reach concensus with Maliki's coalition and he is having his brother arreted or the Iraqi Army is just plainly going after all law breakers in Basra. From accounts, it appears to be the later. The Fadhila Party can still rejoin the coalition; however, Maliki is bringing the rule of law to Iraq. If you are associated with militias or criminal elements, then the Iraqi Army is taking these people down.

It will be interesting to see if there is any linkage between the Wa'ili and Iran as this story unfolds.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Army soldiers discover large cache with Iranian-marked weapons during Operation Charge of the Knights

From MNF-I. If anybody is wondering what is the purpose of Operation Charge of the Knights, one only has to read this story from MNF-I.

The Iraqi Army discovered a large weapons and munitions cache in a house located in the Al Hyyaniyah area of Basrah April 19. Soldiers from the 1st Iraqi Army discovered the cache during the search phase of Operation Charge of the Knights. The cache consisted of a large number of weaponry with Iranian markings. The cache included a 240 mm high-explosive war-head and approximately 160 mortars. Some of which were less than 12 months old. The cache also contained approximately 25 artillery shells, more than 20 complete improvised explosive devices, large quantities of IED components, several explosively formed projectiles and dozens of grenades and fuses. Also included was more than 20 blocks of plastic explosives, homemade anti-personnel mines packed with ball bearings, hundreds of meters of detonation cord, improvised rocket launching rails, and thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition.

Let's put these dates into perspective. It is currently April 2008. President Bush announced the Surge of forces in Iraq in January 2007 of which the first Brigades arrived in February or March of 2007. The full complement of surge Brigade were on the ground and the Surge effectively started 15 June 2007. This story is dated 19 April 2008 and some munitions were less than 12 months old meaning they were manufactured in Iran after April 2007 and then transported to Iraq probably at the earliest May 2007 or possibly later. In August 2007, after a very public battle in Karbala, Sadr announces a ceasefire to allow US forces to help him rid his militia of rogue elements. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army continues to receive a supply of weapons from Iran.

As the surge is focusing on Al Qaeda in Iraq elements in and around Baghdad, the Iranian regime is stockpiling weapons in the south in support of the Mahdi Army and other Special Groups. By January 2008, the surge against Al Qaeda in Iraq is effectively winding down as it has been routed and focus is starting to shift to the next most powerful enemy, the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, in February 2008. Sadr announces a continuation of the ceasefire in February 2008.

Iran attempts a coup in Southern Iraq in March 2008 which PM Maliki blunts. In April 2008, the Iraqi Army is still clearing Basra and Sadr City after having secured the cities of Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah in March 2008. Iran's coup is blunted, and its Qods Forces Commander must come to Basra to personally assure the Iraqi General in charge of operations that his forces will be pulled out of Basra.

All of these actions by Iran are taking place while it is denying any involvement in Iraq, support of Special Groups, and support of the Mahdi Army.

One must wonder what Iran is doing with regards to nuclear weapons in its own coutnry if it is attempting to do all of this under the nose of the US and Iraqi government in southern Iraq, all the while saying its nuclear development is only for peaceful purposes.

I stated before, the Battle of Basra is a major strategic turning point in Iraq. It showed all external forces, both Al Qaeda and Iran, that the Iraqi Army, the Government of Iraq, and PM Maliki have the courage to defend their country at the risk of harming relationships with Iran, a neighbor and also a Shia led power. In addition, it showed the Iraqi Army can quickly be repositioned to affect an attempted coup while still maintaining order elsewhere in the country. Also, it showed Sistani would allow (and even approve) Shiite on Shiite attacks as long as it was happening to ensure the terroritorial integrity of Iraq. Finally, it showed the weakness of the Mahdi Army, and Sadr in particular, which PM Maliki is now capitalizing upon in Sadr City as his forces are seeking to dislodge the Mahdi Army from this last bastion of control in Iraq.

Far from showing PM Maliki's and the Iraqi Army's weakness, the Battle of Basra has shown both are willing and able to secure their country. It is no wonder the Iraqi Accord Front (the major Sunni bloc in government) just announced it would return to the government. It also appears the Iraqi List (headed by interim prime minister Iyad Allawi) and Al Fadila party (an offshoot of Sadr's Mahdi Army) will possibly be returning soon.

PM Maliki just showed Iran and its Special Groups, Sadr and his Madhi Army, and the Sunnis who once were associated with Al Qaeda that military coups are no longer possible in Iraq. If an element wants to have influence in Iraq, it must seek this influence politically within the frameworks of the constitution and through democratic elections. Militarism will no longer be tolerated. In fact, militarism will be put down by force.

While many mistake the Battle of Basra for a small tactical battle which some say the Iraqi Army lost, it has much larger operational (Iraqi Army able to reposition forces quickly) and strategic (rule of law back by a strong central government) consequences.

This undeniable fact is proved by the Qods Forces Commander personally coming to Iraq to validate a ceasefire, the Iraqi Accord Front, Iraqi List, and Fadila party looking to come back into the government, PM Maliki's continual push into Basra and Sadr City, Sadr's unheeded words that he will unleash his Madhi Army, and finally Al Qaeda in Iraq's yet unseen renewed terror.

Iran will continue to attempt re-establish its influence in Southern Iraq. Al Qaeda will continue to attempt re-establish its campaign of terror in the west and northwestern part of Iraq. However, people making progress in Iraq are doing so within the democratic framework established by the constitution, like the Kurds who will continue to work within the constitution and with the central government for semi-autonomy. Neighboring countries will continue to open embassys, to include Kuwait. The EU is even in the process of signing up for oil from Iraq.

The much feared month long offensive by Al Qaeda in Iraq has failed to materialize as will Iranian influence in Southern Iraq wain. Iran's remaining major influence, Sadr's militia, is being systematically dismantled. Al Qaeda is the walking dead with leaders being killed or captured daily. This is not an organization the Sunnis wish to rejoin, in fact, they are rejoining the government.

In this war where we have the strategic Corporol whos actions have far reaching ramifications, we have small battles like Basra which have large strategic implications. While the US was slow to realize this fact, it did realize it in late 2006 and adjusted its tactics with the surge in early 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq still has not realized the implications of the strategic Corporol, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Iranian Special Groups may have just realized it, which is why Coalition forces have now shifted focus to these Special Groups.

As I have stated before, 2008 will be an interesting year for the Global War on Terror. It is shaping up to be an interesting year indeed. Al Qaeda is defeated in its central front and has changed tactics to blunt losses in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran has lost a major underground effort in southern Iraq and is currently losing its voice in the Iraqi Parliament as Sadr's party will potentially be banned from participation in future elections. It may very well lose all influence if the Mahdi Army is defeated wholesale in Sadr City and Basra. The two Muslim extremists groups vying for power and control in the region have suffered major defeats at the hands of freedom and democracy, thanks to the Great Satan.

