Iraq's Jordanian Jihadis
Nir Rosen has written an excellent analysis of Zarqawi, other Salafis jihadis, and the current situation in Iraq for the New York Times. While focusing on Zarqawi and the insurgency in Iraq, it sheds light on the beliefs of Salafism and contrasts Bin Laden's actions with Zarqawi's. It also sheds light on how Al Qaeda has faired in reaching its overaching objectives.
Nir Rosen offers an excellent summarization of Salafism.
"Many of these rootless and unwanted believers found a spiritual and political home in a type of Islam called Salafism. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Salafism emphasizes the rootlessness of faith. It despises local saints and mystical practices (like those of Sufism) and any other departures from the most rigid Sunnism. It despises Shiites. It commonly despises all other sects or practices that Salafis might consider "bida," or "innovation." Given this intense preoccupation with purity, Salafis are constantly trying to identify and expel the impure. This is called "takfir," often translated as "excommunication": an old, disused term that has found new life in Salafism, which permits, even encourages, the killing of Muslims whom Salafis have expelled through takfir. Perhaps the most ferocious embodiment of takfiri Salafism today is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."
Of particular note is the fact that while both Bin Laden and Zarqawi are both Salafis in practice, they fundamentally disagree with how to wage jihad against infidels.
"A critical dispute was over whom to attack: Zarqawi criticized Osama bin Laden for not calling Arab governments infidels and attacking them. For Zarqawi, the "near enemy" was the priority, while for bin Laden the "far enemy" was. This has been perhaps the most critical dispute within violent, extremist Sunni Islam."
Bin Laden felt that by focusing on the far enemy, namely the United States, Israel, Europe, and Russia, he could build a coalition among the diverse and often disagreeable jihad factions. Bin Laden believed this external focus would unite warring factions while allowing breathing room within the Middle East for the Salafis movement to grow. Zarqawi, on the other hand, wanted to focus his jihad efforts against Muslim governments in the Middle East. It is easy to understand how this seemingly minute difference in strategies would cause such a significant rift within jihadis camps. With the US invasion into Iraq, Zarqawi was now able to fight the "near enemy" he had always wanted to fight while falling inline with Al Qaeda's broader stategy of focusing on the "far enemy". Hence, the formal acceptance of Zarqawi's insurgency under the Al Qaeda umbrella, now called Al Qaeda in Iraq. Both parties now not only had a common enemy, but saw the Iraqi insurgency as the same means to the same end. Nir Rosen points out that,
"With Hussein removed from power in April 2003, Zarqawi had a new failed state to operate in. And the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent American occupation presented the perfect opportunity to heal the rift within Muslim extremism: the far enemy had made itself the near enemy as well."
While some may feel this statement vindicates their belief that the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq strengthed Al Qaeda by unifying these diverse jihadis groups against a now common enemy, a more detailed look will demonstrate just the opposite. Al Qaeda became a global terrorist organization able to execute global attacks by Bin Laden's ability to loosely unify diverse terrorist organization's strategies and attacks. While not in total agreement with Taliban-style rule in Afghanistan, it did give Bin Laden the "breathing room" he needed to develop, train, and export terrorists and terrorism to western democracies.
Al Qaeda had four main objectives prior to and since 11 September 2001.
However, Bin Laden did not get the reaction he had hoped for. Instead of cowering with its tail between it legs, the US destroyed his haven in Afghanistan and forced him to hide in caves. His influence in Saudi Arabia was greatly diminished as the Wallabi could no longer openingly and actively pursue his oblectives. His funding has been significantly curtailed as visibility of terrorist charities has grown. Pakistan Salafis training, while still ongoing, is greatly reduced. Iraq is now a young democracy that is actively fighting against Salafism and its use as a future capital for the caliphate. Lebanon was able to rid itself of the Syrian military and is now actively ridding itself of Syrian influence. Jordan security forces and the population as a whole are beginning to crack down on fanatics to prevent other hotel bombings that recently rocked their country.
