Maliki to send several senior officers to early retirement

From Iraq the Model.

There are unconfirmed reports that Prime Minister Maliki has issued orders to send several top security officials to early retirement. The list includes the chief of the explosives department and the director of internal affairs at the ministry of interior (MOI). The news came only a day after Maliki fired the director of operations at the MOI. Less than two weeks ago, the director of the national intelligence service was also fired, or made to resign his position.

To read the complete article, click here.

Abu Risha Sends a Stern Message to Kurdish Leaders

From Iraq the Model.

The chief of the Awakening Councils in Iraq Ahmed Abu Risha told the press that it was not unlikely to form an alliance with PM Nouri al-Maliki in the future because Maliki “presented a national project that transcends ethnic and sectarian lines that strengthens Iraq’s unity”. When asked about Iran, Abu Risha called Iran’s role in Iraq “worrisome” and that “facing this [intervention] requires that Iraqis adhere to their choice of national independence and reject interference in their internal affairs”.

It seems that Maliki may be able to draw a major Sunni party into his new government. If true, his dependence on Sadr is significantly less important.

To read the complete article, click here.

The Endgame in Iraq

From Jack Keane, Frederick W. Kagan & Kimberly Kagan writing for The Weekly Standard.

On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus as commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. The surge strategy Petraeus and Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move forward, and reconciliation to begin. Violence has remained at historic lows even after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi control. Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009. With Barack Obama's recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future. Reductions in violence permitting political change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in Iraq. The United States seeks a free, stable, independent Iraq, with a legitimately elected representative government that can govern and defend its territory, is at peace with its neighbors, and is an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The Iraqi leadership has made important strides toward developing a new and inclusive political system that addresses the concerns of all Iraq's ethnic and sectarian groups. But it has also taken steps in the wrong direction.

These authors of the surge of American forces in 2007 provide an interesting and insightful analysis of not only military, but political considerations in Iraq. They discuss how and when we should drawdown force, long-term security agreements, and the way ahead to ensure Iraq remains a stable democracy and ally to the United States.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq's Nouri Maliki breaking free of U.S.

From the Los Angeles Times.

Once dependent on American support to keep his job, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has consolidated power and is asserting his independence, sharply reducing Washington's influence over the future of Iraq. Iraq's police and army now operate virtually on their own, and with Washington's mandate from the United Nations to provide security here expiring in less than four months, Maliki is insisting on imposing severe limits on the long-term U.S. military role, including the withdrawal of American forces from all cities by June. America's eroded leverage has left Iran, with its burgeoning trade and political ties, in a better position to affect Iraqi government policies.

Ned Parker provides a very interesting read in this Los Angeles Times article. As the American surge of forces allowed Iraqi forces to build capacity resulting in PM Maliki strengthening his position, American influence has wained.

However, a few points which Ned Parker washes over allow the US to retain influence on PM Maliki. First and foremost, is air power and logistics. Iraqi Security Forces need assistance from the US with building their airforce and also current air power capabilities. In addition, while logistics have improved in the Iraqi military, US support is still needed.

Secondly, PM Maliki will have to treat the Sons of Iraq correctly or these folks will melt back into the insurgency. Right now, the US is seen as the arbiter of these forces. If not treated correctly, these forces can quickly turn on Iraqi forces.

Thirdly, Iraqis, whether Sunni or Shia, do not want a theocratic state in Iraq that is subservient to Iran. The Shia coalition will faulter rapidly if this is the is seen as the future of the Iraqi state.

Finally, provincial elections and upcoming national elections are a concern for all parties involved and will significantly change the dynamics in Iraq. Free and fair elections will result in a drastic change in Sunni leadership both at the local and national level which can function as an effective opposition party, especially when united with the Kurds. Provincial elections will result in a more secular focus at the local level resulting in this bottom up movement reaching the Iraqi parliament -- very similar to the bottom up reconciliation which resulted from the Anbar Awakening movement.

PM Maliki is aware of all these issues and is trying to maintain a strong, vibrant coalition which he has built up in the last few months through the elections. His new found strength is dependent upon US forces present in his country providing air cover, logistics, internal security, and limiting external influences. PM Maliki must balance his yearning for independence against his military's capacity, which while able to maintain internal control (with assistance), cannot by any means thwalt an external threat from Iran nor maintain internal control if the Coalition leaves. If he fails to maintain his strong man persona and does not provide for his electorate (which has become the immediate concern), he too will find himself being replaced in upcoming elections.

The US can let both of these events happen if he becomes too unruly by letting him founder militarily or by not providing essential services for the populous. PM Maliki knows this and this fact still allows the US the needed influence over him.

However, I do agree with Ned Parker. Our influence is waning, but wane it should. We gave Iraqis a democracy. It is truly up to them to continue their democracy or resort to something else. We can help guide, but we cannot give them something they are not willing to fight for. I have to believe the events of the last several years will make Iraqis fight for the hard won democracy they now have. I believe, PM Maliki understands this fact.

New procedures to enroll Awakening members

From Al Sumaria.

Baghdad Operations Spokesman, Maj. Gen. Qassim Atah announced that Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki ordered on September 8 to join in Awakening Councils members who enjoy conditions of enrolment in Iraq armed forces, i.e. Iraqi police and Army. In an interview with “Newsmatic” on the sidelines of a conference organized by the office of Prime Minister for a number of Awakening Councils leaders in Baghdad, he clarified that the resoluition that was issued 3 days ago stipulates many conditions to approve the enrolment of Awakening councils members in the security apparatuses including being able to read and write, their educational level as well as passing the medical exam. To that, it is necessary that Awakening Councils members’ criminal records shall be clean. To that, the head of National Reconciliation Committee in the Council of Ministers Mohammad Salwan said that the resolution regarding merging Awakening Councils will include all Awakening Councils members in all the Iraqi Provinces. In the same context, Baghdad Operations Command, Maj. General Abboud Kanbar affirmed in a statement during the conference that the conditions of enrolment that were established in order to accept Awakening Councils members was used as a deterrent measure to prevent militants from infiltrating into Awakening Councils. Kanbar said that Baghdad Operations Commandment will be responsible of accepting Awakening Councils members in the security apparatuses. Enrolment applications will be submitted to the military unit in charge in each of the capitals regions and afterwards a High Committee including representatives of Baghdad Operations Command and National reconciliation Committee in order to study the same, he said.

This statement is a significant change from previous statements. As of a few days ago, only the Al Anbar Awakening movement (a political organization) was going to be brought into the ISF. Now it appears that all Awakening movements have a path for being accepted into the ISF. This apparent change should be watched for how well it accepts Sons of Iraq members from other provinces.

A few days ago, it was announce the GOI would take control of Sons of Iraq in Baghdad beginning on 01 Oct 08. This hand-over is the first step to eventually take control of all Sons of Iraq organizations.

The Sons of Iraq organizations have been credited with reducing the influence and violence of insurgent groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army.

U.S., Iraqi Negotiators Agree on 2011 Withdrawal

From the Washington Post.

U.S. and Iraqi negotiators have agreed to the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from the country by the end of 2011, and Iraqi officials said they are "very close" to resolving the remaining issues blocking a final accord that governs the future American military presence here. Iraqi and U.S. officials said several difficult issues remain, including whether U.S. troops will be subject to Iraqi law if accused of committing crimes. But the officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were unauthorized to discuss the agreement publicly, said key elements of a timetable for troop withdrawal once resisted by President Bush had been reached.

With the current security gains in Iraq, this tentative timetable for withdrawl of US forces will allow Iraqi forces to continue to mature and secure their country from foreign intervention. US forces will be out of cities by next June. In addition, military trainers will stay in Iraq for an unspecified period of time. While not mentioned here, I am certain long-term bilateral security agreements are also in the works much as they are with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

It is much better the US is able to withdraw from Iraq under secure conditions as opposed to unsecure conditions which were present when President Bush announced the surge of US forces in January 2007.

For a full read, click here.

Al-Maliki appoints interior minister to lead Diyala probe (Extra)

From Monsters and Critics.

Iraqi Premier Nuri al-Maliki on Wednesday appointed his interior minister as head of committee that will investigate Tuesday's crackdown on the Diyala province by US-led Iraqi special forces, reports said. Jawad al-Boulani and his team would study details of the crackdown, including the raid on Diyala government headquarters in Baquba that sparked clashes in which the secretary to Diyala Governor Raad Rasheed al-Mulla was killed, according to the Voices of Iraq news agency. A number of Diyala government officials, including Hussein al-Zubeidi, who heads Diyala's security committee, were arrested in the raid. As part of the crackdown, US-led forces also arrested the head of Diyala University and clashed with university security guards. Four people were killed in clashes. Al-Maliki ordered an investigation on Tuesday.

PM Maliki ordering an investigation of recent Sunni arrests in Diyala is an interesting development. Jawad al-Boulani is know for his apolitical views.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq cracks down on US-backed fighters

From the International Herald Tribune.

The Shiite-led government is cracking down on U.S.-backed Sunni fighters in one of Iraq's most turbulent regions, arresting some leaders, disarming scores and banning them from manning checkpoints except alongside security forces. Moves against the fighters in Diyala province reflect mixed views on a movement which began in 2007 among Sunni tribes in western Iraq that revolted against al-Qaida in Iraq and joined the Americans in the fight against the terror network.

The Iraqi government is extremely resistent to bring Sunni Son's of Iraq members into the security forces.

A top Iraqi security official with access to classified information said authorities were especially suspicious of the Diyala groups because many of their estimated 14,000 fighters had been members of al-Qaida in Iraq. But moving against the Sunni movements could alienate the once-dominant minority Sunni Arabs at a time when overtures to them appear to be making headway. "We fought the Americans for four years and we fought al-Qaida too," said al-Safi, a former Iraqi army commando and a veteran of the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war. "We are an experienced armed group. We are fully capable of bringing the house down."

This situation is extremely touchy. PM Maliki's successes in Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, and now Diyala make him feel he does not need to integrate the Son's of Iraq, a predominant Sunni group. The US military, on the otherhand, does not want to alienate fighters who have now switched sides and are fighting against Al Qaeda in Iraq.