Iraq is truly becoming the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007 and the defeat of Iran in the Battle of Basra in 2008 has assured this young democracy is alive, well, and will continue to influence other nations in the Middle East. President Bush's bold maneuver in the heart of the Middle East is paying off. A democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East is fast becoming a shining star which all other Middle Eastern country's will emulate.

Operation Charge of the Knights begins phase 3 in Hyyaniyah

From MNF-I.

BASRA, Iraq – Operation Saulat al Fursan, or Charge of the Knights, began a new phase of operations April 19. Phase 3 of the operation focuses on the criminal militia strongholds within the Hyyaniyah district area. Iraqi Army soldiers from the 1st and 14th Infantry Divisions are conducting the deliberate clearance operation. The operation began at approximately 6 a.m. when British artillery and US aircraft released ordnance against known criminal rocket and mortar sites west of Hyyaniyah. British and American Military Transition Teams are working alongside Iraqi Army units to provide leaders with advice, access to surveillance and the ability to “call for fire” and other support, if needed. “As with the earlier phases of Operation Charge of the Knights, this remains an Iraqi led, planned and executed mission,” said Major Tom Holloway, the British Army’s spokesman in southern Iraq. “Coalition troops are ready to provide support to Iraqi Security Forces as requested and required.” Operation Charge of the Knights began on March 24.

For all those who believe MSM reports which say the Iraqi Security Forces pulled out of Basra with their heads between their legs, they continue to clear district in Basra. Today, they are entering Phase 3 of yet an undetermined number of phases to clear Basra of criminal elements and militias.

While the Mahdi Army laid down weapons and agreed to a unilateral ceasefire which the Iranian Qods Force Commander was dispatched to Iraq to directly validate, Iraqi Security Forces continue to clear, secure, and hold more and more districts in Basra. Those Mahdi Army forces which did not lay down their weapons and other criminal and militia elements continue to be rolled up.

It must be noted again what is going on operationally to have a strategic outcome. Baghdad is being secured by US and IA forces. Mosul (the second largest city) is being secured by IA and US forces. Basra (the third largets city) is being secured by IA forces with US/British assistance. The three largest cities in Iraq are being secured and criminal elements are being pushed out, whether they be Al Qaeda, Iranian sponsored, or just plain opportunistic thugs. Finally, the Sadr stronghold of Sadr City, in Baghdad is systematically being cleared of rogue elements. US forces in the region signaled a shift of focus from Al Qaeda to Special Groups almost a month ago. The battles are now happening.

It must also be remembered, the Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah within the first 48 hours of PM Maliki's surge into southern Iraq. Many of these represent the next largest cities in Iraq behind the top three noted above. These operations, along with operations ongoing in Basra is why an Iranian Qods Forces Commander was dispatched to Iraq to broker a Mahdi Army ceasefire. He had to at least keep what remaining elements under Sadr's command still existed in hopes of fighting another day.

Today, the New York Times is reporting,

Iraqi soldiers took control of the last bastions of the cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s militia in Basra on Saturday, and Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad strongly endorsed the Iraqi government’s monthlong military operation against the fighters.

Just last week, the New York Times reported on the dismal showing of Iraqi forces, mass defections within the Iraq Army, and resiliency of Sadr's forces. Now, just a week later, the New York Times is reporting the "last bastions" of Sadr's forces are being rolled up in Basra. What many miss, including the New York Times, is PM Maliki, after securing Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah within the first 48 hours and much of Basra within the same timeframe, demanded that the Iranian Qods Forces commander come to Basra to guarantee the surrender of Iranian-backed Special Groups, chiefly among them the Madhi Army. In addition, Sadr directly told his force to lay down their weapons.

Those groups now fighting against Iraqi Army forces now have no backing from Iran, as such they are being systematically destroyed. Of course the Iranian Ambassador is going to support the continual operations in Basra after its failed attempt to take over the southern part of the country. First, it is the only thing Iran can do to save a little face in the region by signaling it support for ongoing operations, now into their third week. Second, it main sponsored ally in the region, Sadr and his Madhi Army, have either been killed, captured, wounded, or disarmed in all the southern cites and is being systematically cleared in Basra and Sadr City.

What many people outside the region do not understand is Sistani's power and how it plays into this battle and the region in general. Tithes are given to sects which people in this region believe is their Ayatollah or spirtual ruler. The overwhelming plurality of Shiites in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon give their tithes to Sistani, not Hezbollah's Nasrallah nor Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nor Sadr. The Badr Organization in the south is completely loyal to Sistani also. Religiously, Iran and Sadr now coming out in support of Sistani, who supports the Basra (and Sadr City) operations to disarm militias is the only logical thing Iran and Sadr can do to save face. The difference between Basra is it is a completely Iraqi led operation while the clearance of Sadr City, while Iraqi led, is seen as more US influenced. Hence the Iranian Ambassador can come out and claim "The Great Satan" is indiscriminantly killing civilians.

The battles for control of Southern Iraq and Sadr City is just plainly the next phase of the surge which initially focused on Al Qaeda and has now shifted to focus on Special Groups. Iran has seen its largest Special Groups element effectively wiped out in about 48 hours, with only Basra and Sadr City elements able to hold on longer. If the New York Time article cited above is correct, the "last bastions" of Basra are now under IA control, meaning Mahdi elements have been completely defeated in Basra. The next focus will be Sadr City and then possibly a larger effort in Mosul.

Following these actions, we should see low level insurgencies as Al Qaeda and Special Groups remnants attempt to regain some footing in their respective regions. However, provincial elections in October will drastically change the local landscape in Iraq and who controls the distribution of the country's oil wealth. Moving into national elections with a country which is rather secured, PM Maliki has a good chance of resuming his Prime Ministership as he will not only have the backing of a small but influential Shiite sect, but also have the backing of Sunni and Kurds, which he signed a memorandum of agreement with in December of 2007.

In sum, PM Maliki has consolidated power in Iraq. While his party does not have a militia, he now controls the Iraqi Security Forces, the largest and best equipped force in the region. He was able to do this by establishing agreements with both Sunnis and Kurds. His old alliances, namely Sadr, has now been formally dissolved and its militia is quickly being defeated in Basra and Sadr City. Al Qaeda is only a remnant of its former self, and its leaders are the walking dead. If they stay too long in one place they are ratted out by the Sons of Iraq and Special Forces teams move in to detain or kill them. Iran's attempt to co-op southern Iraq has failed wholesale and now they are actually publically supporting the Mahdi Army's distruction. Oil revenues into the Iraqi treasury are at an all time high, which Iran does not get its fair share due to sanctions. Major oil contracts have just been announced in Iraq. Iraq is now a net oil exporter. Finally, Iraqi Security forces are gaining in capacity and experience. Let there be no mistake why the two greenist divisions were put directly into the fight in Basra and Sadr City. It was to give them combat experience, which shortly, may very well be hard to come by in Iraq.

The future of Iraq has greatly changed not only in the last year during the American military surge, but also in the last three weeks during the Iraqi Army surge.