Bin Laden has been forced to establish ties with regimes that his Salafis tendencies would otherwise prevent him from collaborating with, namely the Shia dominated Iran and mostly secular Syria. A little over four years after his spectacular attack to achieve his first objective of ridding the Muslim world of American influence, Bin Laden is now further away from that goal and having to link up with regimes who are on his list to get rid of as he pursues his second objective. It has always been said that politics breeds strange bedfellows, but Bin Laden cannot see these two unlikely alliances as a step forward in pursuit of his final objective to expand the Muslim empire to its historical significance.
As much as several Middle East leaders fear what democracy will bring to their regimes as Iraq continues to glow and florish, they also are equally apprehensive about the US pulling out of Iraq. As Nir Rosen points out,
"Where will this quiet but constant low-grade jihadi mobilization lead? If the American invasion of Iraq called forth a jihadi response, American withdrawal might likewise lead many men to put their rifles away and go back to selling cars, nuts and mobile phones. At the same time, the withdrawal of the far enemy may leave jihadis with the feeling that they should return to battling the near enemies: their own governments and the multitude of other infidels, including Shiite infidels."
So, over four years later, we have the current situation. Al Qaeda is no closer to its first objective, in fact further away from it now than in the last decade. Al Qaeda is forming an alliance with Zarqawi, who does not agree with its stategic goals, hoping to still somehow salvage its first objective. Al Qaeda is forming alliances with regimes (Iran and Syria) against its Salafis tendencies and second objective in order to regain some influence in the Middle East and possibly regain its once global ability to act (Iran with nuclear weapons). Monies to fund terrorism is significantly reduced and under greater scutiny.
Autocratic regimes allowing (if not pursuing) unrest in Iraq to ensure the Salafis jihadis do not focus efforts on their own countries. Iraq, the beacon of light in the Middle East, is continuing to florish and grow stronger economically than other Middle Eastern countries despite the efforts of a deadly insurgency. Neighboring Muslims are now seeing firsthand what a caliphate would bring to their already limited livelihood and personal freedoms. A newly, free Lebanon is attempting to expel terrorists from their country so they too can florish like Iraq. The entire world is concerned over what a freely elected terrorist organization, Hamas, will do with new found political power. Al Qaeda will find it hard to supplement the possible monetary loss of up to $1 billion in aid to its major terrorists activity (the Palestinians) to accomplish its third objective-the desturction of Israel. The continued defiance of Hamas is causing an unwilling UN and other Middle East countries to side with Israel. One can only hope that it will continue its radical agenda. It is doing more benefit than harm.
This is just in the Middle East. Also Europe is beginning to awaken to the fact that demographics will spell their doom in the next generation as Muslims become a larger percentage, if not majority, of the population. Terrorist attacks, to include the riots in Paris, point gravely to their future. Raging Muslim radicals overreacting to rather timid cartoons of Mohammad only further distress Europeans. The fact that several large newspapers actually stood up to republish these cartoons point to the underlying uneasiness of everyday Europeans. Europeans, who thought with the fall of the Soviet Union their children would grow up without nuclear terror, now have a state sponsor of terror actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Even France, of all European nations, recently stated any attack on its soil or its sphere of influence may be met with nuclear retaliation.
For all the anti-American propaganda spewed from several countries regarding the US invasion of Iraq, America once again led the way to uphold freedom and democracy, not only in the countries that were invaded, but also in many weak democracticies in Europe and reluctant Middle Eastern countries. The Euporean democracies are now stronger from the spilled blood of American and British Soldiers, even though they could not bring themselves to spill their own blood. Soon, the Middle Eastern countries too will reap democracy's benefits even though many of them are spilling blood for the wrong side.
I am often fascinated by the old adage, "You can bring a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink." In this case, Europe and the Middle East, are like the horse that needs water to survive but are reluctantly drinking in freedom and democracy thanks to America. It is almost apocalyptic.