A review of past insurgencies show that a country's military must be integrated and representative of all parties within the country which is why the US is pushing for the Son's of Iraq integration. PM Maliki's position is also understandable, but in direct violation of counter-insurgency principles and the reconciliation the country needs to continue to grow as a democracy. However, a review of our policies after the civil war will show not much difference between the Union's position to the South.

PM Maliki is testing fate here. Whether or not his military forces are strong enough to prevent a resurgent insurgency is to be seen. In addition, his failure to establish a SOFA with US forces may also put past successes in question. Finally, Iran is a wild card which PM Maliki cannot control.

This situation needs to be monitored closely for signs of a resurgent insurgency which Iraqi forces are unable to quell.

For a full read, click here.

Iran on Its Heels

From Vali Nasr writing for the Wasington Post.

For the first time since 2003, Iran has stumbled in Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to confront Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Basra and Sadr City last month caught Tehran off guard. The Mahdi Army lost more than face: It surrendered large caches of arms, and many of its leaders fled or were killed or captured. Crucially, the militias lost strategic terrain -- Basra and its chokehold on the causeway between Kuwait and Baghdad and Iraq's oil exports; Sadr City and the threat it posed to Baghdad security.

Mr. Nasr ends with,

It is a frequent refrain in Washington that the United States needs leverage before it can talk to Iran. In Iraq, Washington is getting leverage. America has the advantage while Iran is on its heels. Engaging Iran now could even influence who wins the Iraq debate in Tehran.

I could not agree more.

For a full read, click here.

Al Maliki the Victorious

From Mshari Al-Zaydi writing for Asharq Alaswat.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki does not tire of reiterating the words national reconciliation, closing the ranks, eliminating sectarianism and foreign infiltration and purging the security forces of sectarian and partisan tendencies. However, more than anything else; he likes to talk about his Iraqi identity and the immortal Iraqi state.

Mr. Al-Zaydi continues with a brief historical background of Maliki and how his background is influencing his current actions. He ends with,

Mr. Prime Minister, we hope that your nationalistic and non-sectarian words are genuine, although we see a group of your advisors following a different course than yours. Theirs is a tense sectarian rhetoric that is partisan-inclined and narrow minded. And who knows, perhaps the man’s words are true, especially when he mentions his grandfather; the poet [Muhammad Hasan Abi al Mahasin] who was the poet of the national revolution, and says that he is an extension of that patriotism.

An interesting read. For a full read, click here.

The Ultimate Sadrist Spin

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Muqtada al-Sadr throws down his arms at Maliki’s feat in the last act of his months-old saga of surrender; he officially disbands the Mahdi Army to everyone’s disbelief, including mine,

Mr. Kazimi continues,

I read Sadr’s directive yesterday: I have to admit that at first I dismissed it as a forgery, seeing that it appeared on an anti-Sadrist website that had peddled forged statements attributed to Sadr in the past. Not only was the wording weird and disjointed, but Sadr actually demobilizes the Mahdi Army, going far beyond “freezing” its activities as he did twice in the past year. He limits “resistance” to a “group that shall be authorized to do so by us in writing soon” and that they alone were the ones allowed to carry arms. Everyone else must turn pacifist.

This piece is very interesting. Beginning in March, PM Maliki began going after the Mahdi Army and Special Groups. He had success in Basrah and later repeated that success in Sadr City. Now Sadr is disbanding the Mahdi Army while Iraqi Army forces are going after his and Iranian elements in Maysan.

PM Maliki is also using the Iraqi Army against the last remaining remnants of Al Qaeda in Mosul.

Having just returned from Iraq recently, I can honestly say it is quite different from a few years ago. But more about that later.

For a full read, click here.

Al-Sadr lawmakers denounce Iraqi government

From Yahoo via AP.

Lawmakers loyal to anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr accused the Iraqi government of trying to crush the movement and warned Saturday of "black clouds" on the horizon for truces that have eased fighting between al-Sadr's militia and security forces.

This statement was delivered by Sadr backed elements after Iraqi forces detained approximately 350 Sadr supporters this weekend in southern Baghdad and continues it pressure on Sadr forces in Basra. Sadrist lawmaker Aqeel Abdul-Hussein stated,

The government is "moving forward in its project to liquidate all the national figures in a more savage way than the previous (Saddam Hussein) regime," Abdul-Hussein told the press conference.

A couple things are interesting here.

1. The difference between the Maliki government and the Saddam government is that in 2009, if PM Maliki goes too far, his government can and will be voted out of office.

2. Sadr's forces are attempting to show the Maliki government is secular not understanding that Iraqis have always been and are becoming more and more secular daily. It is only a recent phenomena (2004-2007) where religious forces gained an upper hand in Iraq. This upper hand is now being lost again to secular forces, especally in the southern regions of Basra and Najaf, the western region of Al Anbar, and the northern region of Mosul. Non-secular figures and militia have caused the violent insurgency in Iraq.

3. Sadr's forces keep threatening to end the ceasefire, but constantly back down. Why? Everytime they end a ceasefire, Iraqi Security forces kill and detain them in numbers over 100 per day. They are able to do this not only because of their increased capacity, but also because this militia no longer enjoys the tacit support of the population. Al Qaeda used to have support from Sunnis. It no longer enjoys this support. Similarily, the Mahdi Army used to have this support among Shiites. It no longer enjoys this support, which is why is constantly backs down.

4. Iraqi Security Forces are seen as secular force which will ensure freedom and democracy in the region. Whether they have to battle extremists Shiites or Sunnis, they are doing their job professionally and effectively. All Sadr's spokesmen can do is to try to tarnish this image. However, they are not succeeding.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Government Launches Operation to Expel al-Qaeda from Mosul

From The Jamestown Foundation.

After four days of a preparatory operation code-named Za’eer al-Asad (The Lion’s Roar), Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki arrived in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul to supervise a new military operation against al-Qaeda in Ninawa (Nineveh) province (al-Jazeera, May 14). Al-Maliki was accompanied by Iraqi Defense Minister Abdul Qadir al-Obaidi and a group of Iraqi military commanders. General Abdul Karim Khalaf, the spokesman of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, announced that Iraqi forces had started operation Umm al-Rabi’ain (The Mother of Two Springs) to chase al-Qaeda and the extremists affiliated with it out of Mosul. General Khalaf said “a second operation with the name Umm al-Rabi’ain (the nickname of Mosul, known for its long spring season) has started targeting those who committed crimes against Iraqi security forces and civilians in Mosul.”

Fadhil Ali goes on to state,

In fact, the major leaders of the insurgent groups appear to have left Mosul two months before the operation (Azzaman, May 17; Almalafpress.net, May 16). The repeated early announcements of the operations offered a chance for the insurgents to take precautions and move out of the region. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is known for avoiding major combat confrontations—its tactics rely mainly on fighting with small groups only. It is clear that the Iraqi government could not achieve a decisive victory with two quick military operations against al-Qaeda in Ninawa province.

However, Bill Roggio, at The Long War Journal quotes MND-N Commander, MG Hertling as stating,

Of those captured, "just under 200" Tier 1 and Tier 2 al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq operatives have been detained, said Major General Mark Hertling, the commander of Multinational Division North said during a briefing on May 15. There have been some very big fishes caught," Hertling said. Tier 1 operatives are operational leaders. Tier 2 operatives are foreign fighters or weapons facilitators, bomb makers, and cell leaders

One article states key leaders fled prior to the battle. Another states just under 200 Tier 1 and 2 terrorists have been captured. Both articles quote a little over 1000 insurgents have been captured. I tend to believe the MND-N Commander, MG Hertling. 200 Tier 1 and 2 Al Qaeda members captured is indeed significant. Since this article, more Al Qaeda members have been captured.

Iraqi and US security forces continue to roll up al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq’s network in Mosul and great Ninewa province. The military said it captured an additional 56 “wanted men” during operations over the past two days. On May 16, the Iraqi military said it captured 1,068 suspects. The US military reported 11 additional al Qaeda fighters and leaders were captured over the weekend. On May 17, Iraqi and Coalition forces captured a weapons facilitator for senior al Qaeda leaders in Mosul. On May 18, Coalition special operations teams captured eight al Qaeda operatives. Today, Coalition special operations teams captured two al Qaeda operatives.

More importantly,

Few of those captured have been released at this time, according to the Iraqi military. Of the 1135 insurgents captured in Ninewa, only 151 have been released, a police source told Voices of Iraq.

Major operations are ongoing in Mosul. Significant high level terrorists have been captured, somewhere in the neighborhood of 200. 1153 insurgents have been captured in about a week. Only 151 have been released.

The significance of this operation is clear in and of itself. However, it is more significant when looked at strategically in conjunction with other operations ongoing. Iraqi forces have taken control of Basra and continue to pursue Special Groups and Mahdi forces in this region. Sadr signed a ceasefire and Iraqi troops are moving into the heart of Sadr City. Now Mosul is offering up over 1000 insurgents.

From 25 March 2008 to 20 May 2008, PM Maliki and his Iraqi Army cleared and secured the cities of Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. He then moved into Sadr City. After a peace intitiative signed by Sadr, the Iraqi Army is now moving wholesale into Sadr City to clear and secure it. Now PM Maliki's forces have captured 1153 insurgents in Mosul, of which about 200 are Tier 1 and Tier 2.

Say what you want, but PM Maliki is showing his muscle and the ability of the Iraqi Army to secure its country. His forces have assumed control of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth largest cities in Iraq which are under contention (not counting Kurdish north). Major areas under contention (Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul) have fallen or are in the process of falling out of insurgent control.

Absolutely stunning, to say the least. In two months, his forces have taken down all major threats from the three groups challenging democracy in Iraq, Al Qaeda, Special Groups, and the Mahdi Army.

Yet, the MSM is not covering this unprecedented victory.

Command and control center of armed militias in Sadr city bombed, destroyed

From KUNA.

The U.S. army in Iraq reported on Saturday that its troops and Iraqi forces bombed and destroyed today a centre for the leadership of the armed militias in Sadr City, north-east of the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

Doesn't sound like the Mahdi Army is fairing very well in Sadr City.