Iraq’s Moment of Truth in Baghdad and Basra

From Mohammed Fadhil at Iraq the Model.

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki has been presented with a golden opportunity to build on political cohesion and bolster the rule of law by dismantling the Mahdi Army.

Why?

I think what encouraged Maliki to push the limits of the conflict to this unprecedented level was the first-of-a-kind success of the Political Council for National Security — an entity that includes the president, PM, and leaders of major parliamentary blocs — to reach consensus on a decision. This entity managed for the first time a week ago to overcome the impotence that had halted its mission since its inception. Evidence of the newfound potency of this entity is that Ayad Allawi, who had refused being part of it for a long time, is now sending delegates to negotiate terms for his membership.

Reconciliation is happening in Iraq. It is interesting that Sadr, or more specifically actions against Sadr, has become the impetus for reconciliation between the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Mohammed explains,

Everyone has come to realize that allegiance to the country provides more security in the long run than sectarian entrenchment does, and in my opinion the awakening of the Iraqi west and the uprising against the perverted violent practices of co-religionists have provided an example for a similar awakening among the Shia — of course, with the main difference we outlined in an earlier post; that is, while in the west we had a tribal uprising against extremist religious powers, in the south the uprising is religious-on-religious, with the target highly identified with one particular group.

An interesting perspective indeed.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi government: "We will continue until we secure Sadr City"

From Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal.

The Iraqi government has committed to wresting Sadr City from the control of Shia militias, an Iraqi government spokesman and a US military spokesman said in a press briefing today in Baghdad. "We will continue until we secure Sadr City. We will not come out, we will not give up until the people of Sadr City have a normal life," Ali al Dabbagh, the spokesman for the government of Iraq, told AFP. "(Security forces) will do what they have to do to secure the area. I can't tell you how many days or how many months but they will not come out until they have secured Sadr City."

We should have taken care of the Mahdi Army in 2004. However, it is good that it will be dealt with by Iraqi Security Forces.

For a full read, click here.

Port City is Open for Business

From MNF-I.

UmQasr, a port city southeast of Basra, is filled with daily activities, as Iraqi workers load export and unload imports last week. “The estimated flow of goods into Iraq is 60,000 tons with 15,000 passing through UmQsar,” said Todd Stratton, Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq. “The single largest commodity is food such as wheat, rice, sugar and other food items,” Stratton said. “The port is a critical gateway to supply the Iraqi nation with food imports.”

Why is MNF-I telling the story of Um Qsar being opened for business? It could be the same reason General Petraeus reported to Congress the port of Um Qasr is now under the control of Iraqi Security Forces.

Meanwhile, anti-insurgent operations in Basra continue, Petraeus reported, noting Iraqi security forces now have control of the city of Um Qasr, the country’s main port. Um Qasr is a major conduit for the smuggling of weapons and contraband into Iraq, the general said.

The major reason for the story is a little talked about victory in Basra. The port, which used to be under control of Sadr's forces backed by Special Groups from Iran, is now under control of the Iraqi Government. This means two things. Smuggling is now most assuredly way down -- smuggling which directly benefited Sadr's Mahdi Army. In addition, the Iraqi Government is now getting imports directly instead of Sadr.

Make no doubt about it, the recent battle in Basra was a major tactical and operational success for PM Maliki and the Iraqi Government. It was not executed perfectly, but it was and still is being executed well enough.

Reports are confirming that approximately 1300 Soldiers and police refused to fight the Sadr militia and Special Groups in Basra and other southern cities. These 1300 traitors are now identified and fired. The remaining 28,700 Soldiers PM Maliki has pushed into the southern region are completely loyal to him and the Iraqi Government. It is these loyal forces which are now in control of the port of Um Qasr, ensuring the Iraqi Government has control of all the supplies coming into and going out of Iraq. More importantly, it assures the Qods forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army are no longer able to smuggle these supplies into the country for economic benefit for their forces, nor more importantly, smuggle oil out of the country. These elements have just lost a major source of revenue.

PM Maliki used military force to regain control of southern Iraq. In turn, his tactical and operational victory has allowed him to gain control of the economies of this region. Politically, he is introducing legislation which will outlaw militias and prevent members from running for Parliament who maintain militias. Finally, if one hasn't noticed, he is on many international and national programs touting the success in the south. He is expertly using all the instruments on Iraqi National Power to reduce the influence of Sadr and Iranian-sponsored Special Groups in Iraq.

I stated before in this blog. The Kurds haved secured the North. The Americans have secured the Central part of Iraq to include Baghdad, the center of gravity in Iraq. PM Maliki is securing the South.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is reduced down to at most 2000 remaining individuals who are hiding, but yet are still getting captured or killed daily. Sunnis, who have joined the Sons of Iraq, are now being screened for military/police service. The Sons of Iraq are, in addition, developing into a political party just in time for October Provincial Elections and National Elections in 2009. PM Maliki is no longer seen as a puppet of the Iranian government by Kurds and Sunnis. He is now seen as an secular Iraqi leader who will fight against Shiites for the betterment of Iraq. Sadr is politically isolated, he and his militia is in hiding in Iraq, and the head of the Sadr block in Iraq has just been assassinated. Iran, who attempted to exert political, economic, and military control in the South, now has to begin its carefully laid plans all over again after years of detailed planning. Finally, the Iraqi Security Forces have been independently tried and tested in the South and were victorious. In addition, 1300 traitors have been identified and expelled from the force to make it completely loyal to the government.

Not a bad month for the Government of Iraq. Not a bad month indeed.

The battle of Basra completely changed the political/diplomatic, informational, military, and economic landscape of Iraq. It solidified PM Maliki's power in Parliament. It will allow for reconciliation with Sunnis and Kurds. It completely isolated Sadr and highlighted Tehran/Qods' force efforts in Iraq. It has opened the way for free and fair elections in the south.

Iran's Busted Iraq Bid - Basra "Rising" Was Tehran's Op

From Amir Taheri. Mr. Taheri always provides great insight into Iran. In this New York Post article, he discusses the Tehran connection in Basra.

A GAMBLE that proved too costly. That's how analysts in Tehran describe events last month in Basra. Iran's state-run media have de facto confirmed that this was no spontaneous "uprising." Rather, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to seize control of Iraq's second-largest city using local Shiite militias as a Trojan horse. Tehran's decision to make the gamble was based on three assumptions: * Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wouldn't have the courage to defend Basra at the risk of burning his bridges with the Islamic Republic in Iran. * The international force would be in no position to intervene in the Basra battle. The British, who controlled Basra until last December, had no desire to return, especially if this meant getting involved in fighting. The Americans, meanwhile, never had enough troops to finish off al-Qaeda-in-Iraq, let alone fight Iran and its local militias on a new front. * The Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf would oppose intervention by the new Iraqi security forces in a battle that could lead to heavy Shiite casualties.

