Revolt in Pakistani Tribal Areas

From Syed Saleem Shahzad writing for the Asia Times Online in Part I and Part II.

The ceasefire deal between the Pakistani security forces and a leading member of the al-Qaeda-linked Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, brokered by two stalwart Afghan commanders who persuaded Mehsud to stay in Afghanistan, is just the lull before a big storm and the beginning of a new chapter of militancy in Pakistan.

Mr. Shahzad continues that the ceasefire is tenuous and is not expected to last.

Even before Thursday's ceasefire, the Taliban's preparations in the strategic backyard of Pakistan were well underway. This included the isolation of Mehsud and appointing a new team of commanders in the Pakistani tribal areas. Most of the new appointments are Afghans, to signify the importance of fighting a war in Afghanistan rather than in Pakistan. The two main commanders are Abdul Wali in Bajaur Agency and Ustad Yasir in Khyber Agency. A key component of the Taliban's offensive this year will be to counter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) plans against them and al-Qaeda. (emphasis added)

I find this Al Qaeda strategy interesting in that it is a defensive strategy rather than an offensive one. Their prime strategy is to counter NATO's plans against them. This fact shows that Al Qaeda is on the ropes in Afghanistan despite MSM reporting. Al Qaeda tells of its areas where it will focus.

"But since the Taliban want to chop off NATO supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban have warned these tribal elders to stay away from the conflict. However, the elders have received huge bribes [funds] from NATO, and so they are obsessed with providing protection to the supply convoys. Therefore, the Taliban will increase their activities in Khyber Agency, which means a war with the elders of the Shinwari and Afirdi tribes," the contact said. The second sector of Taliban activity will be in Nooristan and Kunar provinces in Afghanistan, where US forces are conducting huge counter-insurgency operations. "This year, the Taliban will focus their main attention on a new plan specifically aimed at Kunar and Nooristan. The details of the plan cannot be revealed at this point," said the contact. (emphasis added)

The Khyber Agency in Pakistan and the Nooristan province in Afghanistan both border the Khyber Pass from which US forces in Afghanistan receive supplies from Pakistan. On the Pakistani side of the border, Peshawar will be key to Al Qaeda attacks in the Khyber Pass. Tank and later Bannu would have also given Al Qaeda a tactical advantage. However, securing Tank was the key to securing Bannu. With Tank back in the hands of Pakistani forces and the Shinwari and Afirdi tribes in the Khyber Pass still supporting the flow of supplies, one is hard pressed to see how Al Qaeda can continue with this strategy which is why I find the strategy more of a defensive strategy than an offiensive one.

It appears that both the US and Pakistani forces are more apt to go on the offensive this year noted by the following.

Wana military airfield in South Waziristan and Miranshah airfield in North Waziristan have been upgraded from makeshift airstrips into proper runways with backup facilities, which indicate plans for a powerful air operation. The deployment of US forces at Lowari Mandi and Ghulman Khan checkpoints (both on the Afghan side of the border near North Waziristan) and the construction of a new military camp near Shawal (North Waziristan), on the Afghan side, indicate that the US is not planning on peace for very long.

American and Pakistani forces are building capability to attack Al Qaeda in its unassailable base in Northern and Southern Waziristan. Precision air power has been used very effectively in Afghanistan to prevent any Taliban advancement. It appears the Pakistani military is planning to use precision air power in Pakistan also given the upgrades to the air fields noted above. Al Qaeda however believes that any large scale operation it launches would fracture Pakistan.

"We assess that any large-scale operation would break the army and Pakistan, and this would be a blessing for us. Of course, the Indians would take advantage of the situation and that's why we have a plan to immediately spread this war to the whole region, including India and Afghanistan," Abu Haris explains, basing his arguments on information from al-Qaeda's intelligence and review committee.

While this is certainly a possibility, Musharraf's multi-pronged strategy takes into account the current fragile nature in Pakistan. He and US forces will be able to contain Al Qaeda in North and South Waziristan, destroy training camps in the future using precision air power, and maintain the flow of supplies through the Khyber Pass.

Mr. Shahzad notes Al Qaeda is aware of future Pakistan and US forces intentions, but Al Qaeda has a plan to strike first. While valiant, this tactic from Al Qaeda will mark its death. While Pakitanis overwhelminingly do not want the US to interfere in their country, they also overwhelmingly do not want Al Qaeda to persist in Pakistan either. As Al Qaeda forces move into the cities, they are spreading fear and panic among the population. While Pakistanis have a certain mistrust for the Armed Forces in their country, they trust Al Qaeda much less.

If Musharraf can ensure the Army secures free and fair elections, support for the Army will be greatly enhanced. Al Qaeda will shortly attack after free and fair elections which will result in Pakistani's favoring an Army presence in their cites to secure them. In turn, Pakistani air power will strike with precision at the heart of Al Qaeda camps in North and South Waziristan. Al Qaeda will have nowhere to retreat as the main border crossings in these regions have been closed by US forces in Afghanistan. Bringing India into the battle will only seal another Al Qaeda avenue of retreat.

It is no wonder that Mullah Omar is paniced that Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban are choosing to do battle in Pakistan and has subsequently sacked Meshud. Continued battle in Afghanistan is at least hopeful as NATO countries are reconsidering their presence in this region. However, a 600,000 man Pakistani Army in their unassailable base supported by precision air power and US intelligence will spell the death of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan.

However, at this point Al Qaeda can do nothing else but attack knowing well that a large-scale operation in Pakistan will spell its ultimate destruction. This very fact is why Al Qaeda's tactical focus in Pakistan is defensive (countering NATO actions) while it is pretending to be offensive (large-scale operation in Pakistan).