Is Al Qaeda in Iraq Defeated, Temporarily Laying Low, or just executing it Global Strategy
The Jamestown Foundation has an excellent article about Islamic Army in Iraq's (IAI) current status in an article entitled Al-Qaeda Adapts its Methods in Iraq as Part of a Global Strategy. Specifically this areticle asks the question, Al Qaeda in Iraq defeated, retreating or is this part of their grand strategy. The answer to this question is what many military intelligence personnel are focusing much of their analysis on to answer.
If we believe the dataset coming out of Iraq in which attacks are down 60, 70, and in some cases 80%, one would come to the conclusion that Al Qaeda in Iraq is defeated. Part of General Petreous' counter-insurgency strategy involves making Al Qaeda depart their safe havens permanently. Specifically, routing and reducing Al Qaeda's influence and numbers as they move from place to place to attempt to stay alive.
But if an insurgency is to survive in a country, it needs two things. First and foremost, it must have tacit support of the population. Secondly, it must have external agencies or government which is supplying it the means to continue the fight.
As we examine whether or not Al Qaeda still enjoys tacit support of the population, the article points out that,
The Awakening movements (now about 80,000 strong) are clearly not providing tacit support of Al Qaeda. In addition, these once Sunni only movements are now beginning to also have Shi'ite participation. In fact, many Awakening groups are a mix of Sunni and Shia. But the question still remains is Al Qaeda laying low, waiting out The Surge of American forces? The article points out that this may be Al Qaeda's adaptation to The Surge. Specifically, it states that this setback may be part of Al Qaeda's Seven Point Global Strategy.
We are currently in Al Qaeda's Resurrection phase in which it will be capable of
While forces are growing in intensity (and possibly number) in Pakistan and possibly Afghanistan, I do not see this occuring in Iraq, which Al Qaeda established as the central front to their war. In fact, given the mistake above (attacking Shi'ite shrines) and Zarqawi's declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq out of sequence, I would conjecture, that Al Qaeda put the cart before the horse when it comes to Iraq.
While still getting support from external agencies, Al Qaeda in Iraq does not enjoy the tacit support of the population in Iraq. In fact, Al Qaeda is the scorn of many Sunni Iraqi's as they were always the scorn of Shias.
Finally, tactical retreats do not come from positions of strength. And it not defeated, Al Qaeda in Iraq is definitely at least in a tactical retreat. But, they are being pushed North into Mosul and Kurdish territory. While they can count on support in Mosul, they are also much closer to Kurdish Peshmurga, who definitely do not enjoy their beliefs.
Al Qaeda has lost its central front, namely Iraq. However, they are also surging quite successfully in Pakistan, and to a lessor extent in Afghanistan.
The war is not over, but the battle of Iraq will not go to Al Qaeda.
If we believe the dataset coming out of Iraq in which attacks are down 60, 70, and in some cases 80%, one would come to the conclusion that Al Qaeda in Iraq is defeated. Part of General Petreous' counter-insurgency strategy involves making Al Qaeda depart their safe havens permanently. Specifically, routing and reducing Al Qaeda's influence and numbers as they move from place to place to attempt to stay alive.
But if an insurgency is to survive in a country, it needs two things. First and foremost, it must have tacit support of the population. Secondly, it must have external agencies or government which is supplying it the means to continue the fight.
As we examine whether or not Al Qaeda still enjoys tacit support of the population, the article points out that,
Al-Qaeda did not understand the Iraqi mentality and tried to lead the community by establishing the Islamic State of Iraq, instead of coexisting with the different Iraqi groups. The targeting of Shiites and their shrines aggravated the Sunnis Iraqis as much as it did the Shiites because it upset the precarious balance between the Sunnis and Shiites. These blunders were exploited by the Iraqi government and Coalition forces, leading to the establishment of the successful Sunni Majalis al-Sahwa, or “Awakening Councils” |
1. The Awakening (2000-2003) 2. Eye Opening (2003-2006) 3. Resurrection (2007-2010) 4. Recuperate and Attain Power (2010-2013) 5. Declaration of an Islamic state (2013-2016) 6. Massive Confrontation - 2016 7. Achieving Multiple Victories |
mobilizing jihadis productively, exploiting unrest in different hot areas to keep the U.S. forces occupied in a war of attrition that will weaken its resolve and pave the way to directly attack Jews in Palestine and elsewhere. |
While still getting support from external agencies, Al Qaeda in Iraq does not enjoy the tacit support of the population in Iraq. In fact, Al Qaeda is the scorn of many Sunni Iraqi's as they were always the scorn of Shias.
Finally, tactical retreats do not come from positions of strength. And it not defeated, Al Qaeda in Iraq is definitely at least in a tactical retreat. But, they are being pushed North into Mosul and Kurdish territory. While they can count on support in Mosul, they are also much closer to Kurdish Peshmurga, who definitely do not enjoy their beliefs.
Al Qaeda has lost its central front, namely Iraq. However, they are also surging quite successfully in Pakistan, and to a lessor extent in Afghanistan.
The war is not over, but the battle of Iraq will not go to Al Qaeda.
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