It appears now that Iran misjudged PM Maliki and Sistani. While they thought they had the inside track on both of these leaders, they obviously did not as PM Maliki had the courage to stand up to Iran and Sistani gave his blessing to the Maliki led operation. More important; however, is the outcome of each side. On the Iraqi side,

Soon, however, the tide turned. Maliki proved that he had the courage to lead the new Iraqi Security Force (ISF) into battle, even if that meant confronting Iran. The ISF showed that it had the capacity and the will to fight. Only a year ago, the ISF had been unable to provide three brigades (some 9,000 men) to help the US-led "surge" restore security in Baghdad. This time, the ISF had no difficulty deploying 15 brigades (30,000 men) for the battle of Basra. Led by Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi force sent to Basra was the largest that the ISF had put together since its creation five years ago. This was the first time that the ISF was in charge of a major operation from start to finish and was fighting a large, well-armed adversary without US advisers. During the Basra battles, the ISF did call on British and US forces to provide some firepower, especially via air strikes against enemy positions. But, in another first, the ISF used its own aircraft to transport troops and materiel and relied on its own communication system.

Iraq has shown Iran it is able to defend itself. Iran cannot directly attack Iraq due to US presence in the area so they tried to insight an "internal" uprising. It failed to materialize and the "internal" uprising was smashed. On the Iranian side,

After more than a week of fighting, the Iraqis forced the Quds commanders to call for a cease-fire through Sadr. The Iraqi commander agreed - provided that the Quds force directly guaranteed it. To highlight Iran's role in the episode, he insisted that the Quds force dispatch a senior commander to finalize the accord. The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded. Some analysts suggest this was the first war between new Iraq and the Islamic Republic. If so, the Iraqis won.

Tactically and operationally, the Iraqis won this first war. However, strategically, it was a draw.

But the battle also showed that the ISF still lacks the weapons systems, including attack aircraft and longer-range missiles, needed to transform tactical victories into strategic ones. The Iranian-sponsored Special Groups and their Mahdi Army allies simply disappeared from the scene, taking their weapons with them, waiting for another fight.

Now, all the pieces are starting to fall together better. Ahmadinejad visits Iraq a few weeks ago to test the waters in Iraq. He was able to test the waters with Maliki, but obviously came out with the wrong data. He was unable to see Sistani, as Sistani quitely refused to see him. Sadr, still adhering to a ceasefire, allowed the Qod forces to use his forces to attempt to take control of southern Iraq. This action failed miserably. Sadr is both militarily and politically weakened. PM Maliki is both militarily and politically strengthened. In addition, he is now seen by Kurds and Sunnis as a true Iraqi leader and not just an Iranian puppet. Iran has shown it hand in Iraq and now must restart from ground zero.

Basra was not the defeat that many western media outlets touted. It was, in fact, a major military and operational victory for Iraq. While strategically it is considered a draw, now Iran is in a much worse position to influence affairs inside southern Iraq specifically, and Iraq in general.

This battle has significantly changed the tide in Iraq and the balance of power in the Middle East.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi government moves to sideline Sadrists, Mahdi Army

From Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal.

Less than two week after many American newspapers were headlining that Maliki is weakened and Sadr won the battle of Basra, Mr. Roggio explains the current status of the Mahdi Army, the Sadr political party, and PM Maliki.

Less than two weeks after Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki launched Operation Knights' Assault to clear the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backer militias in Basrah, the Iraqi government is moving to ban Muqtada al Sadr's political movement from participating in the election if it fails to disband the militia. Facing near-unanimous opposition, Sadr said he would seek guidance from senior Shia clerics in Najaf and Qom and disband the Mahdi Army if told to do so, according to one aide. But another Sadr aide denied this.

Since Sadr's militia "won the battle of Basra", the Iraqi Government is seeking to pass an election law preventing movements with militias from participating in the election process. "Weaken" PM Maliki has near-unanimous support in the Parliament from Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite leaders for the proposed law. The "fragmented" Parliament is expected to easily pass this legislation into law within a couple of weeks. Passage in a couple of weeks would be a new record from conception to passage if executed as stated. All of these actions against Sadr does not sound like actions against a victor on the field of battle. PM Maliki leading these actions hardly appears politically weakened in a disjointed Parliament.

Hassan al Rubaie, a Sadrist member of parliament said,

Our political isolation was very clear and real during the meeting.... Even the blocs that had in the past supported us are now against us and we cannot stop them from taking action against us in parliament, We must go and explain to [Sadr] in person that there's a problem."

Maybe, just maybe, the reporters in Baghdad got it all wrong about the winners and losers in Basra, only a couple hundred miles south of their secure hotel rooms.

Far from another quagmire (as portrayed), it appears the Iraqi Government and Army are stepping up to the plate and confronting threats to their young democracy. The number one threat since Americans have isolated and weakened Al Qaeda is the Mahdi Army. The Iraqi Government is doing these actions for the better of Iraq, not Iran who supports Sadr. While not as proficient as American forces, the Iraqi Army is building capacity daily and is able to reposition itself in Iraq to bring the required forces to bear to defeat internal unrest. While not unified, when important, the Iraqi Parliament is able to come together to put into place political solutions to aid military forces.

Maybe, just maybe, the politicians who said all is lost in Iraq and the surge of American forces would only worsen the problems in Iraq got it all wrong from their secure offices only a couple thousand miles from Iraq.

I wonder how politicians, invested in defeat in Iraq, will fare in upcoming national elections in November. I wonder how the only presidential candidate remaining who has steadfastly supported the war and surge effort will fare in his presidential bid come November. October elections in Iraq will be extremely interesting now that Sadr's movement is militarily and politically isolated. More interesting will be November elections in America.

Lessons Learned from the Basra Fighting for the Iraq Hearings

From The Heritage Foundation.

The Maliki government's offensive in Basra sought to accomplish goals that the United States should support: weakening the Mahdi Army and other gangs supported by Iran. But the operation was poorly planned and executed and did not achieve the ambitious goals initially set out by Prime Minister Maliki.Although the Iraqi government did make some progress in curbing the militias in Basra, the campaign also demonstrated the continuing need for U.S. troops in Iraq.

James Phillips draws the following conclusions from the fighting in Basra

1. The Iraqi government's campaign to extend the rule of law to Basra was a step in the right direction. 2. Prime Minister Maliki has strengthened his nationalist credentials. 3. Iraq's security situation is fragile and the U.S. cannot afford to risk withdrawing troops too soon. 4. Iran exploited the Basra situation and will gain much more influence in Iraq if the next Administration rapidly withdraws U.S. troops.

For a full read, click here.

The Press Botches Basra

From The Weekly Standard written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio.

Both of these gentlemen point out differences in reporting coming out of Basrah versus the facts of all the articles combined. While headlines and text hailed Sadr's strength and resilience, facts show something completely different. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross and Roggio explain it best in these paragraph.