Nir Rosen offers an excellent summarization of Salafism.
"Many of these rootless and unwanted believers found a spiritual and political home in a type of Islam called Salafism. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Salafism emphasizes the rootlessness of faith. It despises local saints and mystical practices (like those of Sufism) and any other departures from the most rigid Sunnism. It despises Shiites. It commonly despises all other sects or practices that Salafis might consider "bida," or "innovation." Given this intense preoccupation with purity, Salafis are constantly trying to identify and expel the impure. This is called "takfir," often translated as "excommunication": an old, disused term that has found new life in Salafism, which permits, even encourages, the killing of Muslims whom Salafis have expelled through takfir. Perhaps the most ferocious embodiment of takfiri Salafism today is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."
Of particular note is the fact that while both Bin Laden and Zarqawi are both Salafis in practice, they fundamentally disagree with how to wage jihad against infidels.
"A critical dispute was over whom to attack: Zarqawi criticized Osama bin Laden for not calling Arab governments infidels and attacking them. For Zarqawi, the "near enemy" was the priority, while for bin Laden the "far enemy" was. This has been perhaps the most critical dispute within violent, extremist Sunni Islam."
Bin Laden felt that by focusing on the far enemy, namely the United States, Israel, Europe, and Russia, he could build a coalition among the diverse and often disagreeable jihad factions. Bin Laden believed this external focus would unite warring factions while allowing breathing room within the Middle East for the Salafis movement to grow. Zarqawi, on the other hand, wanted to focus his jihad efforts against Muslim governments in the Middle East. It is easy to understand how this seemingly minute difference in strategies would cause such a significant rift within jihadis camps. With the US invasion into Iraq, Zarqawi was now able to fight the "near enemy" he had always wanted to fight while falling inline with Al Qaeda's broader stategy of focusing on the "far enemy". Hence, the formal acceptance of Zarqawi's insurgency under the Al Qaeda umbrella, now called Al Qaeda in Iraq. Both parties now not only had a common enemy, but saw the Iraqi insurgency as the same means to the same end. Nir Rosen points out that,
"With Hussein removed from power in April 2003, Zarqawi had a new failed state to operate in. And the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent American occupation presented the perfect opportunity to heal the rift within Muslim extremism: the far enemy had made itself the near enemy as well."
While some may feel this statement vindicates their belief that the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq strengthed Al Qaeda by unifying these diverse jihadis groups against a now common enemy, a more detailed look will demonstrate just the opposite. Al Qaeda became a global terrorist organization able to execute global attacks by Bin Laden's ability to loosely unify diverse terrorist organization's strategies and attacks. While not in total agreement with Taliban-style rule in Afghanistan, it did give Bin Laden the "breathing room" he needed to develop, train, and export terrorists and terrorism to western democracies.
Al Qaeda had four main objectives prior to and since 11 September 2001.
- Expel Western influence from the Arabian Peninsula
- Remove secular governments within the region
- Eliminate Israel and purge Jewish and Christian influence
- Expand the Muslim empire to historical significance
However, Bin Laden did not get the reaction he had hoped for. Instead of cowering with its tail between it legs, the US destroyed his haven in Afghanistan and forced him to hide in caves. His influence in Saudi Arabia was greatly diminished as the Wallabi could no longer openingly and actively pursue his oblectives. His funding has been significantly curtailed as visibility of terrorist charities has grown. Pakistan Salafis training, while still ongoing, is greatly reduced. Iraq is now a young democracy that is actively fighting against Salafism and its use as a future capital for the caliphate. Lebanon was able to rid itself of the Syrian military and is now actively ridding itself of Syrian influence. Jordan security forces and the population as a whole are beginning to crack down on fanatics to prevent other hotel bombings that recently rocked their country.
