The War on Terror Comes to Pakistan

Ray Robinson, writing for the American Thinker, has another take on the assassination of Bhutto,

After the US liberation of Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban and its al Qaeda affiliates emulated the Viet Cong in the 60's, and based their operations in the security of a neighboring country. In this instance, Pakistan assumed the role that Cambodia once served, as a sovereign haven from attack. Their ability to relocate into Pakistan and turn a perceived defeat in Afghanistan into an advantage so quickly suggests to some, including me, that al Qaeda had already planned this in response to the reprisals sure to come after the 9/11 attacks. Such a strategy plays against the predictable American reluctance to expand a war.

Mr. Robinson notes that the War on Terror already came to Pakistan prior to Bhutto's assassination with an internal split among the Taliban.

The conditions that led to this change have been reported here but nearly nowhere else in the U.S. The coalition forces have managed to split al Qaeda from a politically important Islamic militant leader in Pakistan. That man leads the Pakistan portion of the Taliban; he helped to create it in the 90's. Pitting him against al Qaeda has split the Taliban. Since Al Qaeda has lost in Iraq, its leadership has reckoned they have nowhere else to go if they lose the support of the Taliban. With the Taliban split jeopardizing its' support base, al Qaeda has been forced into a position of attempting a hostile takeover of the Taliban, supporting young leaders to overthrow the old leaders who are allied with the Pakistan-based leadership.

In explaining the reason for Musharraf's emergency rule, he notes,

Musharraf, though certainly stepping on a lot of toes with his emergency declaration, has used this time to redeploy his forces, which were stagnant on the border with India, into combat. For the first time, he is sending large scale maneuver forces backed by artillery, tanks, and air support into regions controlled by al Qaeda and the sympathetic Taliban. His forces have reportedly driven the Taliban and al Qaeda forces of Maulana Fazlullah into the hills. The Pakistani military has even followed these terrorists into the administered areas which Musharraf effectively turned over to the Taliban over a year ago.

The reason that Al Qaeda is now attacking in Pakistan is that their base is under attack; first from the internal Taliban split and secondly from the Pakistan Army's redeployment during emergency rule from the border of India to the western tribal areas.

This is an indication that al Qaeda is desperate, has redirected forces once meant for Iraq and is willing to crush the same people who have hosted them in Pakistan. In effect, they are doing the same thing in Pakistan that led to their defeat in Iraq. Only this time, they have no other strong support base to fall back to if they lose the Pakistan tribal regions.

To support his claim that Al Qaeda is attempting a hostile take over of the older Taliban with younger commanders, he notes,

The most critical indicator is that the MMA, the extremely militant Islamic party that opposes Musharraf, has remained mute as the army has slaughtered its Taliban and al Qaeda brethren.

Finally, he notes Bhutto's assassination may well be like Al Qaeda's attack on the Golden Mosque.

The assasination of Benazir Bhutto may well be one last attempt to get the Pakistanis fighting among themselves, much as the attack on the Golden Dome temporarily set Shia against Sunni in Iraq. May this attempt at stirring up trouble fail even faster.

However, while almost bringing Iraq to a full fledged civil war, this tactic failed as Al Qaeda lost active and tacit support from the populous. They lost tacit support from the Iraq population in general and later active support from Sunni tribes as they attempted to co-op these tribes under the Al Qaeda in Iraq banner.

In Pakistan too, Al Qaeda is attempting to co-op the Taliban under the larger Al Qaeda banner. In Pakistan too, Al Qaeda has struck at a symbol, this time Bhutto, which had the same significance to Pakistani's as the Golden Dome did to all Shias and many Sunnis.

However, this time, attacks against Al Qaeda will occur at its base which up to now has ben unassailable. The first thing an insurgency needs is an unassailable base. Al Qaeda has potentially brought the battle directly to its base. We will see if it is unassailable.