To be sure, the Iraqi security forces' performance in Basra is best described as mixed. However, they did not run into a wall. The Iraqi military was able to clear one Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood in Basra and was in the process of clearing another when Sadr issued his ceasefire. The ceasefire came on March 30, after six days of fighting, and was seemingly unilateral in the sense that the Iraqi government made no apparent concessions in return. By that time, 571 Mahdi Army fighters had been killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 had surrendered countrywide, according to numbers tabulated by The Long War Journal. Thus, an estimated 95 Mahdi Army fighters were killed per day during the six days of fighting. In contrast, al Qaeda in Iraq did not incur such intense casualties even during the height of the surge. The Iraqi security forces were at their best in the smaller cities in Iraq's south. The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days. The casualties taken by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and the wider south surely played a role in Sadr's tactical decision to call a ceasefire. An American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water. In short, [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort." Time's sources in Basra paint a similar picture. "There has been a large-scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," the magazine reported on March 30.

Both gentlemen go on to point out that Sadr unilaterally issued a ceasefire. PM Maliki accepted Sadr's ceasefire, but did not stop operations nor did he agree to Sadr's terms. In fact, reinforcements were sent to Basrah and raids are still being conducted to this day.

But the fact is that the Maliki government did not agree to the nine-point terms for a truce that Sadr issued, nor did it sue for peace or promise that operations would cease. Instead the Iraqi government called Sadr's order for his fighters to pull off the streets a "positive step," and insisted that operations would continue. "The armed groups who refuse al Sadr's announcement and the pardon we offered will be targets, especially those in possession of heavy weapons," Maliki said, referring to the ten-day amnesty period for militias to turn in heavy and medium weapons. "Security operations in Basra will continue to stop all the terrorist and criminal activities along with the organized gangs targeting people." Subsequent to the ceasefire, the Iraqi military announced it was moving reinforcements to Basra, and the next day pushed forces into the ports of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr. Iraqi special operations forces and special police units have conducted several raids inside Basra since then, while an Iraqi brigade marched into the heart of a Mahdi-controlled Basra neighborhood on April 2. And two days after Sadr called for a ceasefire, the government maintained a curfew in Sadr City and other Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. None of this would be happening had Maliki simply caved to Sadr.

In addition, the press reported an emergency session of Parliament was called to end Maliki's push into Basrah. However, again the facts show what actually happened.

Maliki's governing coalition did not revolt over this operation. When the Iraqi opposition held an emergency session of parliament to oppose the Basra operations, only 54 of the 275 lawmakers attended. AFP reported, "The two main parliamentary blocs--Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance--were not present for the session which was attended by lawmakers from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc, the small Shiite Fadhila Party, the secular Iraqi National List and the Sunni National Dialogue Council." The fact that the major political blocs in Iraq's parliament ignored the emergency session is politically significant, and no evidence suggests that Maliki's governing coalition has been jeopardized since then.

Finally, both of these gentlemen paraphrase what a military officer told them. For me, this provides the correct perspective.

As an American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Claiming a 'victory' and then withdrawing from the battlefield is the tactic of someone that is losing."

Combine this with the Kagan article and a lot of questions remain. However, one thing is certain. PM Maliki security operation was far from a failure it was portrayed to be in the media. While not a resounding tactical success, one has to ask, did it accomplish its strategic goals.

PM Maliki was attempting to secure his nation's oil wealth. He did as Iraqi Army units now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr.

PM Maliki was attempting to break up and defeat criminal elements which continue to bring violence to his country. Killing 95 fighters a day for six days is significant. The killed, captured, wounded, and surrendered numbers come out to 329 per day or 1,972 Madhi forces total for six days. In addition, The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days, as noted. In addition, his forces now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr as previously noted. This is hardly a defeat for PM Maliki.

Finally, PM Maliki stated he wanted to defeat Sadr's militia as the operation continues. This action requires considerable more time and will not be realized in six days. Hence, operations are still ongoing.

Politically, this operation did not hurt him as only 54 of 275 members of Parliament showed up for an emergency session with nobody attending from major parties. Politically, he obviously no longer enjoys the support of Sadr, who's 30 seats guarenteed his leadership of the country, but there are at least well over 200 members of Parliament who at least tacitly supported his operations in southern Iraq.

Militarily, the battle is still ongoing with 9 of 10 southern cities are now controlled by Iraqi Security Forces where they were at best contested beforehand. Militarily, almost 2000 insurgents were taken off the streets in six days. Militarily, Maliki was able to successfully move Iraqi Army units from one part of the country to another and logistically support them.

Looking at the facts, I would consider the battle in Southern Iraq to be completely successful with many strategic objectives accomplished or in the process of being accomplished. The battle of Basrah is ongoing. His military is capable of clearing and securing the south, the center, and is currently clearing Mosul.

Not a bad position to be in when you are uncertain if the US military will begin a wholesale withdraw from Iraq 10 months from today. This very concern is why PM Maliki may have decided to go it alone in the southern part of the country and why he is also providing the majority of forces in Mosul. He has two insurgencies who are vying for power in Iraq. His forces are taking them on, mostly on their own. He might as well test his military now, because 10 months from now, he may very well be going it alone.

The Great Green Zone Freak-Out of ‘08

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Mr. Kazimi discusses in his blog what happened in Basra with Maliki's forces and what happened in the Green Zone. It seems that PM Maliki went planned the Basra operation without Coalition assistance. In fact, while Coalition forces had developed a plan and the timing to go into Basra with Iraqi and American forces, PM Maliki rejected these plans and went with plans drawn up and created strictly by his generals. According to Mr. Kazimi, PM Maliki is asserting himself and his military in Iraq despite what General Petreous and Ambassador Crocker may or may not want to do.

Some Iraqi officers, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, had worked on this Iraqi-American plan that is being referred to by Gordon and they were miffed when Maliki went with an alternative plan laid out by the Army’s point man in Basra General Mohan al-Freiji. These disgruntled Iraqi officers were sounding off during the first days of the offensive but have now gone quiet, opting to join the winning side.

If true, then PM Maliki is coming into his own. This situation supports my first take on the Basra situation is that PM Maliki is taking control of the south while Americans are taking it to Al Qaeda in the center and the Kurds are covering the north.

One thing we as a military have to do is allow the Iraqis to do their own thing. While we may do it better than Iraqi forces in many respects (building combat power, fighting, and logistics), they also do better than the Coalition forces in many other respects (less hindered by rules of engagement, they know the terrain better, and they can distinguish between good guy and bad guy better than we can).

As the situation unfolds, it appears that Sadr's forces took a beating in Basra in a purely planned, led, executed and supported Iraqi operation which was not synchronized with Americans in the Green Zone. This situation caught American personnel in the Green Zone off guard and caused an initial panic of top American generals. PM Maliki is continuing his rhetoric against Sadr stating,

Maliki, for his own purposes, was vocal in his musings earlier today that certain areas of Baghdad such as Sadr City need an Operation Cavalry Charge of their own. Maliki seems confident and this confidence is reflected in the smiling faces and good cheers throughout the halls of the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

While the timing of PM Maliki's attacks in Basra may not coincide with American timelines, PM Maliki is operating on his own timeline. This situation shows that the government of Iraq is coming into its own. In addition, earlier I stated that PM Maliki's "memorandum of agreement" with Sunnis and Kurds is possibly now coming more and more into effect. Mr. Kazimi supports this contention with the following interesting tidbit from Sadr.