Bin Laden has been forced to establish ties with regimes that his Salafis tendencies would otherwise prevent him from collaborating with, namely the Shia dominated Iran and mostly secular Syria. A little over four years after his spectacular attack to achieve his first objective of ridding the Muslim world of American influence, Bin Laden is now further away from that goal and having to link up with regimes who are on his list to get rid of as he pursues his second objective. It has always been said that politics breeds strange bedfellows, but Bin Laden cannot see these two unlikely alliances as a step forward in pursuit of his final objective to expand the Muslim empire to its historical significance.
As much as several Middle East leaders fear what democracy will bring to their regimes as Iraq continues to glow and florish, they also are equally apprehensive about the US pulling out of Iraq. As Nir Rosen points out,
"Where will this quiet but constant low-grade jihadi mobilization lead? If the American invasion of Iraq called forth a jihadi response, American withdrawal might likewise lead many men to put their rifles away and go back to selling cars, nuts and mobile phones. At the same time, the withdrawal of the far enemy may leave jihadis with the feeling that they should return to battling the near enemies: their own governments and the multitude of other infidels, including Shiite infidels."
So, over four years later, we have the current situation. Al Qaeda is no closer to its first objective, in fact further away from it now than in the last decade. Al Qaeda is forming an alliance with Zarqawi, who does not agree with its stategic goals, hoping to still somehow salvage its first objective. Al Qaeda is forming alliances with regimes (Iran and Syria) against its Salafis tendencies and second objective in order to regain some influence in the Middle East and possibly regain its once global ability to act (Iran with nuclear weapons). Monies to fund terrorism is significantly reduced and under greater scutiny.
Autocratic regimes allowing (if not pursuing) unrest in Iraq to ensure the Salafis jihadis do not focus efforts on their own countries. Iraq, the beacon of light in the Middle East, is continuing to florish and grow stronger economically than other Middle Eastern countries despite the efforts of a deadly insurgency. Neighboring Muslims are now seeing firsthand what a caliphate would bring to their already limited livelihood and personal freedoms. A newly, free Lebanon is attempting to expel terrorists from their country so they too can florish like Iraq. The entire world is concerned over what a freely elected terrorist organization, Hamas, will do with new found political power. Al Qaeda will find it hard to supplement the possible monetary loss of up to $1 billion in aid to its major terrorists activity (the Palestinians) to accomplish its third objective-the desturction of Israel. The continued defiance of Hamas is causing an unwilling UN and other Middle East countries to side with Israel. One can only hope that it will continue its radical agenda. It is doing more benefit than harm.
This is just in the Middle East. Also Europe is beginning to awaken to the fact that demographics will spell their doom in the next generation as Muslims become a larger percentage, if not majority, of the population. Terrorist attacks, to include the riots in Paris, point gravely to their future. Raging Muslim radicals overreacting to rather timid cartoons of Mohammad only further distress Europeans. The fact that several large newspapers actually stood up to republish these cartoons point to the underlying uneasiness of everyday Europeans. Europeans, who thought with the fall of the Soviet Union their children would grow up without nuclear terror, now have a state sponsor of terror actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Even France, of all European nations, recently stated any attack on its soil or its sphere of influence may be met with nuclear retaliation.
For all the anti-American propaganda spewed from several countries regarding the US invasion of Iraq, America once again led the way to uphold freedom and democracy, not only in the countries that were invaded, but also in many weak democracticies in Europe and reluctant Middle Eastern countries. The Euporean democracies are now stronger from the spilled blood of American and British Soldiers, even though they could not bring themselves to spill their own blood. Soon, the Middle Eastern countries too will reap democracy's benefits even though many of them are spilling blood for the wrong side.
I am often fascinated by the old adage, "You can bring a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink." In this case, Europe and the Middle East, are like the horse that needs water to survive but are reluctantly drinking in freedom and democracy thanks to America. It is almost apocalyptic.
posted by Lieutenant Colonel Caveman at Sunday, February 19, 2006
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