General sees more Iraqi security forces

From Yahoo/AP.

A senior military commander told a House panel on Thursday that Iraq's security forces are on track to add another 80,000 personnel by the end of the year, putting them well within reach of their goal of more than 600,000. He said the forces are still a long way from becoming self-sufficient.

The reason most units are not self-sufficient is they cannot support themselves, do not have engineers, or indirect fire units. The Iraqi government and US forces focused on combat troops first and foremost because we can support Iraqi troops with these other items. However, this year, Iraqi forces will begin to add this capacity. What is important right now is can they take the fight to Al Qaeda? According to LTG Odierno,

"In terms of them being able to fight, they've really increased their capacity to do that."

But, as the Anne Flaherty reports,

Still, the burgeoning force remains plagued by numerous issues, including a large absentee rate with 23 percent gone at any one point. Also, the Iraqi army lacks enough midlevel officers needed to lead units. Equipment and infrastructure also are lacking, particularly a logistics system that can sustain combat units with such necessities as food and fuel.

Let's attack these one by one.

1. Twenty-three percent gone (on leave) at any one point. In the American Army we get one month leave per year, or eight percent. So Iraqis are triple our numbers. Two items are worth mentioning here. One, we get to go home after a year, reconstitute, retrain, and go back after say one year off. That is equivalent to about a 58% absentee rate. Iraqi forces continue to fight year after year after year. Their absentee rate is 23%. In addition, to account for this absentee rate, Iraqi Security Forces are filling their ranks to 120%. Therefore, most units will be manned at 97%, on average (and that is taking into account that the 23% absentee rate is accurate). So, actually their annual absentee rate will become 3% down from 23% but still significantly less than the US forces absentee rate of 58% on average.

2. Mid level officer shortage. The Iraqi government just passed the Accountability and Justice Law which has the potential to bring in several mid level officers. The US forces are not much better with regards to mid level officer shortages. We too have significant shortages in this range especially as we are expanding our forces.

3. Logistics, equipment, and infrastructure lacking. Again, the focus was on combat units. We can resupply Iraqi forces, we can house Iraqi forces. Over time, they will get new equipment. Another way to look at this is prior to Desert Storm, Iraq was the fourth largest Army with 4000 tanks. After Desert Strom they had 2000 tanks, many of which had significant mechanical problems. After OIF, they had about zero. It took Saddam 20 years to go from zero to 4000. It will take a little time to rebuild the equipment capacity.

But I go back to what LTG Odierno stated,

"In terms of them being able to fight, they've really increased their capacity to do that."

This is what is key. We can supply them beans and bullets (food and ammo). We can assist with mid level officer shortages with MTT (pronounced mitt) teams. Their absentee rate is better than our vacancy rate, and they have a plan in 2008 to fix their absentee rate.

Iraqi forces are now proficient at their combat mission, to close with and destroy the enemy. Are they as proficient as US forces? Heck, I should hope not. Are they more proficient than Al Qaeda forces, clearly. Did we totally destroy and disband their Army infrastructure almost five years ago? Yes, we did. And in five short years, they have become a tactically proficient force. Are they technically proficient? Not yet, but they are getting there.

Were we a tactically and technically proficient force during our Revolution? Heck no. But over time, we got better. And during the revolution, our proficiency was good enough. Right now, during Iraq's revolution, their proficiency is good enough.

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