To Resolve An Insurgency - Part I
A basic Insurgency Cycle has developed now that we have seen a few instances of extreme Islamists (whether Sunni or Shia) forming a government in a region or state. These fundamentals have been observed in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, and the tribal areas of Pakistan recently. They have also been observed in less modern times, but the focus here is on current day Islamists.
1. Islamists move into countries/areas which have weak central governments and are not providing basic services (sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash (SWEAT)) for their citizens.
2. To gain control, they use clan/tribal leadership to establish legitimacy and provide basic services to citizens.
3. Once established, they bring in the clan/tribal leadership in a country/area make them stakeholders of a stronger central government/entity.
4. Once in control, they begin to severely restrict basic freedoms such as ownership of weapons, mass media, free speech, learning, music, etc.
5. They lose the popular support of people, but they are able to maintain their control/power through clan/tribal sponsorship, fear, coercion, and targeted assassinations.
6. Their basis of power is sustained by foreign governments which provide them arms, monies, and logistical support to maintain support of clan/tribal sponsorship.
7. Without external involvement, they persist and continue to oppress their people. However, they are quickly routed once engaged in battle against an organized Army. They do not engage organized Army's in traditional battle and retain their forces for later actions.
8. Once routed in battle, they resort to guerilla tactics, IEDs, and suicide bombings to promote insecurity and to delegitimize the current government.
9. The most important things to execute once Islamists are defeated is to establish and maintain security and establish law & order quickly.
10. If the citizens' basic security needs (SWEAT) are not met and the population is not employed, they will sit on the fence, providing tacit support for the Islamists, while an insurgency builds and grows stronger.
11. If the government/attacker is unable to maintain security, provide basic services, and employment for its citizens, support for the insurgency will blossom and gain favor.
12. The cycle begins again at number 1.
Now that we have the cycle for how Islamists gain control of country/region, the question becomes, how can we interrupt this cycle?
I will answer this question in Part II.
1. Islamists move into countries/areas which have weak central governments and are not providing basic services (sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash (SWEAT)) for their citizens.
2. To gain control, they use clan/tribal leadership to establish legitimacy and provide basic services to citizens.
3. Once established, they bring in the clan/tribal leadership in a country/area make them stakeholders of a stronger central government/entity.
4. Once in control, they begin to severely restrict basic freedoms such as ownership of weapons, mass media, free speech, learning, music, etc.
5. They lose the popular support of people, but they are able to maintain their control/power through clan/tribal sponsorship, fear, coercion, and targeted assassinations.
6. Their basis of power is sustained by foreign governments which provide them arms, monies, and logistical support to maintain support of clan/tribal sponsorship.
7. Without external involvement, they persist and continue to oppress their people. However, they are quickly routed once engaged in battle against an organized Army. They do not engage organized Army's in traditional battle and retain their forces for later actions.
8. Once routed in battle, they resort to guerilla tactics, IEDs, and suicide bombings to promote insecurity and to delegitimize the current government.
9. The most important things to execute once Islamists are defeated is to establish and maintain security and establish law & order quickly.
10. If the citizens' basic security needs (SWEAT) are not met and the population is not employed, they will sit on the fence, providing tacit support for the Islamists, while an insurgency builds and grows stronger.
11. If the government/attacker is unable to maintain security, provide basic services, and employment for its citizens, support for the insurgency will blossom and gain favor.
12. The cycle begins again at number 1.
Now that we have the cycle for how Islamists gain control of country/region, the question becomes, how can we interrupt this cycle?
I will answer this question in Part II.
posted by Lieutenant Colonel Caveman at Thursday, December 28, 2006
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