The Press Botches Basra

From The Weekly Standard written by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill Roggio.

Both of these gentlemen point out differences in reporting coming out of Basrah versus the facts of all the articles combined. While headlines and text hailed Sadr's strength and resilience, facts show something completely different. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross and Roggio explain it best in these paragraph.

To be sure, the Iraqi security forces' performance in Basra is best described as mixed. However, they did not run into a wall. The Iraqi military was able to clear one Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood in Basra and was in the process of clearing another when Sadr issued his ceasefire. The ceasefire came on March 30, after six days of fighting, and was seemingly unilateral in the sense that the Iraqi government made no apparent concessions in return. By that time, 571 Mahdi Army fighters had been killed, 881 wounded, 490 captured, and 30 had surrendered countrywide, according to numbers tabulated by The Long War Journal. Thus, an estimated 95 Mahdi Army fighters were killed per day during the six days of fighting. In contrast, al Qaeda in Iraq did not incur such intense casualties even during the height of the surge. The Iraqi security forces were at their best in the smaller cities in Iraq's south. The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days. The casualties taken by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad, Basra, and the wider south surely played a role in Sadr's tactical decision to call a ceasefire. An American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water. In short, [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort." Time's sources in Basra paint a similar picture. "There has been a large-scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," the magazine reported on March 30.

Both gentlemen go on to point out that Sadr unilaterally issued a ceasefire. PM Maliki accepted Sadr's ceasefire, but did not stop operations nor did he agree to Sadr's terms. In fact, reinforcements were sent to Basrah and raids are still being conducted to this day.

But the fact is that the Maliki government did not agree to the nine-point terms for a truce that Sadr issued, nor did it sue for peace or promise that operations would cease. Instead the Iraqi government called Sadr's order for his fighters to pull off the streets a "positive step," and insisted that operations would continue. "The armed groups who refuse al Sadr's announcement and the pardon we offered will be targets, especially those in possession of heavy weapons," Maliki said, referring to the ten-day amnesty period for militias to turn in heavy and medium weapons. "Security operations in Basra will continue to stop all the terrorist and criminal activities along with the organized gangs targeting people." Subsequent to the ceasefire, the Iraqi military announced it was moving reinforcements to Basra, and the next day pushed forces into the ports of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr. Iraqi special operations forces and special police units have conducted several raids inside Basra since then, while an Iraqi brigade marched into the heart of a Mahdi-controlled Basra neighborhood on April 2. And two days after Sadr called for a ceasefire, the government maintained a curfew in Sadr City and other Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. None of this would be happening had Maliki simply caved to Sadr.

In addition, the press reported an emergency session of Parliament was called to end Maliki's push into Basrah. However, again the facts show what actually happened.

Maliki's governing coalition did not revolt over this operation. When the Iraqi opposition held an emergency session of parliament to oppose the Basra operations, only 54 of the 275 lawmakers attended. AFP reported, "The two main parliamentary blocs--Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance--were not present for the session which was attended by lawmakers from radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's bloc, the small Shiite Fadhila Party, the secular Iraqi National List and the Sunni National Dialogue Council." The fact that the major political blocs in Iraq's parliament ignored the emergency session is politically significant, and no evidence suggests that Maliki's governing coalition has been jeopardized since then.

Finally, both of these gentlemen paraphrase what a military officer told them. For me, this provides the correct perspective.

As an American military officer serving in southern Iraq told us, "Claiming a 'victory' and then withdrawing from the battlefield is the tactic of someone that is losing."

Combine this with the Kagan article and a lot of questions remain. However, one thing is certain. PM Maliki security operation was far from a failure it was portrayed to be in the media. While not a resounding tactical success, one has to ask, did it accomplish its strategic goals.

PM Maliki was attempting to secure his nation's oil wealth. He did as Iraqi Army units now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr.

PM Maliki was attempting to break up and defeat criminal elements which continue to bring violence to his country. Killing 95 fighters a day for six days is significant. The killed, captured, wounded, and surrendered numbers come out to 329 per day or 1,972 Madhi forces total for six days. In addition, The Mahdi Army suffered major setbacks in Hillah, Najaf, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, and Nasiriyah. The security forces drove the Mahdi Army off the streets in those cities within days, as noted. In addition, his forces now control the port cities of Khour al Zubair and Umm Qasr as previously noted. This is hardly a defeat for PM Maliki.

Finally, PM Maliki stated he wanted to defeat Sadr's militia as the operation continues. This action requires considerable more time and will not be realized in six days. Hence, operations are still ongoing.

Politically, this operation did not hurt him as only 54 of 275 members of Parliament showed up for an emergency session with nobody attending from major parties. Politically, he obviously no longer enjoys the support of Sadr, who's 30 seats guarenteed his leadership of the country, but there are at least well over 200 members of Parliament who at least tacitly supported his operations in southern Iraq.

Militarily, the battle is still ongoing with 9 of 10 southern cities are now controlled by Iraqi Security Forces where they were at best contested beforehand. Militarily, almost 2000 insurgents were taken off the streets in six days. Militarily, Maliki was able to successfully move Iraqi Army units from one part of the country to another and logistically support them.

Looking at the facts, I would consider the battle in Southern Iraq to be completely successful with many strategic objectives accomplished or in the process of being accomplished. The battle of Basrah is ongoing. His military is capable of clearing and securing the south, the center, and is currently clearing Mosul.

Not a bad position to be in when you are uncertain if the US military will begin a wholesale withdraw from Iraq 10 months from today. This very concern is why PM Maliki may have decided to go it alone in the southern part of the country and why he is also providing the majority of forces in Mosul. He has two insurgencies who are vying for power in Iraq. His forces are taking them on, mostly on their own. He might as well test his military now, because 10 months from now, he may very well be going it alone.