For a full read, click here.

How We'll Know When We've Won

From Frederick W. Kagan at The Weekly Standard. Mr. Kagan reviews the war's objectives in Iraq.

Virtually everyone who wants to win this war agrees: Success will have been achieved when Iraq is a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia.

So, how are we and the Iraqi government doing in these areas?

Stability. Violence is the most obvious indicator of instability and the easiest to measure. The fact that violence has fallen dramatically in Iraq since the end of 2006 is evidence of improving stability. But critics are right to point out that areas tend to be peaceful both when government forces control them completely and when insurgents control them completely. Violence can drop either because the government is winning or because insurgents are consolidating their gains. So in addition to counting casualties and attacks, it is necessary to evaluate whether government control has been expanding or contracting. In fact, it has expanded dramatically over the past 15 months.

Not a lot of argument about increased stability in Iraq. What about representative government?

Representative government. The Iraqi government is the product of two elections. The Sunni Arabs boycotted the first, with the result that Iraq's provincial councils and governors do not reflect its ethno-sectarian make-up. The second saw a large Sunni Arab turnout and the seating of a multiethnic, multisectarian government in Baghdad. The Iraqi government recently passed a law calling for provincial elections later this year, and the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Steffan de Mistura, has been consulting with Baghdad about the details of the election, including efforts to ensure that the various committees overseeing it are not unduly influenced by militias or political parties. Surveys show that the Iraqis are nearly unanimous in their desire to vote, particularly in Sunni areas. The Anbar Awakening has turned into a political movement, introducing political pluralism into Sunni Arab politics for the first time. Similar movements, including the splintering of Moktada al-Sadr's "Sadrist Trend," are underway more haltingly among the Shia.

Counter arguments can be brought about a representative government, but provincial elections later this year and national elections next year will show whether or not a representative government exists and can transition in Iraq. What about terroritial control?

Control of territory. The restoration of large urban and rural areas formerly held by insurgents and militias to government control is a key indicator of Iraqi progress. And there are others: the Maliki government's determination to clear Basra and Sadr City of militia influence; Iraqi operations to clear Mosul of al Qaeda fighters; the dramatic growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2007 and the further growth underway in 2008. There is anecdotal confirmation of this progress, such as the dramatic decline in the number of illegal militia-controlled checkpoints, most of them set up in and around Baghdad in 2006 for purposes of control, extortion, and murder.

Again, there can be no argument here. Iraqi Security Forces are controlling more and more of their territory as they become larger and more capable.

Orientation toward the West. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq in March 2008 and was warmly received, prompting concern in the United States that the Iraqi government was tilting toward Tehran.... A closer examination shows this to be false.... It has asked the United Nations to endorse the Multinational Force mission supporting it, a mission that includes American forces--but not Iranian ones. It has requested a bilateral security agreement with the United States--and not with Iran. It has determined to purchase American weapons and equipment for its armed forces, to replace the Warsaw Pact gear it had been using--and has not requested equipment from Iran or its principal international suppliers, Russia and China. Baghdad is organizing, training, and equipping its military and police forces to be completely interoperable with the United States--and not with Iran.

Mr Kagan makes a great point here. Iraq will stand with the United States if the United States stands with Iraq. They have clearly showed this fact to be true.

An ally in the war on terror. Al Qaeda has killed many more Iraqis than Americans. Iraq has eight army divisions--around 80,000 troops--now in the fight against al Qaeda, and another three--around 45,000 troops--in the fight against Shia extremists. Tens of thousands of Iraqi police and National Police are also in the fight. Thus, there are far more Iraqis fighting al Qaeda and Shia militias in Iraq than there are American troops there. Easily ten times as many Iraqi as Pakistani troops are fighting our common enemies. At least three times as many Iraqi soldiers and police as Afghan soldiers and police are in the fight. And many times more Iraqi troops are engaged in the war on terror than those of any other American ally. In terms of manpower engaged, and sacrifice of life and limb, Iraq is already by far America's best ally in the war on terror.

This example clearly shows Iraqi are in the fight with the United States. They have committed more troops to battling not only Al Qaeda, but also Shiite extremists. Granted the war is in their country, but they are not sitting back like they did in 2006. They are now actively pursuing Al Qaeda and Shiite militias.

From all these facts, it is clear that the Government of Iraq is well on its way to being a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia.

For a thorough read of all of Mr. Kagan's points, click here.

One month after the launch of Operation Cavalry Charge...

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Deborah Haynes of the The Times becomes the first western journalist to see the situation in Basra with her own eyes, exactly one month to the day since the launch of Operation Cavalry Charge. She is taken along on a tour of Hayyaniya of all places by Gen. Fraiji, who's been described by some anonymous British military sources in earlier media reports as a "dangerous lunatic"; oddly enough, he doesn't come off that way in Haynes' piece. Haynes paints the picture of a city that has undergone dramatic changes for the better.

So, Basra is not the debacle all western journalists have been reporting. In fact, it appears to have been a resounding success. Mr. Kazimi also point out something else which is quite interesting.

Radio Dijla is reporting that the Emiratis have handed over Ismail al-Wa'ili, the brother of Basra's governor, who is wanted by an Iraqi arrest warrant on charges of oil smuggling and other criminal activity. I had heard that he was hiding in Kuwait rather than Dubai ever since Operation Cavalry Charge began. The story of the arrest warrant is true but I'm unsure about the handover, but if it checks out then that's an indication that Maliki is also moving against the Fadhila Party.

I find this fact interesting. The Fadhila (Virtue) Party pulled out of the Maliki coalition in March 2007 and was recently looking at re-entering the Maliki coalition. Now, just a few days later, Maliki's forces possibly arrested Wa'ili's brother.

This can only mean two things. The Fadhila Party did not reach concensus with Maliki's coalition and he is having his brother arreted or the Iraqi Army is just plainly going after all law breakers in Basra. From accounts, it appears to be the later. The Fadhila Party can still rejoin the coalition; however, Maliki is bringing the rule of law to Iraq. If you are associated with militias or criminal elements, then the Iraqi Army is taking these people down.

It will be interesting to see if there is any linkage between the Wa'ili and Iran as this story unfolds.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Army soldiers discover large cache with Iranian-marked weapons during Operation Charge of the Knights

From MNF-I. If anybody is wondering what is the purpose of Operation Charge of the Knights, one only has to read this story from MNF-I.

The Iraqi Army discovered a large weapons and munitions cache in a house located in the Al Hyyaniyah area of Basrah April 19. Soldiers from the 1st Iraqi Army discovered the cache during the search phase of Operation Charge of the Knights. The cache consisted of a large number of weaponry with Iranian markings. The cache included a 240 mm high-explosive war-head and approximately 160 mortars. Some of which were less than 12 months old. The cache also contained approximately 25 artillery shells, more than 20 complete improvised explosive devices, large quantities of IED components, several explosively formed projectiles and dozens of grenades and fuses. Also included was more than 20 blocks of plastic explosives, homemade anti-personnel mines packed with ball bearings, hundreds of meters of detonation cord, improvised rocket launching rails, and thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition.

Let's put these dates into perspective. It is currently April 2008. President Bush announced the Surge of forces in Iraq in January 2007 of which the first Brigades arrived in February or March of 2007. The full complement of surge Brigade were on the ground and the Surge effectively started 15 June 2007. This story is dated 19 April 2008 and some munitions were less than 12 months old meaning they were manufactured in Iran after April 2007 and then transported to Iraq probably at the earliest May 2007 or possibly later. In August 2007, after a very public battle in Karbala, Sadr announces a ceasefire to allow US forces to help him rid his militia of rogue elements. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army continues to receive a supply of weapons from Iran.

As the surge is focusing on Al Qaeda in Iraq elements in and around Baghdad, the Iranian regime is stockpiling weapons in the south in support of the Mahdi Army and other Special Groups. By January 2008, the surge against Al Qaeda in Iraq is effectively winding down as it has been routed and focus is starting to shift to the next most powerful enemy, the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, in February 2008. Sadr announces a continuation of the ceasefire in February 2008.

Iran attempts a coup in Southern Iraq in March 2008 which PM Maliki blunts. In April 2008, the Iraqi Army is still clearing Basra and Sadr City after having secured the cities of Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah in March 2008. Iran's coup is blunted, and its Qods Forces Commander must come to Basra to personally assure the Iraqi General in charge of operations that his forces will be pulled out of Basra.

All of these actions by Iran are taking place while it is denying any involvement in Iraq, support of Special Groups, and support of the Mahdi Army.

One must wonder what Iran is doing with regards to nuclear weapons in its own coutnry if it is attempting to do all of this under the nose of the US and Iraqi government in southern Iraq, all the while saying its nuclear development is only for peaceful purposes.

I stated before, the Battle of Basra is a major strategic turning point in Iraq. It showed all external forces, both Al Qaeda and Iran, that the Iraqi Army, the Government of Iraq, and PM Maliki have the courage to defend their country at the risk of harming relationships with Iran, a neighbor and also a Shia led power. In addition, it showed the Iraqi Army can quickly be repositioned to affect an attempted coup while still maintaining order elsewhere in the country. Also, it showed Sistani would allow (and even approve) Shiite on Shiite attacks as long as it was happening to ensure the terroritorial integrity of Iraq. Finally, it showed the weakness of the Mahdi Army, and Sadr in particular, which PM Maliki is now capitalizing upon in Sadr City as his forces are seeking to dislodge the Mahdi Army from this last bastion of control in Iraq.

Far from showing PM Maliki's and the Iraqi Army's weakness, the Battle of Basra has shown both are willing and able to secure their country. It is no wonder the Iraqi Accord Front (the major Sunni bloc in government) just announced it would return to the government. It also appears the Iraqi List (headed by interim prime minister Iyad Allawi) and Al Fadila party (an offshoot of Sadr's Mahdi Army) will possibly be returning soon.

