Iran's Busted Iraq Bid - Basra "Rising" Was Tehran's Op

From Amir Taheri. Mr. Taheri always provides great insight into Iran. In this New York Post article, he discusses the Tehran connection in Basra.

A GAMBLE that proved too costly. That's how analysts in Tehran describe events last month in Basra. Iran's state-run media have de facto confirmed that this was no spontaneous "uprising." Rather, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to seize control of Iraq's second-largest city using local Shiite militias as a Trojan horse. Tehran's decision to make the gamble was based on three assumptions: * Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wouldn't have the courage to defend Basra at the risk of burning his bridges with the Islamic Republic in Iran. * The international force would be in no position to intervene in the Basra battle. The British, who controlled Basra until last December, had no desire to return, especially if this meant getting involved in fighting. The Americans, meanwhile, never had enough troops to finish off al-Qaeda-in-Iraq, let alone fight Iran and its local militias on a new front. * The Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf would oppose intervention by the new Iraqi security forces in a battle that could lead to heavy Shiite casualties.

It appears now that Iran misjudged PM Maliki and Sistani. While they thought they had the inside track on both of these leaders, they obviously did not as PM Maliki had the courage to stand up to Iran and Sistani gave his blessing to the Maliki led operation. More important; however, is the outcome of each side. On the Iraqi side,

Soon, however, the tide turned. Maliki proved that he had the courage to lead the new Iraqi Security Force (ISF) into battle, even if that meant confronting Iran. The ISF showed that it had the capacity and the will to fight. Only a year ago, the ISF had been unable to provide three brigades (some 9,000 men) to help the US-led "surge" restore security in Baghdad. This time, the ISF had no difficulty deploying 15 brigades (30,000 men) for the battle of Basra. Led by Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi force sent to Basra was the largest that the ISF had put together since its creation five years ago. This was the first time that the ISF was in charge of a major operation from start to finish and was fighting a large, well-armed adversary without US advisers. During the Basra battles, the ISF did call on British and US forces to provide some firepower, especially via air strikes against enemy positions. But, in another first, the ISF used its own aircraft to transport troops and materiel and relied on its own communication system.

Iraq has shown Iran it is able to defend itself. Iran cannot directly attack Iraq due to US presence in the area so they tried to insight an "internal" uprising. It failed to materialize and the "internal" uprising was smashed. On the Iranian side,

After more than a week of fighting, the Iraqis forced the Quds commanders to call for a cease-fire through Sadr. The Iraqi commander agreed - provided that the Quds force directly guaranteed it. To highlight Iran's role in the episode, he insisted that the Quds force dispatch a senior commander to finalize the accord. The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded. Some analysts suggest this was the first war between new Iraq and the Islamic Republic. If so, the Iraqis won.

Tactically and operationally, the Iraqis won this first war. However, strategically, it was a draw.

But the battle also showed that the ISF still lacks the weapons systems, including attack aircraft and longer-range missiles, needed to transform tactical victories into strategic ones. The Iranian-sponsored Special Groups and their Mahdi Army allies simply disappeared from the scene, taking their weapons with them, waiting for another fight.

Now, all the pieces are starting to fall together better. Ahmadinejad visits Iraq a few weeks ago to test the waters in Iraq. He was able to test the waters with Maliki, but obviously came out with the wrong data. He was unable to see Sistani, as Sistani quitely refused to see him. Sadr, still adhering to a ceasefire, allowed the Qod forces to use his forces to attempt to take control of southern Iraq. This action failed miserably. Sadr is both militarily and politically weakened. PM Maliki is both militarily and politically strengthened. In addition, he is now seen by Kurds and Sunnis as a true Iraqi leader and not just an Iranian puppet. Iran has shown it hand in Iraq and now must restart from ground zero.

Basra was not the defeat that many western media outlets touted. It was, in fact, a major military and operational victory for Iraq. While strategically it is considered a draw, now Iran is in a much worse position to influence affairs inside southern Iraq specifically, and Iraq in general.

This battle has significantly changed the tide in Iraq and the balance of power in the Middle East.

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