Iraqis begin to "despise" the Mahdi Army in Baghdad's Rusafa district

From Bill Ardolino at The Long War Journal filing the story from Baghdad, Iraq after interviewing locals in Rusafa. Citizens are beginning to turn away from the Mahdi Army and towards Iraqi Security Forces. One of several similar quotes:

“Originally the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army) in our area used to deceive people by using the name of the religion to do their purposes,” said Dhia, Hassan’s executive officer. “They were all corrupted. They have history in crime, robberies, murders, rapes and all kinds of bad things. They even reached the level of kidnapping people and demanding ransoms just because they have money. It didn’t matter if he is Shia or Sunni; just because he has money. They gave a bad reputation for Islam.”

From another Iraqi:

“Right now because of the fighting Sadr City, people have started to despise [the Mahdi Army] because of the situation they created,” said “Rammie,” an Army interpreter raised and living in Rusafa. “People have started to know the truth of [the Mahdi Army] as kidnappers, killers, car-jackers and agents of the Iranian government. But the recent fighting against the [Iraqi security forces] means they are also against the government. They are not trying to just fight the invasion forces as they claim, but they fight whoever interferes with their mafia activity.”

These are two key points why the Mahdi Army is suffering from lack of recruits. Their actions are against Islam and against the democratic government. Another quote shows distrust for Sadr's forces due to Iranian connections. These are all fissures which ISF and GOI elements should use to decrease Sadr's influence in Iraq.

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Command and control center of armed militias in Sadr city bombed, destroyed

From KUNA.

The U.S. army in Iraq reported on Saturday that its troops and Iraqi forces bombed and destroyed today a centre for the leadership of the armed militias in Sadr City, north-east of the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

Doesn't sound like the Mahdi Army is fairing very well in Sadr City.

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Al-Qaeda is dwindling in Afghanistan and Iraq

From The Daily Star of Lebanon.

The most interesting discovery during a visit to Jalalabad, where Osama bin Laden planted his flag in 1996, is that Al-Qaeda seems to have all but disappeared. The group is on the run, too, in Iraq, and that raises some interesting questions about how to pursue this terrorist enemy in the future.

No only is Al Qaeda's presence reduced in the Jalalabad, it is also in the north, east, and southern part of Afghanistan. Now, insurgents in Afghanistan are a loose collection of insurgent groups, mostly linked to historic warlords, but not a centrally controlled organization. In Iraq, we see much of the same.

Traveling in Iraq this year, I've heard similar accounts of Al-Qaeda's demise there. That stems from two factors: the revolt by Sunni tribal leaders against Al-Qaeda's brutal intimidation; and the relentless hunt for its operatives by US Special Forces. As the flow of human and technical intelligence improves and the US learns to fuse it for quick use by soldiers on the ground, the anti-terrorist rollback accelerates.

For a full read, click here.

Are Sadr and al-Qaeda Teaming Up in Iraq?

From Omar Fadhil.

A few days ago, there were two suspiciously coordinated statements emerging from Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr made open-war threats followed immediately by a similar threat from al-Qaeda. As they say, there is usually no smoke without fire.

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How We'll Know When We've Won

From Frederick W. Kagan at The Weekly Standard. Mr. Kagan reviews the war's objectives in Iraq.

Virtually everyone who wants to win this war agrees: Success will have been achieved when Iraq is a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia.

So, how are we and the Iraqi government doing in these areas?

Stability. Violence is the most obvious indicator of instability and the easiest to measure. The fact that violence has fallen dramatically in Iraq since the end of 2006 is evidence of improving stability. But critics are right to point out that areas tend to be peaceful both when government forces control them completely and when insurgents control them completely. Violence can drop either because the government is winning or because insurgents are consolidating their gains. So in addition to counting casualties and attacks, it is necessary to evaluate whether government control has been expanding or contracting. In fact, it has expanded dramatically over the past 15 months.

Not a lot of argument about increased stability in Iraq. What about representative government?

Representative government. The Iraqi government is the product of two elections. The Sunni Arabs boycotted the first, with the result that Iraq's provincial councils and governors do not reflect its ethno-sectarian make-up. The second saw a large Sunni Arab turnout and the seating of a multiethnic, multisectarian government in Baghdad. The Iraqi government recently passed a law calling for provincial elections later this year, and the United Nations special envoy to Iraq, Steffan de Mistura, has been consulting with Baghdad about the details of the election, including efforts to ensure that the various committees overseeing it are not unduly influenced by militias or political parties. Surveys show that the Iraqis are nearly unanimous in their desire to vote, particularly in Sunni areas. The Anbar Awakening has turned into a political movement, introducing political pluralism into Sunni Arab politics for the first time. Similar movements, including the splintering of Moktada al-Sadr's "Sadrist Trend," are underway more haltingly among the Shia.

Counter arguments can be brought about a representative government, but provincial elections later this year and national elections next year will show whether or not a representative government exists and can transition in Iraq. What about terroritial control?

Control of territory. The restoration of large urban and rural areas formerly held by insurgents and militias to government control is a key indicator of Iraqi progress. And there are others: the Maliki government's determination to clear Basra and Sadr City of militia influence; Iraqi operations to clear Mosul of al Qaeda fighters; the dramatic growth of the Iraqi Security Forces in 2007 and the further growth underway in 2008. There is anecdotal confirmation of this progress, such as the dramatic decline in the number of illegal militia-controlled checkpoints, most of them set up in and around Baghdad in 2006 for purposes of control, extortion, and murder.

Again, there can be no argument here. Iraqi Security Forces are controlling more and more of their territory as they become larger and more capable.

Orientation toward the West. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Iraq in March 2008 and was warmly received, prompting concern in the United States that the Iraqi government was tilting toward Tehran.... A closer examination shows this to be false.... It has asked the United Nations to endorse the Multinational Force mission supporting it, a mission that includes American forces--but not Iranian ones. It has requested a bilateral security agreement with the United States--and not with Iran. It has determined to purchase American weapons and equipment for its armed forces, to replace the Warsaw Pact gear it had been using--and has not requested equipment from Iran or its principal international suppliers, Russia and China. Baghdad is organizing, training, and equipping its military and police forces to be completely interoperable with the United States--and not with Iran.

Mr Kagan makes a great point here. Iraq will stand with the United States if the United States stands with Iraq. They have clearly showed this fact to be true.

An ally in the war on terror. Al Qaeda has killed many more Iraqis than Americans. Iraq has eight army divisions--around 80,000 troops--now in the fight against al Qaeda, and another three--around 45,000 troops--in the fight against Shia extremists. Tens of thousands of Iraqi police and National Police are also in the fight. Thus, there are far more Iraqis fighting al Qaeda and Shia militias in Iraq than there are American troops there. Easily ten times as many Iraqi as Pakistani troops are fighting our common enemies. At least three times as many Iraqi soldiers and police as Afghan soldiers and police are in the fight. And many times more Iraqi troops are engaged in the war on terror than those of any other American ally. In terms of manpower engaged, and sacrifice of life and limb, Iraq is already by far America's best ally in the war on terror.

This example clearly shows Iraqi are in the fight with the United States. They have committed more troops to battling not only Al Qaeda, but also Shiite extremists. Granted the war is in their country, but they are not sitting back like they did in 2006. They are now actively pursuing Al Qaeda and Shiite militias.

From all these facts, it is clear that the Government of Iraq is well on its way to being a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia.

For a thorough read of all of Mr. Kagan's points, click here.