PM Maliki just showed Iran and its Special Groups, Sadr and his Madhi Army, and the Sunnis who once were associated with Al Qaeda that military coups are no longer possible in Iraq. If an element wants to have influence in Iraq, it must seek this influence politically within the frameworks of the constitution and through democratic elections. Militarism will no longer be tolerated. In fact, militarism will be put down by force.

While many mistake the Battle of Basra for a small tactical battle which some say the Iraqi Army lost, it has much larger operational (Iraqi Army able to reposition forces quickly) and strategic (rule of law back by a strong central government) consequences.

This undeniable fact is proved by the Qods Forces Commander personally coming to Iraq to validate a ceasefire, the Iraqi Accord Front, Iraqi List, and Fadila party looking to come back into the government, PM Maliki's continual push into Basra and Sadr City, Sadr's unheeded words that he will unleash his Madhi Army, and finally Al Qaeda in Iraq's yet unseen renewed terror.

Iran will continue to attempt re-establish its influence in Southern Iraq. Al Qaeda will continue to attempt re-establish its campaign of terror in the west and northwestern part of Iraq. However, people making progress in Iraq are doing so within the democratic framework established by the constitution, like the Kurds who will continue to work within the constitution and with the central government for semi-autonomy. Neighboring countries will continue to open embassys, to include Kuwait. The EU is even in the process of signing up for oil from Iraq.

The much feared month long offensive by Al Qaeda in Iraq has failed to materialize as will Iranian influence in Southern Iraq wain. Iran's remaining major influence, Sadr's militia, is being systematically dismantled. Al Qaeda is the walking dead with leaders being killed or captured daily. This is not an organization the Sunnis wish to rejoin, in fact, they are rejoining the government.

In this war where we have the strategic Corporol whos actions have far reaching ramifications, we have small battles like Basra which have large strategic implications. While the US was slow to realize this fact, it did realize it in late 2006 and adjusted its tactics with the surge in early 2007. Al Qaeda in Iraq still has not realized the implications of the strategic Corporol, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Iranian Special Groups may have just realized it, which is why Coalition forces have now shifted focus to these Special Groups.

As I have stated before, 2008 will be an interesting year for the Global War on Terror. It is shaping up to be an interesting year indeed. Al Qaeda is defeated in its central front and has changed tactics to blunt losses in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran has lost a major underground effort in southern Iraq and is currently losing its voice in the Iraqi Parliament as Sadr's party will potentially be banned from participation in future elections. It may very well lose all influence if the Mahdi Army is defeated wholesale in Sadr City and Basra. The two Muslim extremists groups vying for power and control in the region have suffered major defeats at the hands of freedom and democracy, thanks to the Great Satan.

Iraq is truly becoming the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. The defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2007 and the defeat of Iran in the Battle of Basra in 2008 has assured this young democracy is alive, well, and will continue to influence other nations in the Middle East. President Bush's bold maneuver in the heart of the Middle East is paying off. A democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East is fast becoming a shining star which all other Middle Eastern country's will emulate.

Operation Charge of the Knights begins phase 3 in Hyyaniyah

From MNF-I.

BASRA, Iraq – Operation Saulat al Fursan, or Charge of the Knights, began a new phase of operations April 19. Phase 3 of the operation focuses on the criminal militia strongholds within the Hyyaniyah district area. Iraqi Army soldiers from the 1st and 14th Infantry Divisions are conducting the deliberate clearance operation. The operation began at approximately 6 a.m. when British artillery and US aircraft released ordnance against known criminal rocket and mortar sites west of Hyyaniyah. British and American Military Transition Teams are working alongside Iraqi Army units to provide leaders with advice, access to surveillance and the ability to “call for fire” and other support, if needed. “As with the earlier phases of Operation Charge of the Knights, this remains an Iraqi led, planned and executed mission,” said Major Tom Holloway, the British Army’s spokesman in southern Iraq. “Coalition troops are ready to provide support to Iraqi Security Forces as requested and required.” Operation Charge of the Knights began on March 24.

For all those who believe MSM reports which say the Iraqi Security Forces pulled out of Basra with their heads between their legs, they continue to clear district in Basra. Today, they are entering Phase 3 of yet an undetermined number of phases to clear Basra of criminal elements and militias.

While the Mahdi Army laid down weapons and agreed to a unilateral ceasefire which the Iranian Qods Force Commander was dispatched to Iraq to directly validate, Iraqi Security Forces continue to clear, secure, and hold more and more districts in Basra. Those Mahdi Army forces which did not lay down their weapons and other criminal and militia elements continue to be rolled up.

It must be noted again what is going on operationally to have a strategic outcome. Baghdad is being secured by US and IA forces. Mosul (the second largest city) is being secured by IA and US forces. Basra (the third largets city) is being secured by IA forces with US/British assistance. The three largest cities in Iraq are being secured and criminal elements are being pushed out, whether they be Al Qaeda, Iranian sponsored, or just plain opportunistic thugs. Finally, the Sadr stronghold of Sadr City, in Baghdad is systematically being cleared of rogue elements. US forces in the region signaled a shift of focus from Al Qaeda to Special Groups almost a month ago. The battles are now happening.

It must also be remembered, the Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah within the first 48 hours of PM Maliki's surge into southern Iraq. Many of these represent the next largest cities in Iraq behind the top three noted above. These operations, along with operations ongoing in Basra is why an Iranian Qods Forces Commander was dispatched to Iraq to broker a Mahdi Army ceasefire. He had to at least keep what remaining elements under Sadr's command still existed in hopes of fighting another day.

Today, the New York Times is reporting,

Iraqi soldiers took control of the last bastions of the cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s militia in Basra on Saturday, and Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad strongly endorsed the Iraqi government’s monthlong military operation against the fighters.

Just last week, the New York Times reported on the dismal showing of Iraqi forces, mass defections within the Iraq Army, and resiliency of Sadr's forces. Now, just a week later, the New York Times is reporting the "last bastions" of Sadr's forces are being rolled up in Basra. What many miss, including the New York Times, is PM Maliki, after securing Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah within the first 48 hours and much of Basra within the same timeframe, demanded that the Iranian Qods Forces commander come to Basra to guarantee the surrender of Iranian-backed Special Groups, chiefly among them the Madhi Army. In addition, Sadr directly told his force to lay down their weapons.

Those groups now fighting against Iraqi Army forces now have no backing from Iran, as such they are being systematically destroyed. Of course the Iranian Ambassador is going to support the continual operations in Basra after its failed attempt to take over the southern part of the country. First, it is the only thing Iran can do to save a little face in the region by signaling it support for ongoing operations, now into their third week. Second, it main sponsored ally in the region, Sadr and his Madhi Army, have either been killed, captured, wounded, or disarmed in all the southern cites and is being systematically cleared in Basra and Sadr City.

What many people outside the region do not understand is Sistani's power and how it plays into this battle and the region in general. Tithes are given to sects which people in this region believe is their Ayatollah or spirtual ruler. The overwhelming plurality of Shiites in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon give their tithes to Sistani, not Hezbollah's Nasrallah nor Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei nor Sadr. The Badr Organization in the south is completely loyal to Sistani also. Religiously, Iran and Sadr now coming out in support of Sistani, who supports the Basra (and Sadr City) operations to disarm militias is the only logical thing Iran and Sadr can do to save face. The difference between Basra is it is a completely Iraqi led operation while the clearance of Sadr City, while Iraqi led, is seen as more US influenced. Hence the Iranian Ambassador can come out and claim "The Great Satan" is indiscriminantly killing civilians.

The battles for control of Southern Iraq and Sadr City is just plainly the next phase of the surge which initially focused on Al Qaeda and has now shifted to focus on Special Groups. Iran has seen its largest Special Groups element effectively wiped out in about 48 hours, with only Basra and Sadr City elements able to hold on longer. If the New York Time article cited above is correct, the "last bastions" of Basra are now under IA control, meaning Mahdi elements have been completely defeated in Basra. The next focus will be Sadr City and then possibly a larger effort in Mosul.

Following these actions, we should see low level insurgencies as Al Qaeda and Special Groups remnants attempt to regain some footing in their respective regions. However, provincial elections in October will drastically change the local landscape in Iraq and who controls the distribution of the country's oil wealth. Moving into national elections with a country which is rather secured, PM Maliki has a good chance of resuming his Prime Ministership as he will not only have the backing of a small but influential Shiite sect, but also have the backing of Sunni and Kurds, which he signed a memorandum of agreement with in December of 2007.

In sum, PM Maliki has consolidated power in Iraq. While his party does not have a militia, he now controls the Iraqi Security Forces, the largest and best equipped force in the region. He was able to do this by establishing agreements with both Sunnis and Kurds. His old alliances, namely Sadr, has now been formally dissolved and its militia is quickly being defeated in Basra and Sadr City. Al Qaeda is only a remnant of its former self, and its leaders are the walking dead. If they stay too long in one place they are ratted out by the Sons of Iraq and Special Forces teams move in to detain or kill them. Iran's attempt to co-op southern Iraq has failed wholesale and now they are actually publically supporting the Mahdi Army's distruction. Oil revenues into the Iraqi treasury are at an all time high, which Iran does not get its fair share due to sanctions. Major oil contracts have just been announced in Iraq. Iraq is now a net oil exporter. Finally, Iraqi Security forces are gaining in capacity and experience. Let there be no mistake why the two greenist divisions were put directly into the fight in Basra and Sadr City. It was to give them combat experience, which shortly, may very well be hard to come by in Iraq.

The future of Iraq has greatly changed not only in the last year during the American military surge, but also in the last three weeks during the Iraqi Army surge.

Iraq’s Moment of Truth in Baghdad and Basra

From Mohammed Fadhil at Iraq the Model.

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki has been presented with a golden opportunity to build on political cohesion and bolster the rule of law by dismantling the Mahdi Army.

Why?

I think what encouraged Maliki to push the limits of the conflict to this unprecedented level was the first-of-a-kind success of the Political Council for National Security — an entity that includes the president, PM, and leaders of major parliamentary blocs — to reach consensus on a decision. This entity managed for the first time a week ago to overcome the impotence that had halted its mission since its inception. Evidence of the newfound potency of this entity is that Ayad Allawi, who had refused being part of it for a long time, is now sending delegates to negotiate terms for his membership.