They are saying that Maliki “is fighting us with Sunni troops” and that the majority of military divisions and police units involved in the fight were comprised entirely of Dulaim tribesmen from Anbar.

If true, then reconciliation is more on track in Iraq than one would have thought a few days ago. In addition, politically this situation is also important because it shows that PM Maliki is not using Hakim's forces (which may or may not be loyal to him) but instead is using Sunni troops to battle Sadr and other criminal elements in Basra (Badr forces?) to ensure the country's oil wealth is going into the right coffers.

As stated before, the situation in Basra will be interesting to watch as it unfolds and more becomes known about the actual battles in the city. However, a few things are certain.

1. PM Maliki is now completely acting like an independent PM. When he wants to do something contrary to American policy, he will do it for his country's benefit regardless of what American commanders think.

2. PM Maliki has totally split with Sadr, the man who put him into power a few years ago. This tends to support the argument that PM Maliki now has other friends at the national level and does not need Sadr backing. Are these other friends Sunnis and Kurds who signed the "memorandum of agreement in December of 2007?

3. The Iraqi military is coming into its own. It is planning and executing completely independent operations. It is moving around the country from province to province, taking the battle to insurgents, and logistically supporting itself.

4. Whatever Maliki was doing in Basra was not what Iran wanted since they had to call in elements to stop the battle and convinced Sadr to lay down his arms.

All of these things above are good things, even if they are not in line with the Americans. Some other items which may be coming to pass are:

1. If Maliki did use Sunni forces and not Hakim's forces, he may also be splitting with the SIIC. This situation would definitely tend to suggest that PM Maliki has entered into different partnerships.

2. If Maliki did use Sunni forces, reconciliation is more predominant than one would expect.

3. PM Maliki is consolidating his power and now actively protecting his country's wealth, oil.

4. PM Maliki is setting the stage for provincial elections to take place in October 2008.

5. The political situation in Iraq has just drastically changed. The change is not beneficial to Iran nor Sadr. It is however, first and foremost, beneficial to Iraq's national unity.

Mr. Kazimi is always a good read and provides an interesting perspective. For a full read, click here.

Who Won the Battle of Basra?

From In From the Cold blog.

...Well, that depends on who you ask—or which pundit you believe. According to Robert Dreyfus of The Nation the big winners in the recent fighting were radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, his Mahdi Army and their allies in Tehran: .... But contrast Dreyfus’ account to that of Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal. Mr. Roggio, a veteran of multiple embed tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, paints a starkly different picture of the fighting and its results: ....

Mr. Roggio notes,

From March 25-29 the Mahdi Army had an average of 71 of its fighters killed per day. Sixty-nine fighters have been captured per day, and another 160 have been reported wounded per day during the fighting. The US and Iraqi military never came close to inflicting casualties at such a high rate during the height of major combat operations against al Qaeda in Iraq during the summer and fall of 2007.

I tend to agree with Spook86. It is difficult to maintain an insurgency while losing 200+ insurgents a day.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq's Sadr calls million-strong march against U.S.

From Yahoo via Reuters.

Iraqi Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called on Thursday for a million-strong demonstration against U.S. "occupation," a potentially destabilizing show of force after his followers battled U.S. and government troops. The demonstration would take place next Wednesday April 9, the fifth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, when the U.S. commander in Iraq is also scheduled to brief Congress in Washington about progress in the war.

It will be interesting to see how many people actually show up to march. Sadr has called these marches in the past and has not succeeded in getting the numbers requested.

For a full read, click here.

So Who Really Won Iraqi Offensive Against Shiite Militias? (HINT: Not al-Maliki)

From Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog.

Contradictory signals abound in asymmetric conflicts like the Iraqi offensive. An Iranian general who is a designated terrorist played some significant role in the ceasefire, thus vaildating my prognosis. Sadr's backers in Baghdad are claiming victory today, even as U.S. troops patrol their streets. The British are now freezing plans to withdraw more troops from that city, signaling a lack of confidence that the Iraqis will secure the area anytime this year. But an admission from a U.S. Army general in Iraq is telling:

I stated before in this blog that Basra was a test for Maliki. It was his attempt to consolidate his power and weaken Sadr. The Kurds have kept peace in the north. The Americans are defeating Al Qaeda wholesale in the center. Maliki was supposed to defeat Sadr in the south.

According to reports, Sadr's forces were not defeated. I have to concur with Andrew Cochran that Maliki is weakened now since his forces were unable to defeat Sadr's militia in the south. However, the Iraqi Army forces in the south are predominantly made up of Hakim's old Badr Corp. So, not only is Maliki weakened, but so is Hakim. Furthermore, so is Sadr's forces as they have undoubtedly taken a pounding in this battle for control of the south. Politically, this tells me the struggle for Shiite dominance in provincial elections is now up in the air.

This is where I disagree with Andrew Cochran and other commentators about the endstate which is now being forecasted. Maliki is weakened politically, but is not out. Maliki before entered into a memorandum of understanding with Kurdish and Sunni leadership. Maliki's weakened status, as a result of the Basra operation, will cause him to lean more towards respecting this memorandum of understanding, possibly giving a larger voice to Kurdish and Sunni demands.

While it would have been better if Maliki's forces had defeated Sadr's militia wholesale, politics bring together strange bed fellows. This "unvictory" may cause Maliki to honor his memorandum of understanding to maintain political clout. Since Hakim's forces in the south were unable to defeat Sadr's forces, the two main Shiite parties will now split the Shiite vote, possibly giving more influence to Sunni and Kurds as a result of upcoming provincial elections.

The results in Basra politically are not unlike the current American presidential primaries with the Democratic party being split giving McCain a unique advantage in the upcoming general elections. Similarly, the Shiites are split now offering the Sunni and Kurds the ability to get more influence after this round of provincial elections and quite possibly in upcoming national elections in 2009. Both Hakim's SIIC and Sadr's militia are supported by Iran, which may explain why a Revolutionary Guard General from the Iranian Army stepped in to establish a truce.

In effect, the results of Basra has created four primary blocks instead of three. We now have the Sunni block, the Kurdish block, the Sadr block, and the Hakim block. No love has ever been lost between Hakim and Sadr. It was Sadr's hate for Hakim which forced him to throw in his 30 parliamentary seats to back Maliki for PM. With neither block will have a majority in upcoming general elections in 2009. The Sadr block will have to forge a coalition with the Sunni/Kurdish block if they hope to gain influence at the national level. I do not see this coalition happening due to his militia's past activities in sectarian killings. In addition, another coalition between the Sadr block and the Hakim block is now very remote as we saw in the first general election where both parties participated in a unified block. Therefore, the Hakim block will now have to actively negotiate with the Sunni/Kurdish block in any future national government, resulting in a forced reconciliation due to political factors present in a democratic Iraq.

