Pressure on Sadr and the Iranian-backed Special Groups continues

From Bill Roggio at The Long War Journal.

As previously reported at The Long War Journal, US and Iraqi forces have stepped up operations against the Iranian-backed and Mahdi Army-linked Special Groups terror cells. The increase in activity comes as Muqtada al Sadr is deliberating the reinstatement or cancellation of the self-imposed cease-fire.

Mr. Roggio has an excellent analysis of current Iraqi and US forces actions on Mahdi Army linked Special Groups.

Several of the press releases ended with the standard warning to Sadr and his Mahdi Army. "We will continue to disrupt the networks of those who choose not to obey al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire pledge. ... The people of Iraq have made it clear that they will not tolerate the criminal activities of these splinter groups." The US military is warning Sadr that ending the cease-fire will result in operations designed to dismantle the Mahdi Army. (emphasis added)

Mr. Roggio points out Sadr is in a Catch-22.

Sadr's decision to either continue or end the cease-fire has serious implications for his political movement. Ending the ceasefire puts him in the crosshairs of the US and Iraqi military, and expose the depth or shallowness of his support in the Shia community.... But extending the ceasefire may further erode Sadr's power within his political movement and the Mahdi Army.

In turn, the Iraqi and US government is not only using threat of military action and information operations against Sadr, but also beginning legal action.

The Iraqi government is also applying legal pressure on Sadr. The government will begin the trial of former Deputy Health Minister Hakim al Zamili and Brigadier General Hameed al Shimmari, who served as the chief of the ministry's security forces.

For a full read, click here.

One fact not mentioned by Mr. Roggio, but is worth noting is he cites ten recent actions against the Madhi Army (including the trial). Six of these ten incidents involved Iraqis policing their own. In only four of the incidents were US forces involved. The majority involved Iraqi government forces against Mahdi Army forces. As noted before, Iraqi forces and the government have come a long way. The Iraqi government is not ineffectual. Nor are the Iraqi Security Forces. The Surge has allowed both the government and Iraqi forces the room to grow, which was its intent.

In turn, Maliki joined forces with Sunni and Kurdish forces on 26 December 2007 when these parties signed the "memorandum of understanding". This signing allowed Maliki to reduce the influence of Sadr and paved way for national reconciliation with Ba'athist that shortly followed, recent budget resolutions, provincial elections slated for October 2008.

The Iraqi Government is coming into its own. It is becoming a vibrant democracy.