Reconciliation is happening in Iraq. It is interesting that Sadr, or more specifically actions against Sadr, has become the impetus for reconciliation between the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. Mohammed explains,

Everyone has come to realize that allegiance to the country provides more security in the long run than sectarian entrenchment does, and in my opinion the awakening of the Iraqi west and the uprising against the perverted violent practices of co-religionists have provided an example for a similar awakening among the Shia — of course, with the main difference we outlined in an earlier post; that is, while in the west we had a tribal uprising against extremist religious powers, in the south the uprising is religious-on-religious, with the target highly identified with one particular group.

An interesting perspective indeed.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi government: "We will continue until we secure Sadr City"

From Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal.

The Iraqi government has committed to wresting Sadr City from the control of Shia militias, an Iraqi government spokesman and a US military spokesman said in a press briefing today in Baghdad. "We will continue until we secure Sadr City. We will not come out, we will not give up until the people of Sadr City have a normal life," Ali al Dabbagh, the spokesman for the government of Iraq, told AFP. "(Security forces) will do what they have to do to secure the area. I can't tell you how many days or how many months but they will not come out until they have secured Sadr City."

We should have taken care of the Mahdi Army in 2004. However, it is good that it will be dealt with by Iraqi Security Forces.

For a full read, click here.

Port City is Open for Business

From MNF-I.

UmQasr, a port city southeast of Basra, is filled with daily activities, as Iraqi workers load export and unload imports last week. “The estimated flow of goods into Iraq is 60,000 tons with 15,000 passing through UmQsar,” said Todd Stratton, Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq. “The single largest commodity is food such as wheat, rice, sugar and other food items,” Stratton said. “The port is a critical gateway to supply the Iraqi nation with food imports.”

Why is MNF-I telling the story of Um Qsar being opened for business? It could be the same reason General Petraeus reported to Congress the port of Um Qasr is now under the control of Iraqi Security Forces.

Meanwhile, anti-insurgent operations in Basra continue, Petraeus reported, noting Iraqi security forces now have control of the city of Um Qasr, the country’s main port. Um Qasr is a major conduit for the smuggling of weapons and contraband into Iraq, the general said.

The major reason for the story is a little talked about victory in Basra. The port, which used to be under control of Sadr's forces backed by Special Groups from Iran, is now under control of the Iraqi Government. This means two things. Smuggling is now most assuredly way down -- smuggling which directly benefited Sadr's Mahdi Army. In addition, the Iraqi Government is now getting imports directly instead of Sadr.

Make no doubt about it, the recent battle in Basra was a major tactical and operational success for PM Maliki and the Iraqi Government. It was not executed perfectly, but it was and still is being executed well enough.

Reports are confirming that approximately 1300 Soldiers and police refused to fight the Sadr militia and Special Groups in Basra and other southern cities. These 1300 traitors are now identified and fired. The remaining 28,700 Soldiers PM Maliki has pushed into the southern region are completely loyal to him and the Iraqi Government. It is these loyal forces which are now in control of the port of Um Qasr, ensuring the Iraqi Government has control of all the supplies coming into and going out of Iraq. More importantly, it assures the Qods forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army are no longer able to smuggle these supplies into the country for economic benefit for their forces, nor more importantly, smuggle oil out of the country. These elements have just lost a major source of revenue.

PM Maliki used military force to regain control of southern Iraq. In turn, his tactical and operational victory has allowed him to gain control of the economies of this region. Politically, he is introducing legislation which will outlaw militias and prevent members from running for Parliament who maintain militias. Finally, if one hasn't noticed, he is on many international and national programs touting the success in the south. He is expertly using all the instruments on Iraqi National Power to reduce the influence of Sadr and Iranian-sponsored Special Groups in Iraq.

I stated before in this blog. The Kurds haved secured the North. The Americans have secured the Central part of Iraq to include Baghdad, the center of gravity in Iraq. PM Maliki is securing the South.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is reduced down to at most 2000 remaining individuals who are hiding, but yet are still getting captured or killed daily. Sunnis, who have joined the Sons of Iraq, are now being screened for military/police service. The Sons of Iraq are, in addition, developing into a political party just in time for October Provincial Elections and National Elections in 2009. PM Maliki is no longer seen as a puppet of the Iranian government by Kurds and Sunnis. He is now seen as an secular Iraqi leader who will fight against Shiites for the betterment of Iraq. Sadr is politically isolated, he and his militia is in hiding in Iraq, and the head of the Sadr block in Iraq has just been assassinated. Iran, who attempted to exert political, economic, and military control in the South, now has to begin its carefully laid plans all over again after years of detailed planning. Finally, the Iraqi Security Forces have been independently tried and tested in the South and were victorious. In addition, 1300 traitors have been identified and expelled from the force to make it completely loyal to the government.

Not a bad month for the Government of Iraq. Not a bad month indeed.

The battle of Basra completely changed the political/diplomatic, informational, military, and economic landscape of Iraq. It solidified PM Maliki's power in Parliament. It will allow for reconciliation with Sunnis and Kurds. It completely isolated Sadr and highlighted Tehran/Qods' force efforts in Iraq. It has opened the way for free and fair elections in the south.

Iran's Busted Iraq Bid - Basra "Rising" Was Tehran's Op

From Amir Taheri. Mr. Taheri always provides great insight into Iran. In this New York Post article, he discusses the Tehran connection in Basra.

A GAMBLE that proved too costly. That's how analysts in Tehran describe events last month in Basra. Iran's state-run media have de facto confirmed that this was no spontaneous "uprising." Rather, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to seize control of Iraq's second-largest city using local Shiite militias as a Trojan horse. Tehran's decision to make the gamble was based on three assumptions: * Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wouldn't have the courage to defend Basra at the risk of burning his bridges with the Islamic Republic in Iran. * The international force would be in no position to intervene in the Basra battle. The British, who controlled Basra until last December, had no desire to return, especially if this meant getting involved in fighting. The Americans, meanwhile, never had enough troops to finish off al-Qaeda-in-Iraq, let alone fight Iran and its local militias on a new front. * The Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf would oppose intervention by the new Iraqi security forces in a battle that could lead to heavy Shiite casualties.

It appears now that Iran misjudged PM Maliki and Sistani. While they thought they had the inside track on both of these leaders, they obviously did not as PM Maliki had the courage to stand up to Iran and Sistani gave his blessing to the Maliki led operation. More important; however, is the outcome of each side. On the Iraqi side,

Soon, however, the tide turned. Maliki proved that he had the courage to lead the new Iraqi Security Force (ISF) into battle, even if that meant confronting Iran. The ISF showed that it had the capacity and the will to fight. Only a year ago, the ISF had been unable to provide three brigades (some 9,000 men) to help the US-led "surge" restore security in Baghdad. This time, the ISF had no difficulty deploying 15 brigades (30,000 men) for the battle of Basra. Led by Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi force sent to Basra was the largest that the ISF had put together since its creation five years ago. This was the first time that the ISF was in charge of a major operation from start to finish and was fighting a large, well-armed adversary without US advisers. During the Basra battles, the ISF did call on British and US forces to provide some firepower, especially via air strikes against enemy positions. But, in another first, the ISF used its own aircraft to transport troops and materiel and relied on its own communication system.

Iraq has shown Iran it is able to defend itself. Iran cannot directly attack Iraq due to US presence in the area so they tried to insight an "internal" uprising. It failed to materialize and the "internal" uprising was smashed. On the Iranian side,

After more than a week of fighting, the Iraqis forced the Quds commanders to call for a cease-fire through Sadr. The Iraqi commander agreed - provided that the Quds force directly guaranteed it. To highlight Iran's role in the episode, he insisted that the Quds force dispatch a senior commander to finalize the accord. The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded. Some analysts suggest this was the first war between new Iraq and the Islamic Republic. If so, the Iraqis won.

Tactically and operationally, the Iraqis won this first war. However, strategically, it was a draw.

But the battle also showed that the ISF still lacks the weapons systems, including attack aircraft and longer-range missiles, needed to transform tactical victories into strategic ones. The Iranian-sponsored Special Groups and their Mahdi Army allies simply disappeared from the scene, taking their weapons with them, waiting for another fight.

Now, all the pieces are starting to fall together better. Ahmadinejad visits Iraq a few weeks ago to test the waters in Iraq. He was able to test the waters with Maliki, but obviously came out with the wrong data. He was unable to see Sistani, as Sistani quitely refused to see him. Sadr, still adhering to a ceasefire, allowed the Qod forces to use his forces to attempt to take control of southern Iraq. This action failed miserably. Sadr is both militarily and politically weakened. PM Maliki is both militarily and politically strengthened. In addition, he is now seen by Kurds and Sunnis as a true Iraqi leader and not just an Iranian puppet. Iran has shown it hand in Iraq and now must restart from ground zero.

Basra was not the defeat that many western media outlets touted. It was, in fact, a major military and operational victory for Iraq. While strategically it is considered a draw, now Iran is in a much worse position to influence affairs inside southern Iraq specifically, and Iraq in general.

This battle has significantly changed the tide in Iraq and the balance of power in the Middle East.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi government moves to sideline Sadrists, Mahdi Army

From Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal.

Less than two week after many American newspapers were headlining that Maliki is weakened and Sadr won the battle of Basra, Mr. Roggio explains the current status of the Mahdi Army, the Sadr political party, and PM Maliki.

Less than two weeks after Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki launched Operation Knights' Assault to clear the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backer militias in Basrah, the Iraqi government is moving to ban Muqtada al Sadr's political movement from participating in the election if it fails to disband the militia. Facing near-unanimous opposition, Sadr said he would seek guidance from senior Shia clerics in Najaf and Qom and disband the Mahdi Army if told to do so, according to one aide. But another Sadr aide denied this.

Since Sadr's militia "won the battle of Basra", the Iraqi Government is seeking to pass an election law preventing movements with militias from participating in the election process. "Weaken" PM Maliki has near-unanimous support in the Parliament from Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite leaders for the proposed law. The "fragmented" Parliament is expected to easily pass this legislation into law within a couple of weeks. Passage in a couple of weeks would be a new record from conception to passage if executed as stated. All of these actions against Sadr does not sound like actions against a victor on the field of battle. PM Maliki leading these actions hardly appears politically weakened in a disjointed Parliament.

