Implications of the New Kurdish-Sunni Alliance for Security in Iraq’s Ninawa Governorate

Ramzy Mardini, writing for The Jamestown Foundation, discusses the ramification for Iraq regarding the recent "memorandum of understanding" first reported in this blog on 26 December 2007.

As the U.S. military “surge” and the activities of Iraq’s Awakening Councils drive al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups into northern Iraq, a new and largely overlooked accord between Kurds and Sunnis could have enormous implications for the security situation in the Ninawa governorate. On December 24, the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP). Though the agreement was grossly underreported in Western media, the event may presage a gradual but significant change in Iraqi politics with great importance for the political security of Ninawa and the rest of northern Iraq: the formation of a Kurdish-Sunni alliance.

Mr. Mardini continues with,

The apparent Kurdish-Sunni alliance may have been formed to send a signal to Maliki that his power as prime minister is contingent on Kurdish participation. This is in fact what Salim Abdullah, a leader in Hashimi’s party, indicated when he suggested Sunnis and Kurds could come together to challenge Shiite preference and power (al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 26, 2007). By threatening to ally with the Sunnis and break up the four-party alliance—effectively paralyzing the central government—the Kurdish parties gain political leverage in pressuring Maliki to submit to the KRG’s demands.

Mr. Mardini notes the reason behind the Kurdish-Sunni alliance.

The accord’s announcement has come at a delicate time in Shiite-Kurdish relations. In August 2007, the KDP and PUK saved the central government from political paralysis by uniting in a four-party alliance with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party (Aswat al-Iraq, December 25, 2007). Since then, political developments have changed the alliance’s status—perhaps compelling Kurdish leaders to spearhead a strategic relationship with their Sunni Arab counterparts, thus redefining their existing rapport with the Shiite political bloc.

While I agree with his premise that the Kurdish-Sunni alliance seeks gain political leverage for both Kurds and Sunnis, I disagree with his premise that it seeks to break up the four-party alliance and challenge Shiite preference and power.

Instead, I believe Maliki is attempting lessen the government's dependence on Sadr and seeks to form a nonsectarian alliance to counter Iranian influence. Let me explain.

Between Kurds and Sunni, this alliance at most represents an pack supported by 42% of the Iraqi population, in and of itself not enough to gain a majority, but instead to become a significant minority. Adnan al-Dulaimi, whose party makes up a significant portion of the Iraq Accord Front, has recently been implicated in a string of car bombings in the Hai al-'Amil neighborhood, which weakens the political leverage of the Iraq Accord Front. In addition, the initial aims and goals which formed this coalition (namely to unify Sunni political leverage against the Shiites and U.S. forces), is no longer paramount.

Instead, what is paramount is being on the democratically elected government's side during what appears to be the upcoming U.S. victory and a wholesale defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq (and any of its supporters, like Al-Dulaimi) and other militias like the Mahdi Militia.

The United Iraqi Alliance, which Maliki's Dawa party is affiliated, is also breaking up. Again, what was once paramount to this organization, namely, anybody in charge but Sunnis, is no longer the central issue. Instead, the central issue is being on the winning side in Iraqi's civil turmoil. Maliki owes his leadership position to Sadr, whose 30 votes for Maliki effectively soldified his power, but prevented Hakim from becoming Prime Minister. Maliki is attempting to ensure his position is no longer beholden to Sadr.

This Kurdish-Sunni alliance (without Al-Dulaimi's party) allied with the Dawa party of Maliki; however, represents a majority. The key here is this majority would not be beholdened to Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, or the Badr Corps. This fact is something that cannot be said of current political affiliations. In addition, this new alliance would allow Maliki to replace ministers who are tainted by the past insurgency, regardless of affiliation (Sunni or Shiite), and are effectively stalling political progress in Iraq at the national level.

With provincial and general elections coming up this year and next year respectively, this new alliance can enter into elections with an insurgency defeated, several reconciliation laws passed, and without alliance to insurgents or militias.

Maliki's recent reversal on allowing Sunni CLC personnel to join the security forces is a concession he needs to give to Sunnis to become part of this alliance.

What is important is these three diverse groups are forming an alliance not only for their own political survival and leverage, but for the unity and survival of Iraq in general. In addition, this future alliance will not be beholdened to current militias, insurgent groups, or Iran which is plaguing current alliances. This alliance must compromise to get anything accomplished, whether it be an oil law, national reconciliation, or Iraqi federalism. Finally, these parties will undoubtedly have to rule with secularly since such diverse religious affliliations would never agree on religious decrees.

The formation of a Sunni-Kurdi-Maliki alliance would move the Iraqi political process forward and lessen the impact of militia and nonsecular forces in the government allowing Iraq to move forward as a secular democracy.

For a full read of The Jamestown Foundation article, click here.