Provincial elections in October 2008 will ensure provincial governments now speak for the people and allow the provinces to pass laws to regulate their provinces. Up until this time, it was apparent only the Sunni voice would be better represented. Now, both Shiite voices will also be represented, just not united. Nation elections in 2009 will ensure the national government is more representative of all Iraqis due to the possible forced reconciliation this "unvictory" in the south may bring about.

There is a silver lining in all clouds. This "unvictory" of Maliki's may very well be that silver lining that continues the process of reconciliation in Iraq.

Finally, Hakim's forces in southern Iraq which make up the Iraqi Army in this region will definitely be re-examined for loyalty and fitness for duty. This fact is not a bad thing. It is in fact a good thing because the loyalty and dependability of these forces have always been an issue. This battle just brings these factors to the forefront. Integration of Iraqi Army forces has happened all over the country minus the south. This battle may very well force more integration.

In addition, it has caused the Brits to postpone their withdraw and may actually get them actively engaged again in Southern Iraq. It has once again bloodied the nose of Sadr's forces which will cause his forces to once again regroup and retrain buying time for American forces to continue to battle Al Qaeda in Iraq. It has exposed the militia-type mentality of Hakim-dominated forces in the south which the military command can now reform.

What now waits to be seen is if Maliki can understand this "unvictory" was not an outright defeat for him and will seek to solidify partnerships in the "memorandum of understanding" he has been publicly avoiding to solidify his base of support. Only time will tell; however, this "unvictory" in southern Iraq does open new prospects for Iraq's democratic future.

This is just another political possibility as a result of the military operations in southern Iraq.

Muqtada Al-Sadr Announces He’s Retiring From Leadership Of Sadrist Movement, Sequestering Himself

From MEMRI.

The leader of the Shi'ite Sadrists in Iraq, Muqtada Al-Sadr, has announced in a letter to his followers that he is stepping down from his position, distancing himself from people, and focusing on his studies. He explained that he was doing so because he had failed in carrying out his father's will to liberate Iraq from the occupation and turning its people into believing Muslims.

This statement from Sadr will have far reaching ramifications.

While Sadr instructed followers to continue to obey his committee, the lack of a central figure will undoubted cause the movement to fracture even more than it already is, jeopardizing his ceasefire order. Baha al-Araji, a former Sadr spokesman and member of the Iraq Parliament, has been very vocal in his opposition to Sadr's continued ceasefire.

Additionally, an interesting linkage is also present with Sadr's recent "food poisoning" where he was transferred to an Iranian hospital under life-threatening conditions. He was apparently worked on by Russian doctors.

Finally, does any linkage exist between Mugniyah's recent death and Sadr stepping down. Mugniyah was well known for building Hezbollah in the past and more currently restructuring the Mahdi Army.

One also has to wonder whether Sadr has really stepped down from head of the Mahdi Army or is just preparing for the day when he can return to lead the Mahdi Army as a full ayatollah after finishing his studies in Iran.

Whatever the truth behind his stepping down, this situation bears continued obsevation.

Mugniyah behind establishment of Mahdi Army

From Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal.

Imad Mugniyah, the senior Hezbollah military commander who was killed in Syria earlier this month, helped form the Mahdi Army, the military wing of the radical Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr, according to an Iraqi intelligence official. He was described as a “co-founder” of the Mahdi Army, Naharnet reported, based on a translation from the Iraqi daily Al Zaman. Mugniyah helped form the Mahdi Army after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003. He recruited from the Shia communities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and then sent the recruits to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley for training. “The 300 fighters were trained on the use of assault rifles, booby-trapping and kidnapping operations,” the unnamed intelligence official told Al Zaman.

Another excellent analysis by Mr. Roggio.

For a full read, click here.

Uncertainty Facing Iraq’s Awakening Movement Puts U.S. Strategy at Risk

From The Jamestown Foudnation.

As Iraq’s security situation deteriorates in the midst of resurgent violence, an increase in internal and external pressures facing the Awakening (Sahwa) Movement may jeopardize the prospects and goals set forth in the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy created by U.S. General David Petraeus. The formation of the Awakening Councils seemed a promising linchpin to the “surge” strategy, which has shown concrete signs of improving Iraq’s security sector. Though the rise of the Awakening movement contributed substantially in limiting al-Qaeda in Iraq in the short term, its forces face uncertain and problematic long-term challenges. If the dilemmas confronting the Awakening members continue to be marginalized by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, Iraq’s improved security situation is likely to revert back to sectarianism and civil war-like conditions.

A very interesting article.

For a full read, click here.

Muqtada al-Sadr extends Iraqi cease-fire

From Yahoo via AP.

Anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr announced Friday that he has extended a cease-fire order to his Shiite Mahdi Army by another six months, giving Iraq a chance to continue its fragile recovery from brutal sectarian violence.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq Sadr declare 3day mourning for Mughniye

From Alsumaria.

Spokesman for Cleric Moqtada Al Sadr Salah Al Ubaidi announced that Sayyed Al Sadr has issued a statement in which he declared three-day mourning in Sadrist bloc offices in Iraq for the martyrdom of Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniye who was assassinated on Tuesday due to a car bomb explosion in the Syrian Capital, Damascus. Al Ubaidi added that Al Sadr Bloc condemns the assassination and reject it completely.

If this declaration does not express where Al Sadr's loyalties ride, nothing does. While Sadr has withdrawn from the government, put his militia into a cease fire, and is undergoing training to become an ayatollah, he is only biding his time awaiting for US forces to withdraw from Iraq. Afterwards, his organization is wanting to mirror Hezbollah in Lebanon.

However, unlike Hezbollah, the Badr Organization is a strong pro-government militia that is currently keeping and will keep his organization in check.

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr

From the Jamestown Foundation.

As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

Once an ayatollah, Sadr would be able to wield a large amount of power in Iraq and also receive a lot of money in the future. While in the short term, Sadr realizes he cannot regain power due to his inability to directly confront the American military, he is now looking longterm in Iraq. The article notes,

With Hezbollah of Lebanon serving as a model for the new JaM, the result could be an impressive, newly equipped and armed military force, unlike its origin as a populist militia with limited abilities

For now, Sadr will contain his militia as he continues his studies in the effort to fill in the void left by Sistani who will not live forever. It is notable that many Shiites in Lebanon also follow the teachings of Sistani much to Nasrallah's dismay. Both he and Sadr are looking to fill his void in their respective countries.

Once can only hope that democracy will become pre-eminent in Iraq with Sadr able to influence, but not control, the forward progression of the democracy as it grows.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq’s Sadr tells militia to keep observing freeze

From the Khaleej Times.