Hassan al Rubaie, a Sadrist member of parliament said,

Our political isolation was very clear and real during the meeting.... Even the blocs that had in the past supported us are now against us and we cannot stop them from taking action against us in parliament, We must go and explain to [Sadr] in person that there's a problem."

Maybe, just maybe, the reporters in Baghdad got it all wrong about the winners and losers in Basra, only a couple hundred miles south of their secure hotel rooms.

Far from another quagmire (as portrayed), it appears the Iraqi Government and Army are stepping up to the plate and confronting threats to their young democracy. The number one threat since Americans have isolated and weakened Al Qaeda is the Mahdi Army. The Iraqi Government is doing these actions for the better of Iraq, not Iran who supports Sadr. While not as proficient as American forces, the Iraqi Army is building capacity daily and is able to reposition itself in Iraq to bring the required forces to bear to defeat internal unrest. While not unified, when important, the Iraqi Parliament is able to come together to put into place political solutions to aid military forces.

Maybe, just maybe, the politicians who said all is lost in Iraq and the surge of American forces would only worsen the problems in Iraq got it all wrong from their secure offices only a couple thousand miles from Iraq.

I wonder how politicians, invested in defeat in Iraq, will fare in upcoming national elections in November. I wonder how the only presidential candidate remaining who has steadfastly supported the war and surge effort will fare in his presidential bid come November. October elections in Iraq will be extremely interesting now that Sadr's movement is militarily and politically isolated. More interesting will be November elections in America.

Lessons Learned from the Basra Fighting for the Iraq Hearings

From The Heritage Foundation.

The Maliki government's offensive in Basra sought to accomplish goals that the United States should support: weakening the Mahdi Army and other gangs supported by Iran. But the operation was poorly planned and executed and did not achieve the ambitious goals initially set out by Prime Minister Maliki.Although the Iraqi government did make some progress in curbing the militias in Basra, the campaign also demonstrated the continuing need for U.S. troops in Iraq.

James Phillips draws the following conclusions from the fighting in Basra

1. The Iraqi government's campaign to extend the rule of law to Basra was a step in the right direction. 2. Prime Minister Maliki has strengthened his nationalist credentials. 3. Iraq's security situation is fragile and the U.S. cannot afford to risk withdrawing troops too soon. 4. Iran exploited the Basra situation and will gain much more influence in Iraq if the next Administration rapidly withdraws U.S. troops.

For a full read, click here.

The Press Botches Basra

From The Weekly Standard written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio.

Both of these gentlemen point out differences in reporting coming out of Basrah versus the facts of all the articles combined. While headlines and text hailed Sadr's strength and resilience, facts show something completely different. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross and Roggio explain it best in these paragraph.

To be sure, the Iraqi security forces' performance in Basra is best described as mixed. However, they did not run into a wall. The Iraqi military was able to clear one Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood in Basra and was in the process of clearing another when Sadr issued his ceasefire. The ceasefire came on March 30, after six days of fighting, and was seemingly unilateral in the sense that the Iraqi government made no apparent concessions in return. By that time, 571 Mahdi Army fighters had been killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 had surrendered countrywide, according to numbers tabulated by The Long War Journal. Thus, an estimated 95 Mahdi Army fighters were killed per day during the six days of fighting. In contrast, al Qaeda in Iraq did not incur such intense casualties even during the height of the surge. The Iraqi security forces were at their best in the smaller cities in Iraq's south. The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days. The casualties taken by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and the wider south surely played a role in Sadr's tactical decision to call a ceasefire. An American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water. In short, [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort." Time's sources in Basra paint a similar picture. "There has been a large-scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," the magazine reported on March 30.

Both gentlemen go on to point out that Sadr unilaterally issued a ceasefire. PM Maliki accepted Sadr's ceasefire, but did not stop operations nor did he agree to Sadr's terms. In fact, reinforcements were sent to Basrah and raids are still being conducted to this day.

But the fact is that the Maliki government did not agree to the nine-point terms for a truce that Sadr issued, nor did it sue for peace or promise that operations would cease. Instead the Iraqi government called Sadr's order for his fighters to pull off the streets a "positive step," and insisted that operations would continue. "The armed groups who refuse al Sadr's announcement and the pardon we offered will be targets, especially those in possession of heavy weapons," Maliki said, referring to the ten-day amnesty period for militias to turn in heavy and medium weapons. "Security operations in Basra will continue to stop all the terrorist and criminal activities along with the organized gangs targeting people." Subsequent to the ceasefire, the Iraqi military announced it was moving reinforcements to Basra, and the next day pushed forces into the ports of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr. Iraqi special operations forces and special police units have conducted several raids inside Basra since then, while an Iraqi brigade marched into the heart of a Mahdi-controlled Basra neighborhood on April 2. And two days after Sadr called for a ceasefire, the government maintained a curfew in Sadr City and other Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. None of this would be happening had Maliki simply caved to Sadr.

In addition, the press reported an emergency session of Parliament was called to end Maliki's push into Basrah. However, again the facts show what actually happened.

Maliki's governing coalition did not revolt over this operation. When the Iraqi opposition held an emergency session of parliament to oppose the Basra operations, only 54 of the 275 lawmakers attended. AFP reported, "The two main parliamentary blocs--Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance--were not present for the session which was attended by lawmakers from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc, the small Shiite Fadhila Party, the secular Iraqi National List and the Sunni National Dialogue Council." The fact that the major political blocs in Iraq's parliament ignored the emergency session is politically significant, and no evidence suggests that Maliki's governing coalition has been jeopardized since then.

Finally, both of these gentlemen paraphrase what a military officer told them. For me, this provides the correct perspective.

As an American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Claiming a 'victory' and then withdrawing from the battlefield is the tactic of someone that is losing."

Combine this with the Kagan article and a lot of questions remain. However, one thing is certain. PM Maliki security operation was far from a failure it was portrayed to be in the media. While not a resounding tactical success, one has to ask, did it accomplish its strategic goals.

PM Maliki was attempting to secure his nation's oil wealth. He did as Iraqi Army units now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr.

PM Maliki was attempting to break up and defeat criminal elements which continue to bring violence to his country. Killing 95 fighters a day for six days is significant. The killed, captured, wounded, and surrendered numbers come out to 329 per day or 1,972 Madhi forces total for six days. In addition, The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days, as noted. In addition, his forces now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr as previously noted. This is hardly a defeat for PM Maliki.

Finally, PM Maliki stated he wanted to defeat Sadr's militia as the operation continues. This action requires considerable more time and will not be realized in six days. Hence, operations are still ongoing.

Politically, this operation did not hurt him as only 54 of 275 members of Parliament showed up for an emergency session with nobody attending from major parties. Politically, he obviously no longer enjoys the support of Sadr, who's 30 seats guarenteed his leadership of the country, but there are at least well over 200 members of Parliament who at least tacitly supported his operations in southern Iraq.

Militarily, the battle is still ongoing with 9 of 10 southern cities are now controlled by Iraqi Security Forces where they were at best contested beforehand. Militarily, almost 2000 insurgents were taken off the streets in six days. Militarily, Maliki was able to successfully move Iraqi Army units from one part of the country to another and logistically support them.

Looking at the facts, I would consider the battle in Southern Iraq to be completely successful with many strategic objectives accomplished or in the process of being accomplished. The battle of Basrah is ongoing. His military is capable of clearing and securing the south, the center, and is currently clearing Mosul.

Not a bad position to be in when you are uncertain if the US military will begin a wholesale withdraw from Iraq 10 months from today. This very concern is why PM Maliki may have decided to go it alone in the southern part of the country and why he is also providing the majority of forces in Mosul. He has two insurgencies who are vying for power in Iraq. His forces are taking them on, mostly on their own. He might as well test his military now, because 10 months from now, he may very well be going it alone.

The Great Green Zone Freak-Out of ‘08

From Nibras Kazimi at the Talisman Gate.

Mr. Kazimi discusses in his blog what happened in Basra with Maliki's forces and what happened in the Green Zone. It seems that PM Maliki went planned the Basra operation without Coalition assistance. In fact, while Coalition forces had developed a plan and the timing to go into Basra with Iraqi and American forces, PM Maliki rejected these plans and went with plans drawn up and created strictly by his generals. According to Mr. Kazimi, PM Maliki is asserting himself and his military in Iraq despite what General Petreous and Ambassador Crocker may or may not want to do.

Some Iraqi officers, headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, had worked on this Iraqi-American plan that is being referred to by Gordon and they were miffed when Maliki went with an alternative plan laid out by the Army’s point man in Basra General Mohan al-Freiji. These disgruntled Iraqi officers were sounding off during the first days of the offensive but have now gone quiet, opting to join the winning side.

If true, then PM Maliki is coming into his own. This situation supports my first take on the Basra situation is that PM Maliki is taking control of the south while Americans are taking it to Al Qaeda in the center and the Kurds are covering the north.

One thing we as a military have to do is allow the Iraqis to do their own thing. While we may do it better than Iraqi forces in many respects (building combat power, fighting, and logistics), they also do better than the Coalition forces in many other respects (less hindered by rules of engagement, they know the terrain better, and they can distinguish between good guy and bad guy better than we can).

As the situation unfolds, it appears that Sadr's forces took a beating in Basra in a purely planned, led, executed and supported Iraqi operation which was not synchronized with Americans in the Green Zone. This situation caught American personnel in the Green Zone off guard and caused an initial panic of top American generals. PM Maliki is continuing his rhetoric against Sadr stating,

Maliki, for his own purposes, was vocal in his musings earlier today that certain areas of Baghdad such as Sadr City need an Operation Cavalry Charge of their own. Maliki seems confident and this confidence is reflected in the smiling faces and good cheers throughout the halls of the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.

