Tactical to Operational to Stategic
I have been asked why many of my posts begin at the tactical level and proceed to a strategic objective. Please let me elaborate.
Whenever a country employs its instruments of National Power (namely diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) they should be tied to overarching strategic goals and objectives. As such, all tactical operations, especially in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment have to be examined in the context of whether they are accomplishing operational goals and objectives which will ultimately lead to strategic objectives.
The President's strategic goal in Iraq is a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror. For the Middle East, change the word Iraq in the previous sentence to Middle East and one can clearly see the President's strategic goal for the region. For the broader Global War on Terror, change the words Middle East to Non-functioning Gap. The President will use all instruments of national power to move towards this strategic goal. For this purpose; however, let's focus on Iraq, the central front of the War on Terror.
Operationally, this strategic goal is translated into military, economic, and diplomatic objectives. The overarching military objectives in Iraq has always been to clear, secure, hold, and rebuild areas and regions within this country. Tactically, the military clears, secures and holds areas. Once areas are cleared and secured, State Department assets can begin to rebuild. Rebuilding promotes economic growth and employment while promoting a strong central government who, by rebuilding, is providing essential services to members of its country, enhancing its political (or diplomatic) prestige. With essential services provided, commerce will flourish, promoting the democracy, hence the government is in a sort of feedback loop. Security promotes economics which strengthens the government which promotes further security.
In a COIN environment, we not only have a strategic corporal, but we also have tactical successes which lend directly to strategic security and goals. The term "strategic corporal" states this very fact. A corporal is the smallest element of leadership within a tactical formation. His actions have far reaching strategic consequences in a COIN environment.
Similarly, small tactical actions also need to be examined for their strategic consequences through the operational framework of the region.
This is why I often bring small tactical actions through the operational framework of a region and into the strategic objectives laid out by the President. It is only by doing these mental calculations can we see whether tactical actions are nested appropriately into the strategic objectives.
Hence, the battles in Mosul which have netted almost 1,500 insurgents of which about 300 are "wanted" or Tier 1 or 2 insurgents, are looked at operationally throughout Iraq in conjunction with battles in Sadr City, Basra, and Diyala to see if operationally, we are moving in the right direction given the strategic goals in Iraq.
At times, these strategic goals in Iraq are discussed in broader goals for the Middle East in general. In addition, at times these strategic goals are looked at in terms of the non-functioning gap as a whole, which is where the Global War on Terror focuses.
Since our enemy has made Iraq its central front in the battle we call the War on Terror, Iraq, more than any country, provides easy examination of whether or not tactical actions are having the desired strategic affect. Its location, in the heart of the Middle East, and its ethno-religious make up, having Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds, helps us better understand how these different ethno-religious groups perceive our tactical, operational, and strategic actions.
The Global War on Terror's center of gravity is Iraq much as Baghdad, operationally, is the center of gravity in Iraq. Simultaneously, Mosul is tactically now the center of gravity for Al Qaeda as is Sadr City tactically the center of gravity for Sadr's Mahdi Army.
In conclusion, by stepping up and down the goals and objectives ladder from strategic to tactical and examining all these actions within a country's instruments of national power, we can see if tactical actions are having the desired strategic affect in an area or region. This very fact is why I often look at tactical battles and translate them to the broader strategic objectives in a region and at time the strategic objectives of the War on Terror in general.
Whenever a country employs its instruments of National Power (namely diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments) they should be tied to overarching strategic goals and objectives. As such, all tactical operations, especially in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment have to be examined in the context of whether they are accomplishing operational goals and objectives which will ultimately lead to strategic objectives.
The President's strategic goal in Iraq is a unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror. For the Middle East, change the word Iraq in the previous sentence to Middle East and one can clearly see the President's strategic goal for the region. For the broader Global War on Terror, change the words Middle East to Non-functioning Gap. The President will use all instruments of national power to move towards this strategic goal. For this purpose; however, let's focus on Iraq, the central front of the War on Terror.
Operationally, this strategic goal is translated into military, economic, and diplomatic objectives. The overarching military objectives in Iraq has always been to clear, secure, hold, and rebuild areas and regions within this country. Tactically, the military clears, secures and holds areas. Once areas are cleared and secured, State Department assets can begin to rebuild. Rebuilding promotes economic growth and employment while promoting a strong central government who, by rebuilding, is providing essential services to members of its country, enhancing its political (or diplomatic) prestige. With essential services provided, commerce will flourish, promoting the democracy, hence the government is in a sort of feedback loop. Security promotes economics which strengthens the government which promotes further security.
In a COIN environment, we not only have a strategic corporal, but we also have tactical successes which lend directly to strategic security and goals. The term "strategic corporal" states this very fact. A corporal is the smallest element of leadership within a tactical formation. His actions have far reaching strategic consequences in a COIN environment.
Similarly, small tactical actions also need to be examined for their strategic consequences through the operational framework of the region.
This is why I often bring small tactical actions through the operational framework of a region and into the strategic objectives laid out by the President. It is only by doing these mental calculations can we see whether tactical actions are nested appropriately into the strategic objectives.
Hence, the battles in Mosul which have netted almost 1,500 insurgents of which about 300 are "wanted" or Tier 1 or 2 insurgents, are looked at operationally throughout Iraq in conjunction with battles in Sadr City, Basra, and Diyala to see if operationally, we are moving in the right direction given the strategic goals in Iraq.
At times, these strategic goals in Iraq are discussed in broader goals for the Middle East in general. In addition, at times these strategic goals are looked at in terms of the non-functioning gap as a whole, which is where the Global War on Terror focuses.
Since our enemy has made Iraq its central front in the battle we call the War on Terror, Iraq, more than any country, provides easy examination of whether or not tactical actions are having the desired strategic affect. Its location, in the heart of the Middle East, and its ethno-religious make up, having Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds, helps us better understand how these different ethno-religious groups perceive our tactical, operational, and strategic actions.
The Global War on Terror's center of gravity is Iraq much as Baghdad, operationally, is the center of gravity in Iraq. Simultaneously, Mosul is tactically now the center of gravity for Al Qaeda as is Sadr City tactically the center of gravity for Sadr's Mahdi Army.
In conclusion, by stepping up and down the goals and objectives ladder from strategic to tactical and examining all these actions within a country's instruments of national power, we can see if tactical actions are having the desired strategic affect in an area or region. This very fact is why I often look at tactical battles and translate them to the broader strategic objectives in a region and at time the strategic objectives of the War on Terror in general.
Labels: Long War, The Long War
posted by Lieutenant Colonel Caveman at Monday, May 26, 2008
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