Anti-U.S. cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his Mehdi Army militia to maintain its six-month ceasefire, Sadr’s spokesman said on Thursday, while his militiamen clashed with Iraqi and U.S. soldiers. Salah al-Ubaidi said the ceasefire, which expires later this month, should continue to be observed until militia members are told it is over or has been renewed. Some members of Shia cleric Sadr’s bloc are pressuring him not to extend Aug. 29’s freeze on the feared Mehdi Army’s activities, which has been vital to cutting violence in Iraq.

For a full read, click here.

Iran''s Education of Muqtada Al Sadr

From Amir Taheri writing for the New York Post.

AS the "student" arrives in a bulletproof limousine with heavily armed guards, his teachers, ignoring that he's two hours late, greet him deferentially. The scene takes place at the Shiite seminary in Qom, Iran's holy city. The 35-year-old "student": Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, a militia often deemed one of Iran's chief assets in Iraq. Sadr has spent much of the last 10 months in Iran, living in a 14-bedroom villa in Tehran's posh Farmanieh neighborhood. From there, he travels 90 minutes to Qom twice a week, for a crash course designed to transform him first into a Hojat al-Islam (Proof of Islam) and then a full-fledged ayatollah (Sign of God).

Mr. Taheri continues with,

For a while, Sadr sought clerical cover from two ayatollahs whom his father had named "worthy of trust": Ayatollah Bashir Fayyadh, an Afghan-born cleric who lives in Najaf, and Ayatollah Muhammad Ha'eri Yazdi, an Iranian theologian based in Qom. They raised millions of dollars for his movement, but neither would endorse his maverick project - which, if pushed too far, could split the Shiites and give Iran veto power over Iraqi affairs. (emphasis added)

For a full read, click here.

Iraq new national unity government debated

From Alsumaria.

It seems that the meeting held by the Islamic Party political councils and the Islamic Supreme Council headed by Sayyed Abdul Aziz Al Hakim and Vice President Tarek Al Hashemi have reached an agreement upon which the Islamic Party would join the alliance of Kurdish parties and Al Daawa Party and would lead to form a small government headed by Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki. Informed sources affirmed that governmental changes would draw down the number of ministries to 23 and change the number of ministers. Sources have linked between this step and the Islamic Party accord with the quartet alliance after resolving disputes inside the Accordance Front in favor of the party, despite his front’s willingness to return to government if their demands are met. The Islamic Council and Al Daawa Party seek to assure votes of 80 MPs while the Islamic Party is working to convince its allies in the Accordance Front to vote for the new alliance by persuading 30 MPs while Kurds represent about 55 votes, which assures more than half voices in the parliament.

So, it seems that the "memorandum of understanding" between the Sunnis and Kurds will join forces with Hakim's Islamic Council and the Daawa Party, ensuring Maliki a majority in Parliment.

The significance of this national unity government is critical for continued political progress in Iraq.

1. It forms a government representative of Iraqis - Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.

2. It drops Maliki's need for support from Sadr, who is against continued US presence in Iraq and still maintains a militia against the government.

3. It will allow for further reconciliation with Sunnis.

4. It gives the Kurds a voice in future oil laws and federalism.

All and all, if successful, this national unity government could well ensure the survival of this young democracy.

For a full read, click here.

PM receives IAF delegation, stresses reconciliation

From Aswat Aliraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki received a delegation from the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) on Saturday, stressing that reconciliation among all groups of the Iraqi people "has become a fait accompli". "Reconciliation is not a decision issued by high-level officials. Politicians of all blocs have to realize what is actually taking place on the ground and to contribute seriously and effectively to cementing national reconciliation," the prime minister's office quoted Maliki in a statement received by Aswat al-Iraq – Voices of Iraq – (VOI).

PM Maliki is moving closer to sealing the "memorandum of understanding" with Sunnis and Kurds as he attempts to lessen the influence of Sadr and his Mahdi Army.

For a full read, click here.

US military says suspected Shiite militia leader killed

From The Jerusalem Post.

US and Iraqi commandos killed a suspected Shiite militia leader Monday during a raid in western Baghdad, the military said. But relatives said the man was an innocent truck driver who was killed while trying to shield his wife from the troops. Hundreds of men chanted "there is no God but Allah" and carried a huge Iraqi flag as they followed the coffin of Jawad Abdul-Kadim during a funeral service in the Amil neighborhood. Protesters said he was not affiliated with any militant groups. The military said the slain extremist brigade commander led a network of 10 groups in Baghdad that were implicated in murder, kidnappings and other criminal activity against Iraqi security forces and civilians. The suspect had established a group to collect information used to target Iraqi troops, according to the statement. "Credible intelligence indicates he and his group are responsible for the sectarian murder of several hundred Iraqi civilians in the past year," the statement said.

Hundred of men (probably military age) carrying a "truck driver's" coffin and carrying a huge Iraqi flag protesting his killing.

Somethings just do not add up, like this guy not being a "truck driver". Truck drivers, while a noble profession, do not typically get large, patriotic funerals. This is they type of funeral prossession that militant, Iranian-backed Palestinian commanders get, not truck drivers.

How to deal with terrorists.

Arutz Sheva (IsraelNationalNews), has a damning article regarding how to deal with terrorists.

Top Islamic Jihad official Abu Ahmed was interviewed recently by local Arab reporters. The interview was published online, and then quickly removed. However, Israeli investigators managed to find and translate the interview, which reveals the factors that go into the terrorist leadership’s decision-making process. Among other things, Abu Ahmed admitted in the interview that the security fence built by Israel has made it more difficult for terrorists to carry out attacks. Even more effective, he said, is the Israeli strategy of targeting terrorist leaders. He also said that Islamic Jihad often refrains from firing rockets due to fear of the possible Israeli response. Abu Ahmed’s words provide aid to Israel’s diplomatic efforts. Israel’s critics often argue that fighting terrorism is ineffective, and that Israel must make concessions in an attempt to appease terrorists instead. The interview with Abu Ahmed shows that terrorists are discouraged by IDF operations, and that terror can be defeated using military means.

So, according to Abu Ahmed, to reduce terrorists' attacks, peaceful, democratic countries should target terrorist leadership and respond harsely against terrorist groups when they strike.

Who would have thought this tactic would work?

Surely not our Democrat lawmakers who feel if we "cut and run" when terrorists attack, they would respect us and then come to the negotiating table freely, reay to negotiate their surrender.

The question is simple, "cut and run" or "Troop surge". The answer is the same answer we all learned when dealing with bullies at school. If one continues to let the bully pick on him/her, then the bully will keep on pushing. However, if one stands up to the bully, the bully almost always retreats.

Terrorists are no different than bullies at school. That is why they hide behind women and children when they conduct vicious attacks and like Sadr, Nasrallah, and Osama, run when the going gets tough. They do not lead from the front, but instead expect their followers to die for their hopeless cause as they run away to hide in caves.