While the timing of PM Maliki's attacks in Basra may not coincide with American timelines, PM Maliki is operating on his own timeline. This situation shows that the government of Iraq is coming into its own. In addition, earlier I stated that PM Maliki's "memorandum of agreement" with Sunnis and Kurds is possibly now coming more and more into effect. Mr. Kazimi supports this contention with the following interesting tidbit from Sadr.

They are saying that Maliki “is fighting us with Sunni troops” and that the majority of military divisions and police units involved in the fight were comprised entirely of Dulaim tribesmen from Anbar.

If true, then reconciliation is more on track in Iraq than one would have thought a few days ago. In addition, politically this situation is also important because it shows that PM Maliki is not using Hakim's forces (which may or may not be loyal to him) but instead is using Sunni troops to battle Sadr and other criminal elements in Basra (Badr forces?) to ensure the country's oil wealth is going into the right coffers.

As stated before, the situation in Basra will be interesting to watch as it unfolds and more becomes known about the actual battles in the city. However, a few things are certain.

1. PM Maliki is now completely acting like an independent PM. When he wants to do something contrary to American policy, he will do it for his country's benefit regardless of what American commanders think.

2. PM Maliki has totally split with Sadr, the man who put him into power a few years ago. This tends to support the argument that PM Maliki now has other friends at the national level and does not need Sadr backing. Are these other friends Sunnis and Kurds who signed the "memorandum of agreement in December of 2007?

3. The Iraqi military is coming into its own. It is planning and executing completely independent operations. It is moving around the country from province to province, taking the battle to insurgents, and logistically supporting itself.

4. Whatever Maliki was doing in Basra was not what Iran wanted since they had to call in elements to stop the battle and convinced Sadr to lay down his arms.

All of these things above are good things, even if they are not in line with the Americans. Some other items which may be coming to pass are:

1. If Maliki did use Sunni forces and not Hakim's forces, he may also be splitting with the SIIC. This situation would definitely tend to suggest that PM Maliki has entered into different partnerships.

2. If Maliki did use Sunni forces, reconciliation is more predominant than one would expect.

3. PM Maliki is consolidating his power and now actively protecting his country's wealth, oil.

4. PM Maliki is setting the stage for provincial elections to take place in October 2008.

5. The political situation in Iraq has just drastically changed. The change is not beneficial to Iran nor Sadr. It is however, first and foremost, beneficial to Iraq's national unity.

Mr. Kazimi is always a good read and provides an interesting perspective. For a full read, click here.

So Who Really Won Iraqi Offensive Against Shiite Militias? (HINT: Not al-Maliki)

From Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog.

Contradictory signals abound in asymmetric conflicts like the Iraqi offensive. An Iranian general who is a designated terrorist played some significant role in the ceasefire, thus vaildating my prognosis. Sadr's backers in Baghdad are claiming victory today, even as U.S. troops patrol their streets. The British are now freezing plans to withdraw more troops from that city, signaling a lack of confidence that the Iraqis will secure the area anytime this year. But an admission from a U.S. Army general in Iraq is telling:

I stated before in this blog that Basra was a test for Maliki. It was his attempt to consolidate his power and weaken Sadr. The Kurds have kept peace in the north. The Americans are defeating Al Qaeda wholesale in the center. Maliki was supposed to defeat Sadr in the south.

According to reports, Sadr's forces were not defeated. I have to concur with Andrew Cochran that Maliki is weakened now since his forces were unable to defeat Sadr's militia in the south. However, the Iraqi Army forces in the south are predominantly made up of Hakim's old Badr Corp. So, not only is Maliki weakened, but so is Hakim. Furthermore, so is Sadr's forces as they have undoubtedly taken a pounding in this battle for control of the south. Politically, this tells me the struggle for Shiite dominance in provincial elections is now up in the air.

This is where I disagree with Andrew Cochran and other commentators about the endstate which is now being forecasted. Maliki is weakened politically, but is not out. Maliki before entered into a memorandum of understanding with Kurdish and Sunni leadership. Maliki's weakened status, as a result of the Basra operation, will cause him to lean more towards respecting this memorandum of understanding, possibly giving a larger voice to Kurdish and Sunni demands.

While it would have been better if Maliki's forces had defeated Sadr's militia wholesale, politics bring together strange bed fellows. This "unvictory" may cause Maliki to honor his memorandum of understanding to maintain political clout. Since Hakim's forces in the south were unable to defeat Sadr's forces, the two main Shiite parties will now split the Shiite vote, possibly giving more influence to Sunni and Kurds as a result of upcoming provincial elections.

The results in Basra politically are not unlike the current American presidential primaries with the Democratic party being split giving McCain a unique advantage in the upcoming general elections. Similarly, the Shiites are split now offering the Sunni and Kurds the ability to get more influence after this round of provincial elections and quite possibly in upcoming national elections in 2009. Both Hakim's SIIC and Sadr's militia are supported by Iran, which may explain why a Revolutionary Guard General from the Iranian Army stepped in to establish a truce.

In effect, the results of Basra has created four primary blocks instead of three. We now have the Sunni block, the Kurdish block, the Sadr block, and the Hakim block. No love has ever been lost between Hakim and Sadr. It was Sadr's hate for Hakim which forced him to throw in his 30 parliamentary seats to back Maliki for PM. With neither block will have a majority in upcoming general elections in 2009. The Sadr block will have to forge a coalition with the Sunni/Kurdish block if they hope to gain influence at the national level. I do not see this coalition happening due to his militia's past activities in sectarian killings. In addition, another coalition between the Sadr block and the Hakim block is now very remote as we saw in the first general election where both parties participated in a unified block. Therefore, the Hakim block will now have to actively negotiate with the Sunni/Kurdish block in any future national government, resulting in a forced reconciliation due to political factors present in a democratic Iraq.

Provincial elections in October 2008 will ensure provincial governments now speak for the people and allow the provinces to pass laws to regulate their provinces. Up until this time, it was apparent only the Sunni voice would be better represented. Now, both Shiite voices will also be represented, just not united. Nation elections in 2009 will ensure the national government is more representative of all Iraqis due to the possible forced reconciliation this "unvictory" in the south may bring about.

There is a silver lining in all clouds. This "unvictory" of Maliki's may very well be that silver lining that continues the process of reconciliation in Iraq.

Finally, Hakim's forces in southern Iraq which make up the Iraqi Army in this region will definitely be re-examined for loyalty and fitness for duty. This fact is not a bad thing. It is in fact a good thing because the loyalty and dependability of these forces have always been an issue. This battle just brings these factors to the forefront. Integration of Iraqi Army forces has happened all over the country minus the south. This battle may very well force more integration.

In addition, it has caused the Brits to postpone their withdraw and may actually get them actively engaged again in Southern Iraq. It has once again bloodied the nose of Sadr's forces which will cause his forces to once again regroup and retrain buying time for American forces to continue to battle Al Qaeda in Iraq. It has exposed the militia-type mentality of Hakim-dominated forces in the south which the military command can now reform.

What now waits to be seen is if Maliki can understand this "unvictory" was not an outright defeat for him and will seek to solidify partnerships in the "memorandum of understanding" he has been publicly avoiding to solidify his base of support. Only time will tell; however, this "unvictory" in southern Iraq does open new prospects for Iraq's democratic future.

This is just another political possibility as a result of the military operations in southern Iraq.

Operation Cavalry Charge - Maliki's Show of Force in Basra

From Talisman Gate.

Today, the Iraqi Army launched its first major military operation to fully control Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, without any—ANY—Coalition assistance. One source tells me that during the preparation phase of this campaign the Americans offered to position some U.S. Special Forces and air-cover near the Basra battle theater to act as back-up if needed but their Iraqi counterparts planning this operation politely turned down the offer.... Its chief objective is to flush out the organized crime cartels that control the port of Basra and the oil pipelines of the province. One major criminal force in the Basrawi scene are groups that affiliate themselves with the Sadrist movement and its Mahdi Army. Many of these criminal rings are also associated with certain factions of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard that operate in Basra both for intelligence/sabotage purposes as well as enriching themselves. By knocking out these egregious manifestations of lawlessness, Operation Cavalry Charge will have the accrued benefit of mashing up the more subtle patterns of Iran’s malignant influence in Iraqi Shiism’s foremost economic prize, the oil fields and port of Basra.

The question always becomes, why now?

Maliki has sent 50,000 Iraqi soldiers to deal with about a dozen criminal cartels. Militarily, this will be an easy fight. Those counseling caution and delay stressed that smashing Sadrist-related criminal cartels would spark a large-scale Sadrist reaction across Iraq at a time when the Bush administration wants to keep Iraq quiet especially with the ‘4000’ milestone that was being approached and got passed a couple of days ago. Another argument against action counseled that the Iranians are angling for a fire-fight to sully any talk of progress that Gen. Petraeus may give in a couple of weeks when he appears before Congress, and that the Democrats and their allies in the US media would take these images out of Basra and elsewhere and package the news as a “security meltdown” (…which they would and have done so, irrespective of reality).

Talisman Gate believes Maliki does not care about US politics, but instead is concerned about Iraqi politics and its relations with it neighbors.

Maliki decided that he doesn’t give a damn about US presidential elections and that the only timeline that concern him are Iraq’s own upcoming elections. Maliki also concluded, from intensive intelligence reporting, that the Sadrists are weak and that Iran doesn’t really have much punch to its supposed influence in Iraq. That’s why he decided to go for it.Muqtada al-Sadr knows fully well that should a third all-out confrontation erupt between forces associated with him on the one hand and U.S. and Iraqi government troops on the other, then it can only end with his death, arrest or the much more unlikely prospect of escape to Iran from which he won’t return to Iraq for a very, very long time—Muqtada really doesn’t like being in Tehran from what I’ve heard.

What does Sadr think about the attack on his forces?

One well-placed source claims that al-Sadr is lashing out at his inner circle and crying out “You’re going to get me killed! You’re going to get me killed!” I cannot gauge the veracity of this account, but this source had in the past accurately corroborated accounts from al-Sadr’s inner sanctum given to me by a fully trustworthy source (now deceased). This is the weakest that the Sadrist movement has ever been: they are divided, their leader is absent, some answer to Iran, and affluence has made them slothful and soft.

Finally, what about ordinary Iraqis?

Politically, too, the Shia middle class no longer sees a need to tolerate Sadrist hoodlums as the shock troops of the Shia sect in case a civil war breaks out with the Sunnis because that threat has long receded and is essentially forgotten, by both sides. These are the changed circumstances of the Sadrists; they no longer have the appetite for a bruising fight as they did in the spring and autumn of 2004. It has become much more difficult as the Iraqi state is now associated with Shia power (…and wealth transfer) and the vast majority of Shias, who’ve grown wiser about these things, don’t want to see this historic achievement imperiled in any way.

Oil is the wealth of the Iraqi nation. As long as crime cartels and militants control sections of the country's wealth, it can never be truly free and self-sustaining. Maliki is ridding the country of it last main non-government militia (the Mahdi Army) and a entrenched criminal organizations, controlled mostly by Special Groups. He is seeking to limit Iranian influence in his country.

In addition, this operation officially ends his ties with Sadr, who's 30 parliamentary seats, put Maliki into power and has up to this time prevented the government from embracing reconcilitation to a greater extent.

Early in December, a "memorandum of understanding" was signed between the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Dawa Party. Maliki also needed to enlist the support of Hakim's Badr Organization to seal his control of the country. Most military units in Southern Iraq are heavily Badr. Given that these forces are now listening to Maliki and attacking the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, it is obvious that Maliki is telling Iran to get out of Iraq and quit meddling in Iraqi politics by directly attacking those forces Iran supports. In turn, he intends to fully establish his government legitimacy over the country's oil wealth.

I concur with Talisman Gate. Far from this action being a flare up of violence, it is truly a consolidation of nationalistic power across the country and an indirect attack on Iranian influence in the region. The absence of US forces in the mix are a way for Maliki to show other countries his forces are now strong enough to stop defend his country. The presence of US troops in his country will prevent any overt attack. This operation is designed to stop subversive attacks within his country.

Kurdish forces have always been strong in the North and have continued to secure this region. Coalition forces in the center are busy defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq wholesale. The southern fight is Maliki's and he aims to show all Iraqis he can protect his country.

For a full read, click here.

Uncertainty Facing Iraq’s Awakening Movement Puts U.S. Strategy at Risk

From The Jamestown Foudnation.

As Iraq’s security situation deteriorates in the midst of resurgent violence, an increase in internal and external pressures facing the Awakening (Sahwa) Movement may jeopardize the prospects and goals set forth in the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy created by U.S. General David Petraeus. The formation of the Awakening Councils seemed a promising linchpin to the “surge” strategy, which has shown concrete signs of improving Iraq’s security sector. Though the rise of the Awakening movement contributed substantially in limiting al-Qaeda in Iraq in the short term, its forces face uncertain and problematic long-term challenges. If the dilemmas confronting the Awakening members continue to be marginalized by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, Iraq’s improved security situation is likely to revert back to sectarianism and civil war-like conditions.

A very interesting article.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Gov't Aims To Establish General Council For All Iraqi Tribes

From MEMRI.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has said that his government was continuing to work on uniting the Iraqi tribes and their national activity. He added that in this context, the government aimed to establish a general council for all Iraqi tribes. Al-Maliki also praised the help provided by the Iraqi tribes to the armed forces in their struggle against terror elements and lawbreakers, and for support for the National Reconciliation Initiative.

Mosul military operation might be delayed

From Alsumaria.

Nineveh deputy governor Khasro Koran announced that Mosul operation might be delayed because military forces number is not sufficient to start a large-scale military operation which was announced by Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki last month. He clarified that the operation might start within the coming weeks while US preparations are ongoing as US Forces are raiding insurgents’ strongholds.

Troop buildup in Mosul in preparation for big offensive

From Earth Times.

The Iraqi army was gathering troops and military equipment in the northern city of Mosul Thursday in preparation for a big offensive against al-Qaeda militants expected to be launched within hours, local media reported. "All necessary steps have been taken for a successful implementation of the military campaign, which will be backed by air support from the coalition forces," Mosul police chief General Wathik al-Hamdani told the state-owned al-Sabah newspaper. "The target is to enable security forces to take command of hot spots that are the bases of terrorist elements, such al-Qaeda and other loyal groups," the general said. Iraq's Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said Friday a "decisive battle" would be fought against al-Qaeda insurgents in Mosul, the country's third largest city.

The Iraqiness of this upcoming operation is stunning. This is not a US force operation with support from the Iraqi Army nor is it US forces putiing an Iraqi face on the operation. This ooperation is a Maliki led operation with his army against some of the last remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq which will be supported by US forces. This operation would have been unheard of just one short year ago.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi Security Forces Gain in Capability, Professionalism

From MNF-I.

Iraqi security forces increasingly demonstrate their professionalism and willingness to step up to protect the Iraqi people, a spokesman for Multinational Corps Iraq told reporters Sunday. During a briefing in Baghdad, Navy Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith pointed to numerous signs of progress in training and equipping the Iraqi army and police forces and the greater role these forces now play in Iraq’s security. “We continue to see examples of the increasingly professionalized Iraqi security forces stepping up to protect their people,” he said. Smith noted the gains being made by soldiers, police officers and groups such as “The Awakening” and concerned local citizens. For example, last week in Karmah, an Iraqi army unit discovered two critical stockpiles that together included more than 2,500 pounds of homemade explosives.

A functioning government with a capable military are more signs of progress in Iraq.

The Surge clearly provided the Iraqi Government with the breathing room it needed to begin to function. Everyday the government is growing stronger as are its forces.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq new national unity government debated

From Alsumaria.

It seems that the meeting held by the Islamic Party political councils and the Islamic Supreme Council headed by Sayyed Abdul Aziz Al Hakim and Vice President Tarek Al Hashemi have reached an agreement upon which the Islamic Party would join the alliance of Kurdish parties and Al Daawa Party and would lead to form a small government headed by Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki. Informed sources affirmed that governmental changes would draw down the number of ministries to 23 and change the number of ministers. Sources have linked between this step and the Islamic Party accord with the quartet alliance after resolving disputes inside the Accordance Front in favor of the party, despite his front’s willingness to return to government if their demands are met. The Islamic Council and Al Daawa Party seek to assure votes of 80 MPs while the Islamic Party is working to convince its allies in the Accordance Front to vote for the new alliance by persuading 30 MPs while Kurds represent about 55 votes, which assures more than half voices in the parliament.

So, it seems that the "memorandum of understanding" between the Sunnis and Kurds will join forces with Hakim's Islamic Council and the Daawa Party, ensuring Maliki a majority in Parliment.

The significance of this national unity government is critical for continued political progress in Iraq.

1. It forms a government representative of Iraqis - Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds.

2. It drops Maliki's need for support from Sadr, who is against continued US presence in Iraq and still maintains a militia against the government.

3. It will allow for further reconciliation with Sunnis.

4. It gives the Kurds a voice in future oil laws and federalism.

All and all, if successful, this national unity government could well ensure the survival of this young democracy.

For a full read, click here.

Iraqi forces mass outside Mosul

From The Columbus Dispatch.

Iraqi army reinforcements moved yesterday into positions near the northern city of Mosul, ready to strike al-Qaida in Iraq targets in the militant group's last urban stronghold, a top Iraqi officer said. Maj. Gen. Riyad Jalal, a senior officer in the Mosul region, said the additional forces would open an offensive against al-Qaida fighters "immediately after all the added troops arrive."

The significance of the upcoming battle in Mosul is discussed later in the story.

The U.S. military does not plan to send additional forces to Mosul, which a military spokesman said this month was the last urban safe haven for al-Qaida-led insurgents. The United States has said Iraqi security forces will take the lead in Mosul -- a major test of Washington's plan to shrink its force and ultimately leave it as backup for Iraqi security forces.

Iraqi Forces are taking the lead in the battle in Mosul. American Forces are still tied up in Diyala and Tigris River Valley. PM Maliki independently moved Iraqi Forces to Mosul to secure the city. While definitely being assisted by U.S. Forces in the form of Rangers and attack aircraft, the battle of Mosul, where the last significant amount of Al Qaeda in Iraq forces are holed up, will be dealt with by Iraqi Forces. This battle will not have Iraqi Forces being led by U.S. Forces, but Iraqi Forces planning, preparing, and executing the fight.

Combat actions have tested Iraqi Forces. They clearly past all tests. Now, they will be taking their final exam, so to speak. That final exam is Mosul.

PM receives IAF delegation, stresses reconciliation

From Aswat Aliraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki received a delegation from the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) on Saturday, stressing that reconciliation among all groups of the Iraqi people "has become a fait accompli". "Reconciliation is not a decision issued by high-level officials. Politicians of all blocs have to realize what is actually taking place on the ground and to contribute seriously and effectively to cementing national reconciliation," the prime minister's office quoted Maliki in a statement received by Aswat al-Iraq – Voices of Iraq – (VOI).

PM Maliki is moving closer to sealing the "memorandum of understanding" with Sunnis and Kurds as he attempts to lessen the influence of Sadr and his Mahdi Army.

For a full read, click here.

Iraq to go after al-Qaida in Mosul

From Yahoo/AP.

Iraq's prime minister announced Friday that the government was launching a major offensive against al-Qaida in the northern city of Mosul after two days of deadly bombings that killed nearly 40 people. He promised the fight "will be decisive." The announcement by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came after warnings by the U.S. military that Mosul was the last major city where al-Qaida maintains a strong presence after largely being driven from Baghdad and other major population centers. Al-Maliki said the government was sending troops to Mosul and an operations room had been established to fight the insurgents.

This move by Maliki is significant in that he does not mention U.S. forces. He only mentions Iraqi Army forces. While U.S. Forces are already in Mosul, there numbers are small. While Iraqi Army Forces will undoubtedly link up with U.S. Forces, it appears that Maliki wants this fight to be mainly an Iraqi Army fight.

It will be interesting to see how far Iraqi Army forces have come. Can they clear and secure an ethnically diverse city such as Mosul while maintaining support from the populous in this religiously mixed city?

For a full read, click here.